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Abbreviations of party names 
 
Bulgarian parties: 
BBB  Bulgarian Business Bloc        
BSP   Bulgarian Socialist Party          
BZNS-DP Popular Union of Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Democratic Party  
DPS   Movement for Rights and Freedoms        
NMS   National Movement for Simeon IInd 
ONS   Alliance of National Salvation      
SDS  Union of Democratic Forces/Alliance of Democratic Forces  
   
Romanian parties:   
CDR   Democratic Convention of Romania        
FDSN   Democratic National Salvation Front      
FSN   National Salvation Front  
PDSR   Romanian Party of Social Democracy   
PNL   National Liberal Party  
PRM  Greater Romania Party    
PUNR  Party of Romanian National Unity  
UMDR  Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania     
USD   Social Democratic Union  
 
Hungarian parties: 
FIDESZ  Alliance of Young Democrats   
FIDESZ-MPP FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party    
FKGP   Independent Smallholders Party  
KDNP  Christian Democratic People`s Party  
MDF  Hungarian Democratic Forum   
MSZP  Hungarian Socialist Party  
MSZMP  Hungarian Socialist Workers` Party   
SZDSZ Alliance of Free Democrats  
MIEP   Party of Hungarian Life and Justice  
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Introduction 
 
The following paragraph about party systems in Central and Eastern Europe sums up much of 
the main problem in the following pages: 
 
[Party systems] respond more to elite-level changes in configurations of alliances than 
to shifts in the electoral ‘base’, and in many states individual politicians rather than 
political parties constitute the basic building blocks of politics. Yet this does not 
necessarily imply that political competition in post-Communist Europe lacks the 
structure we generally ascribe to Western party configurations; it simply suggests that 
such structures do not reside where we most often look for it – in stable patterns of 
electoral competition between institutionalised political organisations. The challenge 
for students of post-communist politics is to discover just how these systems do work 
and where their regularities lie (Birch 2001:13). 
 
Without necessarily sharing Birch`s view on party systems, this thesis will attempt to find 
such structures and regularities by focusing on cleavages and the distinction between 
horizontal and vertical voter alignment. Under the assumption that structured voter alignments 
are important for the development of stable party systems, expected cleavages will be used as 
explanatory variables for voting behaviour in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in their first 
four post-communist parliamentary elections.1 This will be tested by logistic regression 
models, thus giving the thesis a solid quantitative foundation. The cleavage patterns that are 
identified in this part of the analysis will then be used in an attempt to explain the party 
systems in the three countries.  
 
The scope and extension of the thesis makes it sensible to limit the selection of countries.  
Despite their geographical proximity, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have different 
historical backgrounds, ethnic and religious compositions, as well as different economic 
profiles. There were also significant differences in their respective experiences with 
communist rule and transition to democracy. The party systems in the three countries differ 
from each other, both in terms of stability, level of fragmentation and structure of 
                                                 
1 Later elections are not included because data where not available when the work with this thesis commenced in 
August 2004.  Also, the 1990 election to the Grand National Assembly in Bulgaria is excluded, making the 
parliamentary election in 1991 the starting point for this country. 
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competition. These factors should allow for considerable variation on both the independent 
and dependent variables, and make for suitable test cases of the hypothesis. The thesis can 
therefore be classified as a comparison of few countries, where the aim is to account for the 
differences in party systems through differences in cleavage structures (Landman 2003:29).   
 
Hypothesis  
 
The main question in this thesis is what impact cleavages have on the development of party 
systems, and more specifically, the stability of these systems in post-communist East Central 
Europe. My approach to finding regularities and stable patterns begins with the voters. We 
need to identify the variables that cause, or do not cause, voter alignment. This will be done 
by distinguishing conceptually between alignment between groups of voters, i.e. horizontal 
alignment, and alignment between voters and parties, i.e. vertical alignment. The assumption 
here is twofold: 1) That horizontal alignments exist because of cleavages, and 2) That 
horizontal voter alignment is important for the stability of the party systems even if it is not 
identifiable as steady vertical alignment to a single party over time. In other words, groups of 
voters can change behaviour coherently and still be a stabilising factor for the party systems. 
 
Hypothesis: 
H1: Cleavages are expected to have been a decisive factor for voting behaviour in 
post-communist Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
H2: Party systems that are based on cleavage structures are more stable than party 
systems that are not. 
 
 
These two expectations about the importance of cleavages in party systems are to a large 
extent based on the experiences from Western Europe as first described by Lipset and Rokkan 
in their foreword to Party Systems and Voter Alignments (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). I will not 
attempt to predict a new freezing of party systems, but I am interested in testing the 
importance of cleavages in a political environment that lacks the history of gradual 
development of civil and political rights, which Rokkan describes as passing the four 
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institutional thresholds of legitimacy, incorporation, representation and access to executive 
power (Rokkan 1970:79).   
 
This leads us to possible objections to my expectations. It has been suggested that 
communism eradicated historical structural differences in these societies with the result that 
voter preferences are not based on cleavages and therefore fluctuating greatly (Elster et.al. 
1998:131-140). Whitefield, whose approach to the topic is close to the approach in this thesis, 
sums up this notion of flattened societies  (Wessels and Klingemann 1994) well:  
 
The flattening of the social and ideological landscape was anticipated as an effect of 
the policies of the communist party state that had supposedly atomized social 
relationships, disaggregated social classes, destroyed or inhibited the formation of civil 
society, and caused citizens to retreat from the public to the private domain 
(Whitefield 2002:184).  
 
Finding empirical support for sociological background variables as stable predictors of voting 
behaviour should consequently prove very difficult if all or some of these assumptions are 
correct. Furthermore, this would also predict that, if present,  a high degree of stability in 
party systems would have to be products of other factors, like for instance institutional 
arrangements. 
 
More moderate objections to my hypothesis are also possible. It can be argued that 
sociological structures can have an impact on voting behaviour and political stability without 
necessarily being cleavages, but rather more transitional divides (Kitschelt et.al. 1999: 63).  
 
Yet another perspective is offered by Enyedi, who argues that a cleavage structure is a result 
of the interplay between political entrepreneurs, sociological structures and institutional 
arrangements (Enyedi 2005:700). This implies a different definition of the concept of 
cleavages than the one developed and applied here, but Enyedi`s perspective is interesting as 
he tries to synthesise the factors that are most relevant for the development of party systems. 
Enyedi also has a greater emphasis on the elites than I do, and thus a wider scope.  
 
It should be noted that conclusions on presence or absence of cleavages in post-communist 
Central and Eastern-Europe varies greatly from scholar to scholar. Some find that there is a 
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large number of cleavages present in Central and Eastern Europe (Berglund et.al. 2004:602), 
while others find that it is hard to identify cleavages in the region at all (Lawson et.al. 1999: 
31-33). Not surprisingly, the majority of scholars take an intermediary position. These 
variations are probably to a large extent caused by different understandings and 
operationalisations of cleavages as a concept. A thorough review of previous research would 
therefore have to account for the different scholars` use of the concept in addition to their 
conclusions.2 Rather than summing up the conclusions of other scholars, I have chosen to 
elaborate on the definition of cleavages and make reference to other findings where relevant 
throughout the text. 
 
Delimitations 
 
The conceptual limitations will be dealt with as the main concepts are defined and 
operationalised below. In particular, this applies to how the concepts of cleavages, parties, 
and party systems are treated. However, it could be useful to underline what this thesis does 
not attempt to do already at the outset.  
 
Whereas this thesis ultimately sets out to map out the importance of cleavages in the 
formation of stable party systems, I do not aim at providing the reader with a full account of 
the dynamics of the party systems in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Such an endeavour 
would drastically increase the scope of the thesis due to the need for further control variables 
and a wider theoretic framework.   
 
Institutional arrangements, and in particular distribution of seats and electoral thresholds, are 
important explanatory factors for party systems. Nevertheless, this will not be introduced 
directly as control variables when analysing the importance of cleavages for party system 
stability. It should also be noted that one could argue that institutions make more of a 
difference after the first years of democratisation in this regard (Ware 2003:200).  
 
Transition theory per se is not the focus of this thesis. Transition theory will only be relevant 
to the extent it can explain possible cleavages and no attempts of systematically defining or 
                                                 
2 This would also apply to different contributors to the same volume, as for example in the case of the The 
Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (Berglund et. al. 2004). 
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explaining the transitions in the three countries will be made. As a continuation of this, I will 
not evaluate the quality of the elections with regards to how they meet democratic standards. 
The selection of elections in the study, in particular the exclusion of the 1990 elections in 
Bulgaria, is motivated by the desire of studying the emergence of party systems in the early 
post-communist period. The 1990 elections in Bulgaria stands out as somewhat premature in 
this respect, even if the General Assembly came to function as the Parliament until the next 
election in 1991. A case could also be made for also excluding the first election in Romania, 
but the 1990 election has been included because of the possible loss of information that would 
be likely to follow as the next election only took place in 1992. 
 
Furthermore, the focus is on elections to the lower chamber in Parliament. All other elections 
are excluded, and only mentioned when particularly relevant to party development and the 
relationship between the parties. Hungary has a mixed proportional electoral system, but only 
votes for party lists are measured. The definition of relevant parties, i.e. the parties included in 
the study, is elaborated below. 
 
Finally, this thesis does not set out to present a model for predicting voting behaviour. 
Identifying cleavage patterns as relevant for choice of party is not the same as giving a 
complete explanation of why citizen X votes for party Y. Whereas this causes certain 
challenges with regards to control variables, it does not interfere with the main problem in the 
thesis, which is identifying cleavage patterns and their effect on party systems. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The next chapter will elaborate on and define the relevant concepts, as well and discuss the 
adoption of these concepts to our context, post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, this chapter will deal with the measurement of the main dependent variable, the 
characteristics of the party systems, in greater detail. 
 
With the hypothesis and the conceptual framework in place, the second chapter will address 
the foundations of cleavages in each country, with an emphasis on the 20th century. At the end 
of the chapter, expected patterns of cleavages for each country will be presented.  
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The third chapter is a narrative and descriptive analysis of the elections, with a particular 
focus on the relevant parties and party system development. Volatility and party replacement 
scores will also be addressed here. At the end of the chapter, the party systems will be 
described and classified according to the degree of openness in their structures of competition 
and level of fragmentation. 
 
The methodology chapter will present logistic regression as the statistical tool of choice for 
analysing voter alignment. There is a sound intuitive logic in using support or no support for 
one party in one election as the dependent variable in each regression. After all, this is what 
elections are about, either you vote for a specific party or you do not vote for this party. The 
validity and reliability of the regression models will also be discussed. 
 
Chapter five presents the findings in the multivariate logistics regressions, and offers an 
interpretation of these findings based on the developed theoretical framework. The presence 
and/or absence of cleavage patterns will then be used as explanatory variables for the party 
systems that were identified in Chapter 3.  
 
Finally, the conclusion will be presented together with a few suggestions for further research 
in the field. 
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Chapter 1. Conceptual framework  
 
A theoretical approach to the concept of cleavages 
 
Rokkan and Lipset`s classical conceptualisation of cleavages from 1967 has been accused of 
lacking precision, with a certain extent of conceptual confusion being the unfortunate result 
(Skare 1998: 163). Apparently, there is a consensus that cleavages seem to address something 
very fundamental in terms of social structures and patterns of identification. Furthermore, 
Rokkan and Lipset showed that these structures are likely to have an impact on the political 
landscape as long as they are present in pluralistic regimes (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). A 
disclaimer is due though: As we have already noted above, the notion of frozen party systems 
was an analysis of the development in Western Europe and it is therefore an inherent risk of 
overstretching the concepts when attempting to apply these concepts in other contexts. On the 
other hand, Rokkan was concerned with making models that could be applied to new settings, 
i.e. they were not closed theories (Aardal 1994:222). His use of concepts, like cleavages, 
could therefore be interpreted within this framework. 
 
The classical response to the challenge of creating a concept that can travel well in time and 
space is to limit the number of defining attributes of the concept (Sartori 1970:1044pp.). 
There is great distance on both the time and space dimension from Lipset and Rokkan`s work 
on Western Europe to an analysis of post-communist Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. A high 
level of abstraction is necessary, but it is important to avoid a sub-minimal definition, which 
could lead to simpler and less durable divides being recognised as actual cleavages. Neither is 
a maximalist definition more useful, as a definition that is overburdened with attributes would 
be of little analytical use due to the problems of making the concept measurable (Munck and 
Verkuilen 2002:9). The guideline that was laid out by Sartori on how conceptualisation stands 
prior to quantification is still relevant in this respect (Sartori 1970:1038).  
 
The potential pitfall when using loosely defined concepts is lack of precision. Noteworthy 
efforts have been made in giving the concept of cleavages a clarification by starting with the 
attributes of the concept. Bartolini and Mair`s (1990) and also Knutsen and Scarbrough`s 
(1995) contributions to the debate can be interpreted in this tradition of extensional definitions 
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(Skare 1998:176-186). This is visible in their focus on the different dimensions of the 
concepts, where Bartolini and Mair argue that a cleavage has three characteristics that must be 
present: 
 
1. An empirical element, i.e. the phenomenon must be identifiable in socio-structural 
terms. 
2. A normative element, i.e. a set of values and beliefs that gives a sense of identity to 
a group. 
3. An organisational/behavioural element, i.e. that the cleavage leads to the 
development of an organised effort by the individuals (Bartolini and Mair 1990:215). 
 
Knutsen and Scarbrough`s main objection to this is that it is not sufficient to have these 
characteristics present, but they must also be associated with each other and not have internal 
autonomous variation (Skare 1998:181).  
 
An alternative approach that is suggested, but not put into practise by Skare is to define a 
cleavage intentionally (Skare 1998:187p.). An intentional definition sets out to identify the 
theoretical content or meaning of the concept. As Skare points out himself, there is also an 
intentional aspect in Bartolini and Mair`s definition (Skare 1998:179). The main challenges in 
developing an intentional definition are how to distinguish between cleavages and alignment, 
and how to deal with the retrospective approach favoured by Rokkan (Skare 1998:188).  
 
Developing the concept of cleavages  
 
In this thesis, an extensional definition will be developed and applied. While intentions are the 
point of departure for understanding where to start the selection of relevant attributes, the 
attributes are nevertheless what distinguish one concept from another. Without clearly defined 
attributes, it becomes very difficult to measure the concept and this would create great 
challenges for a comparison across time, space, or both.  
 
I believe that Bartolini and Mair, as well as Knutsen and Scarborough, have a common 
problem in their level of abstraction. It is simply too low to incorporate the intentions of 
Lipset and Rokkan. After all, they are claimed to be writing in the Lipset-Rokkan tradition 
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(Skare 1998:176). If we accept that the intention of Lipset and Rokkan was to create a 
concept that could be useful in a flexible model with capacity for conceptual travelling, it is 
likely that the origin of the concept was set at a high level of abstraction. This does not 
necessarily make it a less precise concept, but it leaves room for making it more specific. For 
example, a socio-economic cleavage would then be a cleavage that has all the attributes of the 
concept cleavage, but also additional attributes that distinguishes it from other cleavages.  
 
In my understanding of the concept then, a cleavage is a concept directed at the macro-level  
in an analysis insofar as we are talking about the origin of the cleavage. I agree with Bartolini 
and Mair that cleavages are related to both identification and a dimension of competition 
(Bartolini and Mair 1990:45) . The difficulty with using their three attributes is the 
behavioural/ organisational element that they require present together with the two other 
attributes. It is premature to reject a possible cleavage if the sociological structures are present 
without actually being manifested in an organised effort by the members of the group. If 
cleavages are indeed something fundamental, collective identification should be recognisable 
without being limited to studying the phenomenon top-down. For instance, a cleavage can 
hypothetically have an impact on the support bases for different parties at different times. 
Cleavages are based on, and refer to, the masses and not to the elites in this respect, and a 
collective identity can be noticed with different outcomes over time, for example when a party 
dissolves or splits because of conflict at the elite level. This is especially important in the 
post-communist setting.  
 
The third attribute proposed by Bartolini and Mair is closely associated with the difference 
between latent and manifest cleavages. The approach that will be used here simply postulates 
that a cleavage can be manifest even though it is not visible as support for the same party over 
time. A cleavage is manifest as long as collective identification triggers collective action, but 
this action can vary with time. 
 
The time dimension is particularly challenging when it comes to newly democratised 
countries. This has also caused some disagreement between scholars on when it is appropriate 
to apply the concept. Kitschelt et. al. avoids using the word because of uncertainty of whether 
or not the sociological divides that have become political in the post-communist countries are 
transitional rather than durable (Kitschelt et.al 1999:63).  However, it is also possible to see 
three or four elections as sufficient empirical evidence to draw conclusions from (Whitefield 
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2002:181, 189, 195-196). It has been claimed that Lipset and Rokkan used the terms 
“cleavages” and “divides” interchangeably themselves (Meisel 1974:6 cited in Kitschelt et.al 
1999:63). Even if this is the case, it is fruitful to draw a clear line between what Kitschelt et.al 
refers to as a divide and a cleavage. The time dimension is the difference, and this is after all a 
challenge that was less problematic to Rokkan and Lipset when they wrote about pre- and 
interwar developments in the 1960s. A compromise between the Whitefield and Kitschelt 
approach is to be very careful with using the term cleavages. In conceptual terms, a divide is a 
more general concept than cleavage, with looser requirements on the time dimension. A 
conclusion on the existence and importance of a divide could therefore be a tentative 
conclusion on a possible cleavage.   
 
 
The applied definition of cleavages 
 
My first attribute of a cleavage is empirical in the sense that a cleavage must be identifiable as 
a sociological structure. The first attribute that we seek to identify is a characteristic that 
makes an individual a member of a group and likely to behave accordingly to this 
membership because of his or her social background. However, this attribute would only 
constitute a divide if it stands alone. Hence,  while being a necessary, it is not a sufficient 
attribute.  
 
The second attribute of a cleavage is a first step in distinguishing a cleavage from a divide. 
The origin of a cleavage must have a historical and theoretical explanation. If we can not 
explain why it is likely to be more than a temporary divide, it should be classified as a 
cleavage neither. This captures the intention of Rokkan and Lipset of studying fundamental 
historical developments and incorporates the idea of cleavage based model building. 
 
The third attribute, and the second difference between a cleavage and divide, relates to the 
time dimension. The requirement that a cleavage is persistent over time does of course not 
imply that it will last forever. However, it should imply that cleavages will need time to 
disappear, by eroding over time. If a phenomenon disappears overnight as a determining 
factor for voting behaviour it was most likely never a true cleavage at all. Hence, resilience 
over time is a necessary but not sufficient attribute of the concept. 
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 These three attributes must all be present in a cleavage. The challenge of retaining the 
intentions of Lipset and Rokkan have been met within a conceptual framework that is largely 
extensional in design and set at a high level of abstraction. The most challenging attribute 
included in the definition is the requirement of a meaningful theoretical explanation of  the 
origin of a cleavage. Theoretical justifications have been seen as the most challenging or most 
disputed aspect in analysing cleavages also when it is not included as a defining attribute 
(Whitefield 2002:183). I would argue that this perspective legitimises the attribute, as this 
also strengthens the applicability of the concept in operational terms, by providing a more 
solid base for falsification or strengthening of a hypothesis.  
 
Consequences of a new conceptualisation of cleavages 
 
The immediate consequence of removing the organisational attribute from the definition of 
the concept is that the focus shifts from the elite level to the mass level. Cleavages are the 
structures that create the space in which the elites can play out their strategies. The first 
alignment we should look for is therefore horizontal alignment, i.e. voters identifying with 
each other because they have something fundamental in common. Vertical alignment, 
between groups of voters and the political parties, is the second dimension where cleavages 
can have an impact on the party system. However, this is where intra-elite conflicts, 
institutional arrangements, and poor communication may interfere in the relationship with the 
voters. As follows from my hypothesis, the horizontal alignment can still matter even when 
the vertical alignment to the parties is weak. As long as groups of voters behave similarly, and 
we can explain their behaviour  with the cleavage theory, it is meaningful to say that 
cleavages matter as a stabilising element. Figure 1 illustrates this model: 
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 Figure 1. Possible effect of a cleavage on horizontal and vertical voter alignments. 
  
 
                                      Parties  
(Basis for party                        
organisation)       Vertical alignment in elections 
 
 
Cleavage                       Voters 
                        Causes horizontal alignment  
 
This is not to say that cleavages do not have effect on the formation of parties, but the model 
recognises that the horizontal alignment between voters stands prior to the vertical 
alignment.3 This assumption rests on the definition of a cleavage that was outlined above, and 
the high level of abstraction we are operating with is also a precondition for the model.  
 
The organisational element from Mair and Bartolini`s definition of cleavages is not irrelevant, 
but it appears to be directed at the explaining vertical alignment. The most important 
consequence of the model, which is also highly relevant to the hypothesis, is that it is possible 
to have relative stable horizontal alignment, even when vertical alignment is volatile. This can 
be illustrated with a hypothetical, and simplified, example: Let us imagine that there is an 
urban-rural cleavage in a country. The strength of the cleavage creates horizontal alignment, 
which causes urban voters to behave similarly and rural voters to behave similarly. Most 
likely, these groups of voters will align vertically towards two parties and vote for an “urban 
party” and a “rural party”. However, these parties might be a disappointment to the voter 
groups, and the groups might look elsewhere in the next election. This would be vertical 
dealignment. On the other hand, if the voter groups continue to vote coherently, but for parties 
“X” and “Y” instead of the original “urban” and “rural” parties, it would be fair to conclude 
that the horizontal alignments have not been weakened. Following the definition of a 
                                                 
3 It is also possible to argue that horizontal and vertical alignment could happen more or less in parallel, for 
example during a revolution, but horistontal alignment would still be a precondition for vertical alignment in 
such cases. 
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cleavage, one would then have to conclude that not only do cleavages matter, but they also 
have a stabilising effect in terms of structuring the electorate, and hence the party system. 
 
The vertical alignment has quite a few challenges. There is interplay between the electorate 
and the party elites between elections, and in the Western European example, also on the 
party formation stage. This interplay takes place in what could be described as political space. 
This space is also influenced by institutional arrangements in the sense that alterations in the 
rules of the game might give both voters and parties different incentives for their behaviour. 
In this respect, Figure 1 is more of an illustration than an exhaustive model, something which 
also follows from the thesis` limitations.  
 
The applied conceptualisation of cleavages, and in particular the distinction between 
horizontal and vertical alignment, is key to understand how this analysis will differ from other 
scholars` work on the same topic. One example is Kay Lawson, who sums up a volume 
compromising studies on Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland by 
writing about an: ”...uncoupling of the forces of electoral democracy, of parties from 
cleavages and of voters from parties...”  (Lawson et.al 1999:33). Apparently, Lawson 
concludes on both horizontal and vertical alignment here, but without addressing the 
distinction conceptually. The consequence is that horizontal alignment is ignored. 
 
 
Parties   
 
One way to approach a definition of a party is to look at its functions. A minimum definition 
should also be limited to the purpose of distinguishing a party from any other organisation 
with similar functions. Giovanni Sartori identifies the party’s functions as being 
representative agencies and a channel for expression of interests, and he emphasises the latter 
(Sartori 1976:27).   
 
A party is nevertheless more than an organisation that voices opinions in the society. A party 
is an institution that seeks influence in the state (Ware 1996:5). Also, different beliefs can be 
voiced within a party. This is Ware`s second point as he points out how a party usually 
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attempts to aggregate interests (Ware 1996:5). Based on Ware`s ideas, the following 
definition of a party will be applied in this thesis: 
 
A party is an institution where interests and beliefs are aggregated as a mean for its 
members and supporters to channel their voices and maximise their influence in the 
state.  
 
As relatively few voters in general, and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular, are 
members of a party, elections stand out as the arena for interaction between the party and the 
supporters. With regards to elections in Central and Eastern Europe, it should also be noted 
that it has been quite common for different parties to engage in electoral coalitions. These 
coalitions are then an even greater aggregation of interests, but of course also more diversified 
in interests. The question is whether these coalitions can be treated as parties or if they need to 
be disintegrated to the parties that participated in the coalition. The first option would imply a 
stretching of the definition, but not necessarily a violation of it.  
 
Defining relevant parties 
 
I have chosen a numerical definition of relevant parties, i.e. the parties included in the study. 
Instead of examining the potential of the parties as coalition partners in government or their 
blackmail potential for bringing down governments, we can set a limit of percentage of seats 
in the lower chamber of the parliament. Therefore, a relevant party in this thesis is a party 
which won a minimum of 5% of the seats in the given election. This is in part motivated by 
the limitations in scope and extension of the thesis. 
 
There is of course a risk of loosing cleavages by setting the threshold this high. At the same 
time, as we are looking at the effect of the cleavages on the party systems, it does make sense 
to focus on the larger parties.   
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Party systems 
 
Parties are part of a party system when they interact and compete as parts of a system (Sartori 
1976:4). Consequently, there must be more than one party, because what we study in a party 
system is how the different parts of the system relate to each other (Sartori 1976:4). Bakke 
suggests that party systems have contents, which makes the parties belong to party families, 
and form, which can be identified as the number of parties, their relative size and their degree 
of polarization (Bakke 2006:17p.). However, such “classical” definitions of party systems 
have recently been challenged by Bardi and Mair, who, in part based on the experiences from 
post-communist Europe, suggest that this approach needs revision  (Bardi and Mair 2008). 
Their main message is that we should a) distinguish between sets of parties and systems of 
parties, and b) distinguish between vertical, horizontal and functional systems of parties 
(Bardi and Mair 2008:147pp.). Their conclusion is that a multidimensional approach is 
necessary to capture possible different dynamics of party systems, which may operate in 
parallel (Bardi and Mair 2008:161p.). One dimension which is relevant here, is awareness of 
possible differences in electoral and parliamentary party systems (Bardi and Mair 2008:158). 
An example of this could be if a party entered a coalition government after an election, but in 
doing so, also cut across the cleavages that had defined the electoral base of the party. This 
party would then risk being punished by their core electorate in the next election, because of 
differences in the electoral and parliamentary party systems. The attention to the potential 
difference between horizontal and vertical alignment should therefore be well suited to catch 
possible differences in electoral and parliamentary party systems over time, although without 
addressing this issue directly. 
 
The horizontal dimension, i.e. different party systems on different levels in a polity, becomes 
less relevant as this thesis is limited to studying elections to the lower chambers of Parliament 
alone.  
 
In an earlier work, Mair focuses on to which extent the structures of party competition are 
“open” or “closed” (Mair 1997). Mair argues that consolidation of a party system can been 
seen as a closing process of the structures of competition, thus creating greater predictability 
(Mair 1997:214). He also suggests that lack of closure has created lack of stability in post-
communist Europe, leading to less stability in party systems in the region (Mair 1997:191).  
 
 20
Table 1.   Closed and open structures of competition 
Closed structure of competition Open structure of competition 
Wholesale alternation in office, or non-
alternation in office 
Partial alternation in office, or mix of both 
partial and wholesale alternation 
Familiar governing formulae Innovative governing formulae 
Access to government restricted to a limited 
number of parties 
Access to government open to (almost) all  
parties 
                (Mair 1997:212) 
 
As I interpret Mair to be talking primarily about the parliamentary dimension here, this 
distinction between open and closed structures of competition strikes at the core of the 
dependent variable in the thesis. In the following, party systems will therefore be discussed on 
the basis of the degree of openness, as well as measures of fragmentation like the effective 
number of parties and the relative size of the parties. The number of effective parties is found 
using Laakso and Taageperas formula: 1/S2 , where S is the percentage of seats for each of the 
parties represented in Parliament (Laakso and Taageperas 1979, cited in Bakke 2006:271). 
 
Volatility and party replacement 
 
Volatility and emergence of new parties can not be disregarded as signs of instability per se. It 
is therefore necessary to take a closer look at these features, in order to get a clearer 
understanding of the extension of these two measures of change.  
 
Commonly defined as changes in party support from one election to the next, volatility is 
particularly difficult to assess in the post-communist context because of the large degree of 
splits and mergers between the parties (Birch 2001: 1). It could therefore be useful to 
distinguish between changes based on voter movements between continuous parties and shifts 
to new parties. Birch names the latter party replacement, which she defines as: “...the sum of 
the vote shares won by electoral contenders at election t+1 that had not contested election t” 
(Birch 2001: 4). Volatility is defined as “...a measure of changes in the electoral fortunes of 
existing players in the electoral game...” (Birch 2001: 4). 
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It has been argued that there is a significant difference in the effect on the party system 
between the cases where voters shifts from parties within a block and the cases when voters 
shift across blocs (von Beyme 1985: 304). This observation fits the perspective laid forward 
here as well, but it is important to underline that it is the movement of voters as a block that is 
of interest. Bartolini and Mair argue that block volatility and volatility within blocks are the 
most appropriate measures of cleavage structure (Bartolini and Mair 1990:36). However, the 
concept of blocks becomes problematic when it relates to parties rather than the voters, as it is 
then presupposed that the parties themselves can be organised in blocks.  
 
Short distance voter movements from one election to the next do not necessarily signal lack of 
or weakened cleavages. In the cases where a given party has ceased to exist because of a split 
or a merger, the voter would even be forced to vote for a different party than the one he or she 
voted for in the previous election. In terms of volatility then, which is most often seen as an 
indicator of instability, the main interest in the post-communist context should be to identify 
the nature of voter movements and party development.   
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Chapter 2. Historical foundations for expected cleavages 
 
The definition of cleavages applied in this thesis emphasises the origin of the cleavage. The 
aim of this chapter is therefore to identify the historical developments in the three countries 
that may have created lasting cleavages. The chapter focuses on  state- and nationbuilding and 
the development of economic structures, and the approach is thematic rather than strictly 
chronological. 
 
While state- and nationbuilding have certain historical critical junctures, these are also 
continuous processes. In this respect state- and nationbuilding returned to the political scene 
under new conditions at the collapse of communism. Together with regime change in itself, 
and the introduction of market economy, state- and nationbuilding constitute what has 
become known as the triple transition (Offe 1992:14). This triple transition should be 
considered a possible arena for emergence of new cleavages, though great care should be 
exerted regarding their expected durability.  
 
The challenge in formulating expectations of potential cleavages in post-communist Europe is 
to make a framework which allows for both long-term interregional variation and the impact 
of communism. On what I believe would be valid for all three countries, Karasimeonov notes 
that Bulgarian history has seen several periods where different cleavages have shaped 
political behaviour, though primarily on the elite level (Karasimeonov 1999:39). The pre-
communist history also differs substantially from country to country. The communist period 
clearly had a major impact on the societies. Old cleavages are likely to have been affected, but 
not necessarily eradicated, by the communist regimes. However, we know that there were 
differences in the degree of self-determination that Moscow allowed its satellites. Kitschelt 
et.al. make a useful distinction between three types of communism in this respect: 
Bureaucratic-authoritarian, national-accommodative, and patrimonial communism, and place 
Hungary in the first category, while Romania and Bulgaria both fit under the label of 
patrimonial communism (Kitschelt et. al. 1999:23pp.)The differences between these 
categories relate to the economic sphere, historical background, and the degree of pluralism. 
 
   
 
 23
Territory, identity, and religion 
 
Hungary`s history as a regional player from the state formation process in the 10th century and 
onwards should be considered in terms of the strength of nationalist sentiments. The defeat 
for the Ottoman empire at Mohács in 1526 marks the first of two main national traumas (Seim 
2006:27). The Habsburg empire acquired Hungary from the Ottoman empire in 1699, and as 
the uprising in 1848-49 was unsuccessful, the Hungarian elites had to wait for self-
governance until 1867, when the Habsburg empire split in two. The second trauma, the loss of 
land after the peace accords in Trianon in 1920 is probably of greater interest here, as these 
borders also define the Hungarian state today (Seim 2006:27). The peace of Trianon meant 
that Hungary lost substantial territory, and a Hungarian diaspora was created in the 
neighbouring countries. It is likely that this created a cleavage between those who have strong 
ties to the diaspora or believe that the Hungarian state should compromise the whole 
Hungarian nation on one side, and those who feel that present-day Hungary is consolidated on 
the other side. 
 
Romania is one of the countries with a large Hungarian minority, based in Transylvania. 
According to the 1992 census, Hungarians constituted 21% of a total population of 7,7 million 
in this region (Romanian Institute for National Statistics: http://www.recensamant.ro/). After 
centuries with different rulers in different parts of the country, Romania was able to 
consolidate “Greater Romania” in the interwar era. However, Romania also lost Bessarabia to 
the Soviet Union as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The issues between the 
Romanian province of Moldova and the Republic of Moldova are still important in the 
bilateral relationship between the two countries, and a possible cleavage in this respect should 
be tested. 
 
Bulgaria was the last nation-state to come out of the Ottoman empire, following the Russo-
Turkish war in 1878. Russia was instrumental in securing Bulgarian independence, and the 
Russians also refrained from heavy interference in the subsequent state- and nationbuilding 
processes (Karasimeonov 1999:38). Positive or negative attitudes towards Russia were 
important in defining the political actors before WWI, but lost relevance after the war 
(Karasimeonov 1999:40p.). When discussing the relevance of such a cleavage today, one 
would also have to take the effects of communism into account. Considering the poor state of 
the Russian Federation after the transition, I would therefore believe that a cleavage here 
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would relate to communism-related nostalgia rather than to Slavophil versus western 
orientation.  
 
The borders of Bulgaria changed with the varying fortunes in the Balkan wars, where the 
tripartite alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece had initial success against the Ottoman 
empire after war broke out in 1912. However, Serbia and Greece turned against Bulgaria a 
year later, which implied not only a loss of territory, but also lead to Bulgaria joining 
Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans towards the end of World War I. Finally, the 
borders of Bulgaria were dictated in the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919, resulting in yet another 
loss of land. Although one would be hard pressed to draw the same conclusions in terms of 
the effect of Treaty of Neuilly compared to the effect of Treaty of Trianon in Hungary, 
Bulgaria was clearly severely punished (Karasimeonov 1999:43). A possible cleavage on the 
nationalist dimension in Bulgaria would therefore be likely, primarily because of the Turkish 
minority and the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, the Pomaks, in the country, but also because 
this could reinforce sentiments similar to those expected in Hungary. After all, one poll 
showed that 51% of the respondents expressed territorial dissatisfaction in 1991 (Von Beyme 
1996:51p.) 
 
Summing up, the diaspora issue is expected to be most salient in the Hungarian case, but 
nationalist cleavages could also matter in the two other countries. The strength of the 
Hungarian and Turkish minorities in Romania and Bulgaria could possibly overlap with these 
issues and mutually reinforce such cleavages. Furthermore, ethnic and religious minorities 
became more visible in the interwar period, and most elites embarked on assimilation policies 
between the wars (Berglund et.al 2004:18). In Bulgaria, the assimilation policies towards the 
Turkish minority saw renewed strength in the 1980s (Karasimeonov 1999:44). This could also 
possibly overlap with an authoritarian versus pluralism cleavage, with minorities being 
distinctly anti-authoritarian. 
 
The history before 1920 is also interesting in terms of the relationship between the borders of 
the contemporary states and the influence from the Western and Eastern traditions of division 
versus concentration of power (Berglund et.al 2004:14p.). This overlaps with the religious 
dimension, where Western and Eastern Christianity follow much the same geographical 
division, and creates space for potential cleavages where the contemporary polities have 
populations with origins from both sides of this watershed. In the sample of countries that is 
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used here, it is thus likely that Romania could have a religion cleavage as the country has 
roots in both traditions, corresponding to the minority cleavage. Furthermore, the interwar 
failure of communist parties in Romania can to a part be attributed to the strength of 
orthodoxy, particularly in the rural areas (Datulescu 1999:98). It is also likely that orthodoxy 
survived to a greater extent in rural areas during communism, possibly cutting across other 
urban-rural dimensions. 
 
As a predominantly counter-reformation country, Hungary could have a potential cleavage 
with origin in the conflict between modern secularity and Catholicism. Moreover, there is a 
relatively large Calvinist population in Hungary, which could reinforce the secular-believer 
cleavage, while at the same time splitting Calvinists and Catholics. The different 
denominations in Bulgaria are expected to reinforce a cleavage between the titular nationals 
and the Turkish minority. Overall, the long-term effects of the division between Western and 
Eastern Christianity should also be visible with regards to degree of authoritarianism and 
relevant for the degree of communist penetration. In other words, it could be expected to find 
reinforced cleavage patterns when these dimensions are examined below.  
  
 
Authoritarianism versus pluralism: Explaining nostalgia? 
 
The Habsburg and Ottoman spheres of influence have different traditions with regards to pre-
democratic pluralism. The former had earlier experiences of nation- and statebuilding in 
comparison with the more authoritarian rule in the east. Hungary does not share Bulgaria`s 
and Romania`s clientelistic and patrimonial heritage from Ottoman rule. This perspective may 
serve as an overarching framework for possible regime-related cleavages. 
 
All three countries had experiences with pluralism and different degrees of democracy in the 
first half of the 20th century. Also, all these democratic systems broke down before the 
communist period. Hungary had very turbulent years after declaring independence at the end 
of WWI. Béla Kun became de facto leader and an alliance with the Soviet Union was the 
overarching principle for a few months in 1919 (Seim 1994:167p.). The struggle between 
communist and anti-communist forces, the “red-white terror”, continued in the early 1920s, 
and also turned into a more regular military operation, with Romanian forces standing more 
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or less on the outskirts of Budapest (Seim 1994:167p.). Admiral Miklós Horthy took power 
from the communists and became Regent of Hungary in March 1920. Horthy also came 
victorious out of a struggle for power with King Karl IV, who had not resigned from the 
throne. The elections in 1920, in which the communists were banned and the social-democrats 
intimidated from active participation, eventually produced some degree of stability. The 
smallholders and conservative forces took the reigns, and István Behlen became Prime 
Minister, a position he kept from 1921 to 1931 (Seim 1994:172pp.). This would prove to be a 
period of efficient, though authoritarian, governing, as well as a period of  marginalisation of 
extreme political forces. However, the regime became more authoritarian when Gyula 
Gömbös was appointed Behlen`s successor in 1932. Civil liberties were further reduced and 
increasing anti-Semitism showed signs of where Hungary was heading. The fascists emerged 
as a leading political force after Gömbös died in 1936, and Hungary entered World War II as 
an allied of Germany (Seim 1994:223pp.). Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the Arrow Cross 
Movement, eventually became “Leader of the Hungarian Nation” in 1944 and stayed faithful 
to Hitler until the end of the war.  
 
The communist period started later in Hungary than in the two other countries. The armed 
forces and the security apparatus came under Soviet influence early, but it was the 
Smallholders party that won the election in 1945, mainly because they were the clearest anti-
communist alternative (Seim 1994:354). Later,  the Hungarian demands for free elections, 
withdrawal of Soviet troops, and a free press in 1956 ended in violence and the death of Prime 
Minister Imre Nagy. Still, Hungary could experiment with “reform-communism” under János 
Kádár, and opposition movements were also in play. In sum, and in comparison with the rest 
of the region, there was both considerable experience and a certain pluralism to draw upon 
when the roundtable negotiations started in 1989. The roundtable format also proved to work 
well, ensuring a comparatively smooth transition.  
 
Political parties were present since independence in Bulgaria, but democratic ideas had 
varying fortunes also before WWI. Stefan Stambolov came to power in 1889 and his rule, 
which lasted until 1894, was characterized by a step towards authoritarian rule through 
passing of anti-democratic laws (Karasimeonov 1999:40). Political pluralism returned after 
his fall, but Bulgaria remained an elite-dominated polity for some time.  
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It was the agrarian movement that came to lead the first elected interwar government in 
Bulgaria. Prime Minister Stamboliski soon had strong adversaries, and a coup d’état was 
carried out by parts of the army in 1923, ending with torture and murder of Stamboliski (Seim 
1994:182p.). Other political forces were far more radical than the agrarians. Macedonian 
extremists (IMRO) were a factor in the coup in 1923, and the communists were banned and 
prosecuted after a spectacular, but partly failed, attempt of killing the entire political elite in 
Sofia (Seim 1994:182p.). One could argue that Bulgaria faced a dilemma between freedom-
or-modernisation in this period, with the agrarians representing the more political liberal anti-
modernisation force (Karasimeonov 1999:43). Democracy did return briefly in 1929, but 
authoritarian rule was re-established with what Karasimeonov describes as “a dictatorial 
monarchic regime” under King Boris, which lasted from 1934 to WWII.  
 
The transformation to totalitarian communist was rapid in Bulgaria (Berglund and Aarebrot 
1997:63). The communist decades in Bulgaria were marked by loyalty to Moscow and regime 
stability (Janos 2000:321). Todor Zhivkov led the country for almost three decades, until 
1989. In addition to being totalitarian, and I concur with Berglund and Aarebrot here, the 
communist regime was also characterized by nepotism. Kitschelt`s description of patrimonial 
communism as a mixture of repression and clientelistic co-optation fits Bulgaria well 
(Kitschelt 1999:24). 
 
The Romanian interwar regime history is another examply of limited pluralism and 
democratic breakdown. The agrarian party entered government in 1920, but King Ferdinand 
dissolved this government in an undemocratic fashion. The political parties reflected the 
social elite structures, and were founded as early as in the mid-nineteenth century (Datulescu 
1999:96). The main conflicts were between different categories of landowners, with 
nationality playing a role, and also between urban bourgeoisie and rural Romania. However, it 
was clear that this was an elite project, with farmers and workers being “mere spectators” 
(Datulescu 1999:95). The other important political force in Romania before WWII was the 
royal family. King Carol IInd found himself in uneasy and shifting alliances with the other 
elites, and this power struggle eventually ended with the establishment of a monarchic 
dictatorship from 1938 to 1940 (Datulescu 1999:99). Popular mobilisation did return in the 
1930s, partly with origins in the peasantry, but also with urban elements (Datulescu 1999:99). 
The successful mobilizer was the fascist movement known as the Iron Guard. However, the 
fascists did not come to power until WWII broke out.  
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 In Romania, Nikolae Ceausescu operated relatively independently from Moscow after he took 
over the leadership of Romania after Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965. At the same time, he 
created one of, if not the, most repressive regimes behind the Iron Curtain. The Romanian 
communist regime had many common traits with the Bulgarian, although there were 
significant differences in the degree of loyalty to Moscow. The sudden and violent overthrow 
testifies to the nature of the Ceausescu regime, and also to the weakness of civil society at the 
time of transition. Structures from the previous regime could use the state apparatus when 
they took over and consolidated power before and in the founding elections. 
 
The authoritarian experiences from the interwar period in Hungary, with extreme radicalism 
both on the left and right side of the political spectrum could of course have created a 
cleavage that deeply divided the nation. At the same time, it could also be seen as a valuable 
lesson of the costs of extreme positions, to a certain extent comparable with the West-German 
experience after WWII. The salience of the expected nationalism cleavage based on the 
diaspora is most likely not compromised by the latter perspective, although one could expect 
to find a rather clear difference between moderate and radical nationalists. It is also interesting 
that there was some degree of pluralism, particularly in the 1920s. Though dominated by the 
elites, the masses were also parts of Hungarian politics in the interwar period, to some extent 
through the communist period, and as stakeholders in the transition process. This could imply 
that there was greater potential for consensus on the regime dimension than in other countries, 
making a nostalgia cleavage less likely.  
 
In sum, the level of authoritarianism in Bulgaria and Romania is striking. Various strongmen 
and elites, although representing very different backgrounds, have been dominant in the 
political life in the countries for most of the 20th century. The nature of the communist regime 
could have created space for a nostalgia cleavage in these two countries, with certain parts of 
the electorate favouring stability and communist ideals over experiments with a new kind of 
pluralism. This could also apply to those who were favoured through clientelistic networks in 
the old regime. However, this would probably have to correspond with economic cleavages 
for such a cleavage to matter. If present though, such a cleavage would be strong because of 
the reaction from those who value pluralism and meritocracy. However, there are also 
important differences between Romania and Bulgaria in this respect. The patrimonial aspect 
appears to be somewhat stronger in the Romanian case, based on the position that Illiescu 
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gained through the transition. Although being a key member of the old regime, he and FSN 
managed to distance themselves efficiently from Ceausescu. The aspect of continuation was 
stronger in the case of BSP in Bulgaria.  
 
In other words, pre-communist traditions appear to have had some relevance for the type of 
communism rule that was established in the three countries, as illustrated by how civil society 
is most developed in the parts of Central Eastern Europe that has roots in Western Christianity 
(Berglund et. al 2001:166).However, I believe that it is first and foremost the communist 
regimes and the modes of transition that can be said to have created space for cleavages in the 
polities of today. Finally, and although it can not be classified as a cleavage, the patrimonial 
heritage in Romania and Bulgaria could also have paved way for a greater political space for 
new political “strongmen”. 
 
 
Economic structures 
 
Although communism reshaped the economic structures of the three countries dramatically, 
possible cleavages on the economic dimension from before this period should be considered. 
For example, the role and status of the peasantry faced challenges on the centre-periphery 
dimension in this period. An economic cleavage between rural and urban parts could very 
well have developed into lasting cleavages where strengthened by ethnic, religious or 
economic structures like ownership and mode of production. There were also big differences 
between the three countries in this regard. 
 
Hungary had considerably more industry than Romania and Bulgaria already at the dawn of 
the 19th century, and also saw workers mobilise to a greater extent than in the other two 
countries (Seim 1994:162). Urbanisation in Hungary also happened before communism, and 
the percentage of people living in cities with a population of more than 100 000 actually 
declined from 1950-1976 (Berglund et.al 2004:39). Hungary had a considerable middle class 
and the largest industrial worker class in the region at the time (Seim 1994:352). At the same, 
ownership mode and power structures in the countryside changed less, land reforms were 
modest and the aristocratic social order were still in place at the end of the interwar period 
(Seim 1994: 173,176).  
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During the communist period, the agricultural sector underwent collectivization at first, but 
like in other economic spheres, there was a liberalisation of the regime here as well from the 
late 1950s. When the New Economic Mechanism was implemented in the late 1960s, with 
certain market-oriented solutions and decentralised decision-making, Hungary in reality took 
a step towards the transition, which Romania and Bulgaria had to wait another 20 years for 
(Seim 1994:440p.). The reforms were slowed down in the mid-1970s, but picked up the pace 
again later (Seim 1994:440p.). 
 
With a comparatively developed economy, one could therefore expect a traditional left-right 
cleavage to be of importance in Hungarian post-communist politics. This cleavage would be 
expected to revolve around the issue of social protectionism and state regulation versus liberal 
market economy. Also, since the different occupational groups have long been mobilised to a 
certain degree, we could expect to find a relevant urban-rural dimension here. Differences in 
income levels might cut across other cleavages. 
  
Romania was one of several countries in the region with more than 70% of the population 
working in the agricultural sector in the interwar period (Seim 1994:184). Only 45 000 people  
worked in modern factories in 1910 (Janos 2000:128). The major landowners and aristocrats 
managed to avoid major land reforms, and the tendencies to radicalisation of the peasants 
were also tamed through cooptation of their leaders (Seim 1994:190p.). However, these social 
structures were to large extent to be eradicated when  collectivization of the agricultural sector 
in Romania was completed. 
 
While the interwar level of industrialisation in Romania was relatively low, urbanisation 
increased also before the communist period (Datulescu 1999:94). The industrialisation during 
the communist decades was an important factor in reshaping the economic structures of the 
country. Connected with both education and accelerated urbanisation, this could very well 
have reinforced existing urban-rural cleavages. About half the Romanian workforce was 
employed in the industrial sector in 1985 (Datulescu 1999:102). The industrialisation of 
Romania was a deliberate policy choice that was not welcomed in Moscow in the 1960s, 
when the Soviet leadership envisaged greater regional specialisation instead of reliance of 
heavy industry (Seim 1994:426). There was therefore a distinct national element in the 
Romanian industrial policy, which was taken to the extremes under Ceausescu. The country 
eventually became the poorest in Europe, with farmers increasingly returning to manual 
 31
labour (Datulescu 1999:91). The down payment of all foreign debt in the early 1980s added to 
this burden, but also reinforced the national aspect.  
 
In terms of economic cleavages then, one could clearly argue that Romania was a very flat 
society in 1989. However, I do believe that there is reason to expect an urban-rural cleavage, 
based on the economic dimension, as urban and rural populations would have different needs 
after the transition. The rural populations could be more dependent on state intervention, 
while urban (elites) would favour liberal economic policies. Also, the economic transition 
would probably have created income differences, which could qualify as a cleavage, and 
possibly reinforce a cleavage between the few privileged and the masses from the previous 
regime. The nationalist dimension of the economic policies in Romania could also have 
survived, and strengthen the urban-rural cleavage. 
 
Bulgaria was also predominantly rural and agricultural before WWII. The land reform in 1920 
reached quite far, and some land was redistributed to the peasants. Also, the agrarian 
movement had a clear program, they believed in the right to private property of the land, 
combined with cooperation between farmers in order to make use of the effect of larger 
networks in production and sales (Seim 1994:178). However, as we have seen above, the 
agrarians only had influence in a limited period of time. The deep rift between wealthy, 
powerful elite and the masses was therefore quite intact in a less than modernised Bulgaria at 
the end of the interwar period. 
 
The economic structures in Bulgaria changed completely after WWII, as the ideas from 
Moscow were followed both in ideas and implementation. Berglund et.al. emphasises how 
industrialisation, urbanisation and education also was a modernising project (Berglund 
et.al.2004:38). Although these ideals faded somewhat after the death of Stalin, Bulgaria never 
let up on the centralised planning of the economy. The result was not only a complete 
transformation of the economic structures of the society, but also the creation of a new elite, 
the nomenklatura (Berglund et.al.2004:38). This is visible in the mode of transition, and in the 
election to the Grand Assembly, where the communists had legitimacy to negotiate and take 
part in the transition. The communists represented a force that claimed to be sustaining 
welfarism in respect (Sakwa 1999:80). 
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The likelihood of economic cleavages is high in Bulgaria, particularly with respect to 
opinions on the degree of state intervention in the market. Like in Romania, there could be a 
cleavage between old and new elites. The history also makes a case for an urban-rural 
cleavage, despite the transformation during communism. In this respect, rural voters are 
expected to demand social protection, while urban voters are expected to be more liberal. The 
farmers are an interesting category, which is not entirely covered by the urban-rural 
dimension. If present, the agrarian history could lead to coherent voting behaviour in this 
particular group. 
 
 
Expected patterns of cleavages 
 
Cleavages do not operate in a vacuum, they reinforce each other when the same values on the 
cleavage variables overlap and cut across each other when values on one cleavage overlap 
while values on a second cleavage do not. This has been demonstrated when describing the 
expectations above, and the main expectations are summed up in Table 2. The interpretation  
of the table is relatively straightforward, as “reinforcing cleavage patterns” are expected to 
split to the electorate in two, and “cross-cutting cleavages” are expected to create further splits 
within these categories. However, this is a deliberately crude approach, as it is of course also 
possible that only a few of the “reinforcing cleavages” are important to different voters. For 
example, Table 2 should not be interpreted categorically in the sense that a Hungarian voter 
needs to be nationalist, religious, rural and economic liberalistic to vote for a party. These are 
archetypes, and in reality it should rather be expected that two or three of these cleavages 
matter to each voter, thus determining horizontal alignment and, probably, voting behaviour. 
Table 2.   Expected cleavage patterns 
 Hungary Romania Bulgaria 
Reinforcing 
cleavage 
patterns 
Nationalist 
Religious 
Rural 
Economic 
liberalism 
 
Not nationalist 
Secular 
Urban 
State 
intervention  
 
Rural 
Nostalgia 
Nationalist 
State 
intervention 
Low income 
 
 
Urban 
Not nostalgic 
Not nationalist 
Economic 
liberalism 
High income 
 
 
Rural 
Nostalgic 
State 
intervention 
Secular 
 
Urban 
Not nostalgic 
Economic 
liberalism 
Religious  
Cross-cutting 
cleavages 
Denomination   
Income 
 
  
 
Ethnic minority 
Religiosity 
Denomination  
  
Ethnic minority 
Farmer/not farmer 
Income 
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To conclude, different cleavage patterns are expected in the three countries. Bulgaria is 
expected to be most clearly affected by communism, while the nostalgia dimension is largely 
expected to be absent in Hungary. The ethnic minority issue stands somewhat alone in 
Romania and Bulgaria, and it is classified as a cross-cutting cleavage because the minorities 
are likely to vote coherently regardless of their values on other variables. The strong 
reinforcing cleavage pattern in Romania suggests a clear difference between voters with 
scepticism towards modernity and liberal, urban voters. However, the expectations of cross-
cutting cleavages suggest that it is possible with many different constellations of horizontal 
voter alignment. In Bulgaria, a similar pattern is expected, but with a clearer emphasis on the 
communist past. Hungary is also likely to have a mainly two-dimensional space, which is 
based on nationalism, religion and residence, rather than nostalgia. 
 
Cleavages or issues? 
 
A few words should also be said about issues, which may be political salient, but are not 
tested as cleavages below. First of all, there is the issue of European and trans-atlantic 
integration through EU and NATO membership. There has been little controversy and 
mobilization on these issues in the three countries. To the extent that these issues divide the 
populations, it is more likely a matter of strengthening existing cleavages such as nationalism 
and social protectionism versus market economy.  
 
Secondly, it could be argued that there is an age cleavage because of different experiences 
from communism, and in some cases even from the interwar period. For example, there could 
be an important difference between cohorts born before 1956 in Hungary and those born later. 
Again, I would argue that this would be an underlying dimension in the tested cleavages, like 
for example nostalgia. In the same fashion, education is likely to be an underlying dimension 
of the urban-rural and income cleavages. 
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Chapter 3. Elections, parties and party systems 
 
This chapter intends to describe the relevant parties and the party systems in the three 
countries. The aim is to get a clearer picture of how the parties have performed, how 
governments have been formed, and the nature of the different party systems before we turn 
to the analysis in Chapter 5.4 
 
Hungary 
 
All non-communist party activity was suspended in Hungary in 1948 (Tóka 2004:291). Still, 
Hungary saw the earliest development of parties in the East-Central European countries 
towards the end of communism, with parties starting to form in 1987 and 1988 (Lewis, 
Lomax and Wightman 1994:157p). This happened in parallel with reformist trying to change 
the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) from within, and the period leading up the 
election in May 1990 was marked by hectic political activity. The National Roundtable 
Negotiations was the key arena, where not only the features of the transition to democracy 
was worked out, but also because it was the central arena for testing strength and acquiring 
legitimacy as political players before the first election. The Opposition Roundtable (Ellenzéki 
Kerekasztal, EKA) was founded in the spring of 1989, and saw the participation of SZDSZ, 
FIDESZ, MDF, FKGP, the Hungarian People’s Party, the Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society, 
and the Democratic Trade Union of Scientific Workers. At a later stage the League of Free 
Trade Unions and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KNDP) were invited (Falk 
2003:149). It should prove difficult to keep EKA together, and it did also split over 
differences on accepting Imre Pozsgay as President. However, agreement was reached to hold 
the free and fair elections in May 1990 (Grzymała-Busse 2002:109) .   
 
At the same time, the three main actors, MDF, SZDSZ, and FIDESZ also had to figure out 
how to distinguish themselves from each other. MDF and SZDSZ both had rather 
longstanding ties with dissident movements, while FIDESZ sprung out a milieu of students 
and young professionals, which had started to form in second half of the 1980s (Tóka 
2004:293p.). The initial membership in FIDESZ was low, only 37 people participated in the 
                                                 
4 Elections results can be found in Appendix 1 while government compositions can be found in Appendix 2. 
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founding meeting (Lomax 1996:35). Tóka argues that these three parties started to position 
themselves tactically, particularly in the cases of MDF and SZDSZ. The former appeared to 
be a centre-right, patriotic Christian party, while the latter was characterized by being 
cosmopolitan, agnostic and radical (Tóka 2004:292). In comparison, the historical parties and 
the reform socialist were much more tied up by predetermined attitudes (Tóka 2004:292).  
 
As mentioned, the reform communist, lead by Imre Pozsgay, took their time before they 
finally broke out of MSZMP and created the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in October 
1989. It should prove hard to for the generation of reform communists to make up for the lost 
time in the first elections (Lewis, Lomax and Wightman 1994:159). However, MSZP has 
been a key player in Hungarian politics since. 
 
Coming out of the first elections, the origins of a pattern emerged. Jósef Antall and MDF 
formed a coalition government with FKGP and KDNP, which clearly signalled a Christian-
national platform (Tóka 2004:297). The events during Antall`s (and Boross`) governments are 
key to understand the continued development of Hungarian party politics. FKGP formally left 
the government a little less than two years later after a short and troubled companionship. 
Some members of FKGP remained in government, and they were subsequently excluded from 
their party. MDF also had to live with major internal difficulties, some of which were clearly 
ideologically founded. The party’s vice-President, István Csurka, came out strongly in favour 
of a clearer profile in the national-populist népi-nemzeti direction, which in turn gave birth to 
the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIEP) (Tóka 2004:300p.).  
 
The 1994 elections led to a change of government. MSZP and SZDSZ formed a government, 
while FIDESZ continued, and accelerated, their own transformation. The 1994 election is 
therefore an important milestone in the relationship between SZDSZ and FIDESZ. SZDZS 
would subsequently learn the difficulties of being the junior partner in a coalition, much like 
FKGP did in the previous round (Tóka 2004:307.). On the other hand, MSZP managed to 
secure their position as a modern social-democratic option. MDF did a poor election, and 
would come to face increased pressure as FIDESZ changed name to FIDESZ-Hungarian 
Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP) in 1995. This was a manifestation of the Christian-National 
platform of the new party.  
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The election campaign in 1998 was therefore clearly influenced by the experiences from the 
first two government formations. MDF more or less split over disputes on choice of coalition 
partners, while FKGP aligned with FIDESZ-MPP. The socialists did very well in the first 
round of the elections, but lost out when FIDESZ-MPP, FKGP and the remnants of MDF 
showed strong willingness to form a coalition. MIEP secured their first seats in Parliament, 
and it is interesting that this party was not seemed as an appropriate coalition partner.  
 
The vulnerability of small parties because of the five percent threshold would also see MDF 
forming an electoral pact with FIDESZ-MPP in 2002. Furthermore, FKGP had to deal with 
several financial scandals in the period, and plummeted in the polls as a result. Apparently, 
this was not without the interference of FIDESZ-MPP officials, who saw an opportunity for 
further strengthening their own party (Tóka 2004:311). The 2002 election marks the endpoint 
for this study, and it produced another change of government. MSZP and SZDSZ won a very 
close-fought election, where MIEP narrowly missed the electoral threshold.  
 
Summing up, it should be safe to say that there has been considerable stability in the patterns 
of competition in Hungarian party system in the first four elections. The transformation of 
FIDESZ is striking, and could of course be taken as an argument for fluid politics. On the 
other hand, this also underlines the main dimension of conflict, which we will return to later.  
 
 
Romania 
 
The transition to democracy in Romania differs considerably from the Hungarian case 
presented above. The Ceausescu regime was repressive to the very end, and the regime 
change was violent and highly dramatic. Former Politburo member Ion Iliescu headed the 
National Salvation Front (FSN), which initially claimed to be a non-political entity when 
taking provisional control of the country on 22 December 1989 (Eyal 1993:122). FSN quickly 
called for elections to be held in April the following year, elections in which they made 
promises not to take part in. However, FSN reversed their position only a month later, when 
they announced their intention of participating in the first elections after all. Though FSN 
would eventually dissolve, Ion Illiescu came to be a dominating factor in Romanian politics 
both through the successor parties of FSN and his persona, and what started as an interim 
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regime at the time of the execution of Nikolae and Elena Ceausescu turned into a main 
political force in Romanian politics.  
 
The interest for participating in the founding election was great, with more than 70 parties 
running for seats in the legislature (Crowther 2004:367). Most of them bear little relevance to 
this study, but it is interesting to note how quickly the historical parties re-entered the arena 
(Cotta 1994:113).   .  
 
When presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 20 May 1990, it became clear 
that nobody could match FSN and Illiescu. Public demonstrations and further violence in the 
capitol did not damage Illiescu`s popularity and he received 85,1% of the votes in the 
presidential election. FSN`s strong showing in the parliamentary election also illustrates the 
character of the limitations of this first election, which was completely dominated by FSN`s 
position and resources. FSN won 66,31 % of the votes, as the only party to win more than 
10%. UDMR also had reason for satisfaction, as they succeeded in finding their place as the 
party for the Hungarian minority. The historical parties all performed rather poorly.  
 
It would only take two years before the second elections were to be held. FSN came under 
pressure both from internal strides and from public unrest. The streets of Bucharest filled up 
with angry protesters again in the autumn of 1991, with demands of the resignation of the 
Prime Minister and President. Prime Minister Roman resigned, and he was succeeded by 
Teodor Stolodjan. The internal issues in FSN centred on the reform agenda. Petre Roman 
headed a group calling for more rapid and extensive reforms, and he was elected chairman of 
the party when finally confronting Illiescu in March 1992 (Crowther 2004:369p). Illiescu 
subsequently founded the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN), which went on to 
win the parliamentary elections in November 1992. The 1992 elections had several interesting 
features. Even though both FSN and FDSN won a considerable number of seats, they came 
nowhere close the numbers from the 1990 election. The newly introduced thresholds5 also 
helped limit fragmentation.  
 
The formation of the Democratic Convention (CDR) before the local elections earlier the 
same year was the first successful attempt of forming a large coalition with the purpose of 
                                                 
5 Thresholds were 3% for a single party, while another percentage point was added for each party in a coalition. 
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challenging FDSN and FSN. CDR did achieve a decent result, but would come back in a 
much stronger fashion two years later. Though aligned with CDR, UMDR did not partake in 
the coalition in the parliamentary election. This was probably a wise decision, as they 
manifested their position as the party for the Hungarian minority. The final feature of the 
second elections, which should be mentioned, is the importance of the “red-brown” nationalist 
parties. Nationalism became a factor not only through the Greater Romania Party (PRM) and 
the Party for Romanian National Unity (PUNR), but also through these parties` links to 
Illiescu and FDSN (Crowther 2004:370). In comparison with the completely FSN-dominated 
founding elections, the 1992 election therefore illustrates clearer political competition.  
 
The next elections were held four years later, four years in which Romania struggled 
economically. FDSN merged with three smaller parties and changed name to the Party of 
Romanian Social Democracy (PDSR). Illiescu, who was re-elected President in 1992, 
continued to work with the nationalist parties, and PUNR had two ministers in the 
government from 1994 (Crowther 2004:383). However, the cooperation resulted both in lack 
of fiscal prudence and in unpopularity among other European leaders. PDSR therefore moved 
away from their allies from the far right towards the 1996 elections, and the days of red-
brown companionship appeared to be drawing to an end (Crowther 2004:383). 
 
The opposition parties on their side continued to work together, and were able to present a 
stronger and more coherent CDR in 1996. In addition, a new coalition was born when Petre 
Roman`s new party, the Democratic Party (PD), and the Social Democratic Party (PSDR) 
formed the Social Democratic Union (USD). CDR won both the parliamentary and the 
presidential elections, and Romania saw the first complete transfer of power since the 
revolution. PDSR and PUNR were the losers, while Vadim Corneliu Tudor`s PRM showed 
more stability.  
 
CDR quickly ran into trouble when they assumed office. Expectations were high, but the 
point of departure for their reform agenda was less than ideal. Inflation rose to 151 % in 1997 
as a result of implementation of liberalization policies (Crowther 2004:387). The immaturity 
of the political elite in terms of corruption and cronyism did not serve CDR well neither. The 
government was hardly able to govern efficiently, something which three changes of Prime 
Minister in the course of four years testify to.  
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PDSR on their side emphasised their role as providers of social protection, and paved the way 
for a solid comeback in the 2000 elections. Disillusionment was widespread in the public, and 
turnout dropped further, to a meagre 58,4 %. CDR and USD fell apart, leaving PNL and PD  
to fill this space together with UDMR. PDSR won the parliamentary elections and Illiescu 
also returned to the presidency. The other winner was PRM, which benefited from blaming 
minorities for the hardships “ordinary Romanians” faced. Tudor was also the main challenger 
to Illiescu in the race for the presidency. It should not be underscored that PDSR had 
increasingly succeeded in creating a more modern social democratic alternative. The reform 
wing of the party saw this as the way forward, with a combination of continued reform, 
European integration and social protection. The choice of Adrian Nastase as Prime Minister 
underlines this, despite continued troubles of widespread corruption on the elite level. After 
the 2000 elections, yet another name change occurred and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
was born in June 2001.  
 
Internal strife, shifting alliances and allegations (and convictions) of corruption are all still 
important dimensions of Romanian politics today. Concerning the first four elections three 
things are particularly striking. Firstly, all four elections were to a large extent about whether 
or not those who took control in the revolution were fit to lead the country in a democratic 
setting. Secondly, the stable performance of UMDR, the varying fortunes of the nationalist 
parties, and the attempts of forging a red-brown coalition suggest that nationalism is an 
important factor in Romania. Finally, it seems like Illiescu and his affiliated parties have 
managed to modernise over the first decade.  
 
 
Bulgaria 
 
The reintroduction of political parties in Bulgaria followed neither the Hungarian nor the 
Romanian path. In some respect, the events in 1989 and 1990 is somewhere in-between the 
negotiated solution in Hungary and the revolution in Romania. When the Union of 
Democratic Forces (SDS) was founded in late 1989, this large gathering of opposition forces 
resembled other alliances in the region (Waller 1994:51). However, due to the repressive 
nature of the communist regime under Todor Zhivkov, this happened late and without the 
same tradition of opposition work that EKA benefited from in Hungary. SDS consisted of 
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historical parties, dissidents, and new political formations, which found common cause in 
ridding the country of communist rule. On the other side, the Bulgarian Communist Party 
(BCP) lived on under the new label of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)6, and the 
adversaries for the first rounds of elections were set.  
 
Although the 1990 election to the Grand National Assembly is excluded from this analysis, 
this first round is interesting as it suggests that BSP enjoyed substantial popular legitimacy. 
The Turkish minority managed to gain political representation through Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms (DPS), which was founded in 1990 and had 140 000 members by 1991 
(Millard 2004:235). Coming to the parliamentary elections in 1991 then, it was nevertheless 
clear that this was first and foremost a contest between two blocks, the ex-communists and 
their opposition. Both sides had internal differences. BSP was divided between the 
conservatives parts of the old nomenclature and the reformist wing, and SDS struggled with 
personal ambitions and conflicting views on how far one should go in anti-communist 
rhetoric (Karasimeonov 2004:420). The result of the 1991 election showed signs of a quite 
evenly divided electorate, and DPS became a welcome supporter for SDS when the latter 
formed government.  
 
Bulgaria remained a heavily bureaucratic state for years to come. The SDS government faced 
constant pressure from BSP in the period leading up to the next elections, and also saw a 
change of Prime Minister after Philip Dimitrov lost a vote of confidence.  
 
The 1994 elections shifted power back to BSP. Karasimeonov argues that this proved BSP`s 
efficiency in playing the different parts of SDS against each other, and that the result was the 
defeat of the radical anti-communist faction in SDS (Karasimeonov 2004:421p.). Two new 
actors entered Parliament, namely the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB) and the Popular Union 
of Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Democratic Party (BZNS-DP). DP was 
previously part of SDS, while the agrarian party also saw the need for an allied if they were to 
acquire representation. It has been claimed that BBB was a party of a more populist 
orientation, which also made some use of nationalist rhetoric (Karasimeonov 2004:422; 
Ganev 2001:188). DPS manifested their position as the party for, and by, the Turkish 
minority. 
                                                 
6 Formally, BSP has had different partners in several parliamentary elections, but BSP will still be treated as one 
party here due to the dominating role it has played in these “coalitions”. 
 41
 BSP should prove unable to meet the expectations from the public. Together with Romania, 
Bulgaria struggled with modernising the economy, with dramatic consequences for large parts 
of the population. Another unfortunate common trait with their neighbour to the north was the 
widespread corruption and lack of accountability outside elections. The dissatisfaction 
culminated with public demonstrations in 1997, and this led to early elections being held in 
April the same year.  
 
Power shifted back to SDS, and this party, together with their new partner BZNS-DP, won an 
absolute majority in Parliament (Karasimeonov 2004:422). In addition, DPS chose not to run 
alone this time, but instead spearheaded a new and successful coalition, the Alliance of 
National Salvation (ONS) together with the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union – Nikola 
Petkov (Karasimeonov 2004:422). BBB secured representation for four more years, while a 
new social democratic alternative, Euroleft, also managed to win 14 seats. While BSP still 
received over 20% of the votes, the 1997 election was a clear signal that confidence in the 
electorate was fading. 
 
SDS made use of the majority won in 1997 to implement a number of successful reforms, 
both in the fields of social policy and economic liberalization (Karasimeonov 2004:433). 
Also, and again like Romania, the external pressures that came with ambitions of membership 
in the EU and NATO, gave legitimacy to reforms as there was consensus on these issues of 
European and Trans-Atlantic integration.7 Nevertheless, the ruling coalition once again 
suffered from declining popularity, and corruption and clientelism were the main reasons 
(Karasimeonov 2004:433). The most disappointed voters would probably say that the first 
decade of democratic elections had produced little more than a new elite, whose main interest 
was self-interest, or, in familiar wording, a new nomenklatura.  
 
Disillusionment with the two dominant factors paved way for a remarkable new force in 
Romanian politics in the 2001 elections. The ex-king Simeon II answered to the call, and the 
National Movement Simeon IInd (NMS) swept into the arena, winning more than 40 % of the 
votes and 50% of the seats in the parliamentary elections. He did so in part because of his 
charismatic persona and an untainted reputation, but also because he addressed what he saw 
                                                 
7 In the Romanian case, this became more evident with the PSD government headed by Nastase, and it is 
therefore not elaborated upon above. 
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as a morally corrupt new elite. At the same time, he avoided the nostalgic and nationalist 
rhetoric of Tudor in Romania and Méciar in Slovakia (Karasimeonov 2004:433).   
 
After four elections, the party system in Bulgaria appeared to have drastically altered. At the 
time of writing, we know that the 2005 elections produced another change of government, and 
also introduction of further new elements to the political landscape.   
 
 
Party systems in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 
 
Summing up the descriptive analysis above, it is clear that there are signs of both stability and 
instability. The first step in systematising these trends is to take a closer look at the 
differences in volatility and party replacement, as this was defined in chapter 2. 
 
Table 3.   Volatility and party replacement in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 1990-2004 
 First-Second Election Second-Third Election Third-Fourth Election 
 Volatility Party 
Replacement 
Score 
Volatility Party 
Replacement 
Score 
Volatility Party 
Replacement 
Score 
Hungary (PR 
ballot) 
 
24,98 5,64 30,69 2,22 Data 
missing 
Data missing 
Romania 
 
56,52 41,77 16,34 14,69 30,88 32,89 
Bulgaria 
 
10,94 58,09 20,92 55,63 25,10 12,34 
Mean Central-
Europe8 
25,56 41,03 18,48 19,27 20,42* 26,77* 
*Lacking data for Poland and Hungary       Source: Birch 
2001 
 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary all have high volatility scores in the elections Birch studies, 
but Hungary has a lower party replacement score than the other two countries (Birch 2001: 
                                                 
8 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia 
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16-17).9 Interestingly, volatility increased steadily in Bulgaria, while it has been fluctuating 
more in the two other countries (Birch 2001: 17). Still, the lack of clear patterns would 
support an argument towards overall instability both on the elite level, and in terms of vertical 
voter alignment. The question remains if this also means that there is less reason for expecting 
strong horizontal alignment, i.e. between different voters who share values on cleavage 
variables? Following the theory set forth below, this is not necessarily the case. In this regard, 
it is important to note that it has be argued that as much as three-quarters of mean volatility in 
Central and Eastern Europe has been caused by party change (Rose and Munro 2003:82).  
 
The next question is how the pattern of fragmentation has developed.  The number of 
effective parties gives information about fragmentation on the parliamentary level, with the 
benefit of taking both the number of parties and the relative size of the parties into account 
(Bakke 2006:271). However, it should also be pointed out that large differences in the sizes of 
the parties will result in a lower effective number of parties than a more even-sized 
parliament. Although it is not the primary focus here, I have also classified the countries` 
party systems by Ware`s categories, both when considering and not considering relative party 
size in Table 4 (Ware 2003:158 pp.). This has been included primarily to illustrate that 
numerical measures alone only provides part of the picture. The parties` behaviour is likely to 
be influenced by the relative size of the parties, which in turn could influence the structures of 
competition (Ware 2003:161). 
 
Table 4 shows that the level of fragmentation is lower in Hungary and Bulgaria than in 
Romania. Bulgaria has also produced a predominant party system in each election, but as we 
know, this relates to three different parties, and the overall impression is therefore one of 
instability. Considering relative size, the overall impression of Hungary is one of a system of 
two large parties, with other parties playing support roles in government formation processes 
and coalition-building. Romania also appear to have a lower level of stability than Hungary, 
both due to the higher level of fragmentation and in light of the undefined party system, when 
considering the relative size of the parties.   
 
 
                                                 
9 Birch has data on the first five elections for Bulgaria, the first four elections in Romania, and the first three 
elections in Hungary. 
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 Table 4.   Parties and party system in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 1990-2004 
 Number of 
parties gaining 
representation10 
Effective 
number of 
parties11 
Percentage of 
seats held by 
the largest 
party 
Party system, 
not considering 
relative size 
Party system, 
considering 
relative size 
Hungary 199012 7 3,79 42,49 More than five 
parties 
System with 
two large 
parties 
Hungary 1994 7 2,11 54,15 Predominant 
party system 
Predominant 
party system 
Hungary 1998 8 3,08 34,72 More than five 
parties 
Even multiparty 
system13 
Hungary 2002 4 2,21 48,70 Three to five 
parties 
System with 
two large 
parties 
      
Romania 1990 27 2,20 66,41 Predominant 
party system 
Predominant 
party system 
Romania 1992 20 4,81 35,67 More than five 
parties 
Even multiparty 
system 
Romania 1996 21 3,94 35,57 More than five 
parties 
Even multiparty 
system 
Romania 2000 23 3,53 44,93 More than five 
parties 
System with 
two large 
parties 
      
Bulgaria 1991 3 2,92 52,08 Predominant 
party system 
Predominant 
party system 
Bulgaria 1994 5 2,73 57,55 Predominant 
party system 
Predominant 
party system 
Bulgaria 1997 5 2,47 50 Predominant 
party system 
Predominant 
party system 
Bulgaria 2001 4 2,92 66,41 Predominant 
party system 
Predominant 
party system 
                                                 
10 No threshold is applied for measuring relevant parties, and the table therefore includes the minority seats in the 
Romanian legislature. 
11 Based on percentage of seats in Parliament, not counting independents and joint candidates. 
12 Independent candidates are not counted 
13 Very close to be classified as a system with two large parties 
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 Returning to Mair`s classification of open versus closed structures of competition, which 
remains the primary focus in the evaluation of the party systems here, we should have 
sufficient information to classify the overall impression of the party systems after the first 
four elections. 
 
Table 5.   Party systems and structure of competition 
Structure of competition  True Partly True False 
Wholesale alternation in 
office, or non-alternation in 
office 
Hungary 
Romania  
Bulgaria 
  
Familiar governing formulae Hungary Romania Bulgaria 
Access to government 
restricted to a limited number 
of parties 
Hungary Romania Bulgaria 
 
Although Romania had to wait until the third election, all three countries have had wholesale 
alternation in office. The variation on the familiarity with governing formulaes is interesting. 
Hungary has, since the transformation of FIDESZ was consolidated, seen such familiarity in 
the government formation processes. Romania has been more open, but the clear division 
between FSN/FDSN/PDSR and an alternative suggests that there is some degree of 
predictability on this dimension. However, the varying fortunes of the red-brown coalitions do 
to a certain extent contradict this. The 2001 election in Bulgaria clearly underlines that the 
governing formulae are not predictable in this country. The same differences between the 
countries apply to access to government.  
 
Summing up, Hungary can be said to have a party system with a closed structure of 
competition and low level of fragmentation. The Romanian party system is fragmented, but 
shows tendencies to a closed structure of competition, while Bulgaria, despite a low level of 
fragmentation has an open structure of competition. In stability terms, Hungary therefore 
appears to be stable and Bulgaria unstable, with Romania in an intermediary position. 
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Chapter 4. Methodology14 
 
This chapter will elaborate on the choice of method for analysing the presence and effects of 
cleavages, as well as present the measures that will be interpreted in the multivariate logistic 
regression analysis. Issues relating to the validity and reliability of the analysis will also be 
discussed. 
 
Data and operationalisation of the cleavages 
 
Cleavages have been defined as historically founded sociological structures that shape voting 
behaviour over time. This gives us a natural dichotomous dependent variable, as one can only 
voter for one party at the time. The independent variables are operationalisations of the 
possible cleavages identified in Chapter 2. The codebook for operationalisations of the 
cleavages can be found in Appendix 4. Different datasets have been used for the different 
elections and countries, and the details are available in Appendix 4.15 This has posed quite a 
challenge in terms of recoding the data in order to make them comparable. The independent 
variables have been dichotomized as well, in order to simplify the comparisons and raise the 
level of abstraction. This should also add to the reliability of the analysis, as long as the same 
level of abstraction is kept. However, one can not reject the possibility of different results if 
the cleavages are measured on another scale. 
 
The operationalistation of the variables also raises the question of the validity of the data, in 
the sense that it is important that the variables actually measure the cleavages they are 
intended to measure (Ringdal 2001:168). The applied definition of the concept and the 
historical foundation of the expected cleavages have been the guidelines for my selection of 
                                                 
14 I worked closely with a fellow student, Bjarte Folkestad, in the initial stages of writing this thesis. As he was 
doing a similar study of cleavages in post-communist Russia, we cooperated extensively on developing a 
suitable methodology for our purpose. Hence, this chapter bears significant resemblance to Folkestad`s chapter 
on methodology (Folkestad 2005:59pp.). 
15 Some of the data that have been used in this thesis have been compiled from the Eurobarometers of the EU. 
The data have been made available by Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste (NSD). Neither the EU nor 
NSD have responsibility for the analysis or findings in this thesis. The other data have been made available with 
the kind assistance of Wissenchaftzentrum für Sozialforschung in Berlin (WZB) during my stay as a Ruhrgas 
scholar there August-September 2004. The responsibility for the analysis or findings in this thesis is mine alone 
also when based on these data. 
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variables. The main challenge has been that it has not been possible to use the same variable 
for each cleavage in all the elections, and this remains an issue with regards to the validity.  
 
Furthermore, a filter for relevant parties is applied in the datasets, so that only the voters who 
voted for the relevant parties are counted as units. The rationale for this is that we want to 
focus on the voting behaviour that has defined the party systems in the study. 
 
The question of which cleavages to test is important, and it is hard to avoid errors in this 
respect. The possible errors can be separated in two types: Type I errors in the cases were 
cleavages, which in fact are true cleavages are not tested, and Type II errors where structures, 
which are not true cleavages are included in the models (Przeworski et.al. 2000:23). 
Following the rather rigid definition of cleavages that is presented above, this analysis appears 
to be better guarded against Type II errors than against Type I errors. This is a deliberate 
choice as the model could then rather be extended to include more variables in the future.  
 
Design 
 
It is also clear that voting behaviour can not be accounted for by cleavages alone. There are 
many different approaches to explaining voting behaviour, and it could also be argued that the 
experience from the West suggest that different forms of rational choice theory are best suited 
for analysing voter behaviour because they explain changes (Evans and Whitefield 
1993:527p.). However, I would argue that cleavages play some role for voting behaviour if 
they are present, even when they are not analysed at the level of abstraction that is used here. 
As explained in the introduction to the thesis, it is far beyond the scope of the thesis to 
develop a completely satisfactory statistical model for explaining voting behaviour. The focus 
here is to identify cleavages and examine their effect on the party systems. That does of 
course not relieve us of the dilemma of control variables. As long as it is an assumption that 
cleavages alone are insufficient for explaining voting behaviour to a full extent, it is an 
inherent weakness that there will be errors. Not measuring the effect of the institutional 
design, particularly salient issues, or the state of the economy are a few examples in this 
respect. The assumption is that it is possible to obtain a meaningful understanding of the 
relationship between the cleavages and voting behaviour without these control variables.  
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Although table analysis would give valuable information with the basic design described 
above, there are clear arguments in favour of using regression analysis. In order to assess the 
presence and importance of the cleavages, the outputs of interest are primarily level of 
significance, and the direction and strength of the correlation between the variables. At the 
first step of the analysis, bivariate logistic regressions will be used to map out the significant 
variables, as well as whether the correlation is positive or negative. The level of significance 
is defined as the chosen probability level for accepting a false rejection of the assumption that 
the correlation between the independent and dependent variables is zero (Skog 2003:176). 
The variables that are significant on a 5% level, i.e. less than 5% probability for rejecting a 
correct assumption of no correlation, in the bivariate regressions will then be used to make 
multivariate models. The standardised logistic regression coefficient Beta will also be 
reported in the multivariate regressions in order to evaluate the strength of the relationship, 
controlled for the effect of the other variables.  
 
The design furthermore rests upon a systematic interpretation of the findings in the 
multivariate models. Tables and scatterplots showing the resilience of significant variables 
over time will create a framework for interpreting the patterns of cleavages. This will provide 
us with a good basis for a substantial interpretation of the findings within the developed 
theoretical framework, and enable us to examine the effects of cleavages on the party systems 
in the countries in question. 
 
 
Logistic regression 
 
An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression would be a problematic solution when working 
with a dichotomous dependent variable, and I have therefore decided to run logistic regression 
analysis throughout the thesis. The two main problems with using a linear regression model 
with a dichotomous dependent variable are that the statistical tests of significance may be 
unreliable, and that predicted probabilities may exceed the interval between 0 and 1 (Ringdal 
2001:428). The most fundamental problem is that the linear regression model assumes that the 
effect of X is constant, which enables predicted probabilities to exceed the interval between 0 
and 1. Logistic regression offers a solution to this for a dichotomous dependent variable 
through the logit-transformation. According to Ringdal this is done by firstly transforming 
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probabilities to odds, and then making the natural logarithm of the odds of Y=1 (logit Li) the 
dependent variable. The logistic regression model can then be defined as: 
Li =β0+ β1Xi1+ β2Xi2+...+ βK-1XiK-1 , where Li is a linear function of the x-variables and the 
probabilities are non-linear functions of the x-variables (Ringdal 2001:429).  
 
The second problem of using a linear regression model in our case is that the assumption of 
equal variance around the regression line for all values of the independent variable(s) is not 
met. This problem of lack of homoscedastity is solved by logistic regression because it does 
not apply Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for estimating the coefficients. Instead, the 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) technique is based on identifying the estimates of 
the coefficients with the greatest probability for creating the results in the selection, and thus 
avoids this (Ringdal 2001:429).  
 
Most likely, some of the independent variables that were significant on a 5% level in the 
bivariate regressions will not remain significant at the same level when controlled for the 
effect of the other independent variables in the multivariate models. The multivariate models 
presented below are therefore the models that proved most robust, without being subject to 
multicollinearity.   
 
In the multivariate regressions, the logistic regression coefficients will also be standardised, in 
order to enable us to evaluate the strength of the correlations, when controlled for the effect of 
the other variables. Standardising the logistic regression coefficient (B) is not done 
automatically in SPSS. These have therefore been computed manually by: 
 
1. Saving the predicted values of Y when running the logistic analysis in SPSS, in 
addition to keeping the unstandardised regression coefficient (b) 
2. Saving Nagelkerke R2 (other measures of R would also work) 
3. Calculating the predicted value of logit(Y) by using the equation logit 
logit(Ŷ)=ln(Ŷ/1-Ŷ) 
4. Calculating SlogitŶ, the standard deviation of logit(Ŷ). 
5. Calculating the standard deviation (sx) of the independent variables in the equation  
6. Calculating the standardised logistic regression coefficient by using the following 
formula Byx=(byx)(sx)(R)/ SlogitŶ (Menard 2001:52pp). 
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The values of the parameters necessary ((byx),(sx),(R), and (SlogitŶ)) for calculating the Beta 
values (B) will all be reported as output in the multivariate models below for the sake of 
transparency. However, the interpretations of the findings will be based on the level of 
significance and the direction and strength of the Beta values alone. The standardised logistic 
regression is interpreted much like the interpretation of the standardised regression coefficient 
in a linear regression. An increase of 1 standard deviation in X produces a B standard 
deviation increase in logit(Y) (Menard 2001:53). 
 
  
 51
Chapter 5. Analysis 
 
The findings from the bivariate regressions are not presented in detail here, but incorporated 
in the text where necessary. Output from the bivariate regressions can be found in Appendix 
2. The focus here is on the multivariate models and the relationships over time. The country- 
and party specific analysis come first, before cleavage patterns in the three countries are 
compared. Finally, we turn to the question of the relationship between the cleavage patterns 
and party systems. 
 
Hungary 
 
The three parties that have obtained representation in all four elections will be discussed first, 
before turning to the other parties. A comparison of the findings from the different party 
analyses should help to identify the most clear-cut patterns. If the multivariate logistic 
regression models give similar results over time, this would be a clear indication that 
cleavages have an important role for the support base of the party in question and thus for the 
political system.   
 
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 
 
MSZP was established in October 1989 and distanced itself from Marxist-Leninism from the 
outset (Tóka 2004:291). One of the interesting questions relating to this party is if the break 
with the past is also visible in their voters. The multivariate models are presented in Table 6: 
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 Table 6.   Multivariate logistic regression analysis for MSZP support 
        
MSZP 1990        
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,584 0,280 0,284 0,753 0,351 0,037 -0,077 
Nationalism (is harmful) 0,370 0,154 0,284 0,753 0,498 0,016 0,069 
Nostalgia 1,587 0,151 0,284 0,753 0,363 0,000 0,217 
Farmer -0,712 0,339 0,284 0,753 0,297 0,036 -0,080 
Market economy is positive -0,433 0,156 0,284 0,753 0,490 0,006 -0,080 
Constant -2,652 0,141    0,000  
        
        
MSZP 1994        
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,888 0,201 0,297 0,750 0,341 0,000 -0,120 
Nationalism (is harmful) 0,400 0,103 0,297 0,750 0,498 0,000 0,079 
Nostalgia 1,143 0,114 0,297 0,750 0,365 0,000 0,165 
Satisfaction with democracy -0,512 0,116 0,297 0,750 0,466 0,000 -0,095 
Income in the lowest quartile -0,404 0,127 0,297 0,750 0,427 0,001 -0,069 
Market economy is positive -0,543 0,106 0,297 0,750 0,493 0,000 -0,106 
Constant -1,385 0,096    0,000  
        
        
MSZP 1998        
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,758 0,246 0,287 0,676 0,353 0,002 -0,114 
Nostalgia 1,104 0,193 0,287 0,676 0,456 0,000 0,214 
Satisfaction with democracy -0,593 0,158 0,287 0,676 0,499 0,000 -0,126 
Constant -0,960 0,192   0,000  
        
        
MSZP 2002        
  b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,832 0,197 0,159 0,331 0,319 0,000 -0,128 
Urban 0,265 0,140 0,159 0,331 0,433 0,058 0,055 
Income in second quartile 
(difficult to live on income) 0,315 0,133 0,159 0,331 0,468 0,018 0,071 
Income in lowest quartile (very 
difficult to live on income) 0,396 0,203 0,159 0,331 0,306 0,052 0,058 
Constant -0,092 0,093   0,318  
 
The multivariate logistic regressions still show that nostalgia is an important and stable 
predictor for support for this party in the three first elections, controlled for the effects of the 
other variables in the models.16 Moreover, it is also consistently the strongest variable when 
measured by the Beta values. As expected, the religiosity variable is significant and negative 
over time, when controlled for the other variables in the models. It is interesting that the 
                                                 
16 No relevant variable is available for the 2002 analysis. 
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market economy variable only is negative and significant in the two first elections in the 
multivariate models. The variable is also significant on the 5% level in the bivariate analysis 
in 1998, but in this election it is omitted from the multivariate model because it is not longer 
significant when controlled for the other variables. This may indicate a weak economic 
cleavage or that the anti-market voters have left MSZP. Other variables are less stable in the 
multivariate models, but it should be noted that the voters are significantly anti-nationalist in 
the two first elections, other variables held constant. Furthermore, the significant negative 
Beta value on the farmer variable in 1990 and the positive Beta value on the urban variable in 
2002 can be interpreted as a reflection of a pattern of an urban support base. This is also 
supported by the findings in the bivariate models, where the urban variable is positively 
significant on a 10% significance level in all four elections.  
 
Overall then, the multivariate models first and foremost give a strong incentive not to reject 
the notion of a nostalgic dimension and it also suggests that this dimension is reinforced by 
secularity. The economic cleavage is interesting as the leftist attitude appears to be confirmed 
in the first two elections, but it disappears from the multivariate models later. A tentative 
conclusion here could be that while economic policy attitudes are not insignificant for voting 
behaviour, they are not dominant. In the sense that this issue is not capable of creating a stable 
common identity and behaviour among the groups of the electorate, it should not be 
considered cleavage. However, this needs to be interpreted in light of the findings for the 
other parties. 
 
Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDZS. 
 
SZDZS has seen a dramatic decline in support over from the 1990 election to the 2002 
election. As it was noted above when discussing volatility, this is interesting from a cleavage 
perspective because it is a promising test case for the defining cleavages of the core electorate 
of the party.  
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Table 7.   Multivariate logistic regression analysis for SZDZS support 
SZDZS 1990               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,308 0,170 0,160 0,457 0,351 0,071 -0,038 
Urban 0,306 0,119 0,160 0,457 0,484 0,010 0,052 
Income in the third quartile 0,585 0,130 0,160 0,457 0,421 0,000 0,086 
Income in the highest quartile 0,496 0,129 0,160 0,457 0,431 0,000 0,075 
Farmer -0,670 0,249 0,160 0,457 0,297 0,007 -0,070 
Market economy is positive 0,149 0,108 0,160 0,457 0,490 0,167 0,026 
Constant -1,953 0,127     0,000   
                
                
SZDZS 1994               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,972 0,274 0,186 0,696 0,341 0,000 -0,089 
Nationalism (is harmful) 0,625 0,144 0,186 0,696 0,498 0,000 0,083 
Urban 0,623 0,167 0,186 0,696 0,481 0,000 0,080 
Capitol and surroundings 0,300 0,153 0,186 0,696 0,407 0,050 0,033 
Nostalgia -0,790 0,216 0,186 0,696 0,365 0,000 -0,077 
Market economy is positive 0,328 0,133 0,186 0,696 0,493 0,014 0,043 
Constant -3,166 0,173     0,000   
                
                
SZDZS 1998               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Calvinist 0,755 0,342 0,158 0,560 0,383 0,027 0,081 
Capitol and surroundings 0,789 0,335 0,158 0,560 0,395 0,018 0,088 
Income in the third quartile 0,725 0,313 0,158 0,560 0,489 0,021 0,100 
Constant -3,435 0,277     0,000   
        
                
SZDZS 2002               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Catholic -1,038 0,365 0,212 0,3307 0,4984 0,004 -0,331 
Nationalism -1,160 0,606 0,212 0,3307 0,4006 0,056 -0,297 
Urban 0,969 0,302 0,212 0,3307 0,4335 0,001 0,269 
Income in the third quartile 
(“coping”) 0,833 0,336 0,212 0,3307 0,5002 0,013 0,267 
Constant -3,496 0,329     0,000   
 
The urban and/or capitol variables are important and significant in all elections. There is also 
a pattern of secularity among the voters, as negative values on church attendance is significant 
in 1990 and 1994, while catholic denomination is negative and significant in 2002. The 
positive Beta value for Calvinism in 1998 disturbs this picture somewhat, but overall there are 
similarities to the finding in the MSZP models for these two cleavages. Moreover, the voters 
also appear to be anti-nationalist, although this variable is only significant in two of the 
multivariate models.  
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A positive attitude to market economy is visible in the multivariate models for the first two 
elections. However, it should be noted that the variable is only significant on a dubious 17% 
significance level in 1990 and that the Beta-values are relatively modest compared to the 
other variables in the respective models. Although with opposite directions on the 
correlations, this variable follows the same development as in the MSZP analysis by loosing 
significance after the 1994 election. In this respect, it supports the preliminary conclusion that 
economic policy attitudes are part of the political agenda in Hungary, but not fundamental 
enough to produce a cleavage. 
 
SZDZS appear to have a stable support base in the group of people with an income in the 
third quartile. This variable is significant in the 1990, 1998 and 2002 elections, when 
controlled for other variables. A somewhat surprising finding is that negative values on the 
nostalgic variable are not particularly visible. It appears only in the multivariate model for 
1994 and it is not significant in the bivariate analysis for 1990 and 1998. This could have been 
a cleavage that would have cut across other similarities with MSZP, but the conclusion must 
be that this is not a defining dimension for SZDZS support.  
 
Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) and FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party(FIDESZ-
MPP) 
 
There is wide consensus on the substantial change in policy and image that  FIDESZ 
underwent before the elections in 1998, when the party also was renewed in name as a result 
of a merger.  
 
Table 8 shows that the changes on the elite level are also clearly visible on the level of the 
voters. When controlled for the other variables in the models, the multivariate models show 
that while secularity and low church attendance explained FIDESZ support in the 1990 and 
1994 elections, high church attendance becomes positive and significant in 1998 and 2002, 
when controlled for the other variables in the models. Furthermore, catholic denomination is 
also positive and significant in the multivariate model for 2002. A similar pattern can be 
observed on the urban-rural dimension. The capitol variable is positive and significant in 
multivariate model for 1990, while the urban variable is negative and significant in 
multivariate models for 1998 and 2002. Despite being fundamental, the changes therefore 
appear to have been coherent. 
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Table 8.   Multivariate logistic regression analysis for FIDESZ and FIDESZ-MPP support 
Fidezs 1990               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,949 0,300 0,144 0,572 0,351 0,002 -0,084 
Secular 0,354 0,145 0,144 0,572 0,500 0,015 0,044 
Capitol and surroundings 0,421 0,158 0,144 0,572 0,406 0,007 0,043 
Nostalgia -0,624 0,222 0,144 0,572 0,363 0,005 -0,057 
Satisfaction with democracy -0,449 0,170 0,144 0,572 0,449 0,008 -0,051 
Market economy is positive 0,369 0,140 0,144 0,572 0,490 0,009 0,045 
Constant -2,408 0,139       0,000   
                
                
Fidesz 1994               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,614 0,223 0,183 0,582 0,341 0,006 -0,066 
Secular 0,615 0,113 0,183 0,582 0,500 0,000 0,096 
Satisfaction with democracy -0,249 0,120 0,183 0,582 0,466 0,038 -0,036 
Income in the lowest quartile -0,302 0,140 0,183 0,582 0,427 0,031 -0,041 
Farmer -0,659 0,242 0,183 0,582 0,293 0,006 -0,061 
Market economy is positive 0,420 0,108 0,183 0,582 0,493 0,000 0,065 
Constant -2,043 0,114       0,000   
                
                
Fidesz-Mpp 1998               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity 0,431 0,224 0,332 0,732 0,353 0,055 0,069 
Nationalism 0,321 0,162 0,332 0,732 0,496 0,048 0,072 
Urban -0,375 0,175 0,332 0,732 0,458 0,032 -0,078 
Nostalgia -0,613 0,174 0,332 0,732 0,456 0,000 -0,139 
Satisfaction with democracy 0,963 0,165 0,332 0,732 0,499 0,000 0,218 
Income in the third quartile  0,414 0,164 0,332 0,732 0,489 0,012 0,092 
Constant -0,634 0,234       0,007   
                
                
Fidesz-Mpp-MDF 2002               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Catholic 0,285 0,126 0,176 0,331 0,498 0,023 0,076 
Religiosity 0,698 0,194 0,176 0,331 0,319 0,000 0,119 
Urban -0,474 0,146 0,176 0,331 0,433 0,001 -0,110 
Constant -0,480 0,093       0,000   
 
A second interesting observation is that the economic policy dimension also changes. The 
multivariate models for 1990 and 1994 shows that a positive attitude to market economy had 
a positive and significant effect on FIDESZ support, when controlled for the other variables in 
the model. As for the other parties, this variable is no longer significant when tested with 
control variables in 1998 and 2002.  
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The feature that is most consistent over time is the negative value on the nostalgia dimension. 
The anti-communist attitude is significant in the multivariate models for both 1990 and 1998. 
 
Independent Smallholders Party, FKGP 
 
This historical agrarian party gained representation in the three first elections, but lost all their 
seats in 2002. The history and profile of the party delivers promises of a clear cleavage based 
existence, and this could of course point to the conclusion that the 2002 election represents a 
de-alignment. However, this would be a premature conclusion as both underlying 
assumptions in such an argument need an empirical assessment. First of all, we need to 
determine the factors that secured support in the three elections when FKGP won seats in 
Parliament, and secondly, we need to determine if these factors have been important for a 
different party in 2002. If the latter is the case, the cleavages have probably proven more 
resilient than the party itself.   
Table 9.   Multivariate logistic regression analysis for FKGP support 
FKGP 1990        
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Calvinist 0,593 0,207 0,238 0,926 0,307 0,004 0,047 
Religiosity 0,350 0,188 0,238 0,926 0,351 0,063 0,032 
Urban -0,466 0,169 0,238 0,926 0,484 0,006 -0,058 
Capitol and surroundings -1,015 0,331 0,238 0,926 0,406 0,002 -0,106 
Nostalgia  -1,034 0,334 0,238 0,926 0,363 0,002 -0,096 
Income in the second quartile 0,641 0,195 0,238 0,926 0,436 0,001 0,072 
Income in the lowest quartile 0,714 0,191 0,238 0,926 0,441 0,000 0,081 
Farmer 0,655 0,201 0,238 0,926 0,297 0,001 0,050 
Constant -2,628 0,171   0,000  
        
        
FKGP 1994        
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Urban -0,539 0,194 0,168 0,887 0,481 0,006 -0,049 
Capitol and surroundings -0,825 0,352 0,168 0,887 0,407 0,019 -0,063 
Nostalgia -1,498 0,460 0,168 0,887 0,365 0,001 -0,103 
Income in the lowest quartile 0,748 0,182 0,168 0,887 0,427 0,000 0,060 
Farmer 0,435 0,236 0,168 0,887 0,293 0,066 0,024 
Constant -2,762 0,152   0,000  
        
FKGP 1998        
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity 0,860 0,340 0,191 0,700 0,353 0,011 0,083 
Nationalism -0,711 0,321 0,191 0,700 0,496 0,027 -0,096 
Urban -0,603 0,337 0,191 0,700 0,458 0,074 -0,075 
Farmer 0,621 0,332 0,191 0,700 0,466 0,061 0,079 
Constant -2,392 0,356    0,000  
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The multivariate models show an expected pattern of reinforcing cleavages that defines a 
support base. The rural and agrarian profile of the voters is significant in all the multivariate 
models. Furthermore, religiosity is also positive and significant in 1990 and 1998. It is 
noteworthy that the income variables from the first and second quartile are significant and 
positive, when controlled for the other variables. This is probably due to an overlap effect 
with the agrarian profile of the voters, and it is interesting that the relationship is robust 
enough to withstand the test of control variables in the multivariate model, without being 
subject to multicollinearity.    
 
The nostalgia variable is significant and negative in the multivariate models for 1990 and 
1994. It is still negative in the bivariate regression for 1998, but not significant on a 5 % level. 
This fits with the overall impression of an re-enforcing cleavage structure that distinguishes 
these voters from the MSZP voters. The comparatively high Beta values on the variable in 
1990 and 1994 make it somewhat surprising that the variable is no longer significant in 1998.  
 
Christian Democratic National People`s Party (KDNP) 
 
Although this party was only represented in 1990 and 1994 and with around 5 percent of the 
seats in the Parliament, it is another interesting party from a cleavage perspective. 
 
Table 10. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for KDNP support 
KDNP 1990        
  b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity 1,841 0,222 0,301 1,035 0,351 0,000 0,019 
Catholic  1,316 0,256 0,301 1,035 0,482 0,000 0,185 
Constant -4,465 0,220    0,000  
        
        
KDNP 1994        
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Catholic  0,863 0,225 0,316 0,974 0,482 0,000 0,135 
Religiosity 2,108 0,211 0,316 0,974 0,341 0,000 0,233 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 0,460 0,198 0,316 0,974 0,466 0,020 0,070 
Constant -4,481 0,206    0,000  
 
The findings are very much as expected with catholic denomination and religiosity as strongly 
positive and significant variables in the multivariate models, other variables held constant. 
The bivariate models also show significant negative values for nostalgia and positive values 
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for the lowest quartile of income in both elections, but these variables are not significant when 
controlled for the effect of the religion variables and thus omitted from the final multivariate 
models. Although the KDNP voters gave a clear indication of an important religious cleavage 
in the first two elections, it is once again necessary to look at the bigger picture to understand 
the importance of the religious dimension. 
 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) 
 
Table 11. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for MDF support 
MDF 1990        
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Catholic  0,194 0,097 0,132 0,285 0,482 0,047 0,043 
Religiosity -0,275 0,138 0,132 0,285 0,351 0,046 -0,045 
Nostalgia -0,305 0,132 0,132 0,285 0,363 0,021 -0,051 
Satisfaction with democracy 0,532 0,097 0,132 0,285 0,449 0,000 0,111 
Constant -1,069 0,069    0,000  
        
        
MDF 1994        
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Calvinist 0,520 0,187 0,261 0,837 0,308 0,006 0,050 
Secular -0,697 0,156 0,261 0,837 0,500 0,000 -0,109 
Nationalism (is harmful) -0,335 0,139 0,261 0,837 0,498 0,016 -0,052 
Capitol and surroundings 0,446 0,156 0,261 0,837 0,407 0,004 0,057 
Satisfaction with democracy 1,162 0,139 0,261 0,837 0,466 0,000 0,169 
Income in the lowest quartile 0,330 0,151 0,261 0,837 0,427 0,029 0,044 
Market economy is positive 0,534 0,141 0,261 0,837 0,493 0,000 0,082 
Constant -2,947 0,163    0,000  
 
 
The findings from the multivariate models for MDF are challenging to interpret. The one 
variable that is positively significant in both multivariate models is interesting in this respect. 
Satisfaction with democracy can be viewed as a transition-based cleavage, and it seems clear 
that MDF benefited from this in the first two elections. On the other hand, the next elections 
reveal that this proved to be a temporary base of support, especially as the transition in 
general terms went smoothly in Hungary.  
 
The picture gets more complex when we take the bivariate findings into consideration . A 
number of variables are significant in both the 1990 and the 1994 elections. The catholic and 
Calvinist denomination, religiosity, urban, lowest quartile of income and market economy all 
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have positive regression coefficients, while nostalgia and secularity are negative. The 
multivariate model for 1994 matches this picture pretty good as the Calvinist, urban, lowest 
quartile of income and market economy variables stay significant when controlled for the 
effect of the other variables in the model, though all with low Beta values. The multivariate 
model for 1990 is more of a puzzle in this respect as the model reveals a more confusing 
pattern on the religion dimension with religiosity turning out to have a negative effect and 
catholic denomination staying positive when the control variables are introduced. A possible 
interpretation of this is of course that the most devout Catholics went elsewhere, for instance 
to KDNP with their votes. The negative effect of nostalgia is still significant when controlled 
for the other variables. Overall, this may taken as support for the perspective that the 
democracy attitude was the overshadowing factor that had effect on voting for MDF, 
particularly in 1990. The Beta values for the satisfaction with democracy variable confirm this 
by being by far the highest in the multivariate models for both 1990 and 1994. 
 
Cleavage patterns in Hungary 
 
The findings from the regression analysis confirm the changes in the political landscape 
starting with the 1998 election. Moreover, it also confirms that the cleavages have been more 
resilient than some of the parties. In the following, we will leave the focus on the specific 
parties and examine the cleavages over time in cross tables and scatterplots that have been 
designed on background of the findings in the multivariate regressions. 
 
Religion 
The overall impression is that religion, and especially the cleavage between those with and 
without a strong belief, is an important dimension for voting behaviour in Hungary.  
Table 12. The religiosity cleavage in Hungary 
Religiosity 1990 1994 1998 2002 
Positive significant KDNP, FKGP KDNP, FKGP FIDESZ-MPP FIDESZ-
MPP-
MDF 
Negative significant MSZP, MDF, 
SZDZS, 
FIDESZ 
MSZP, 
SZDZS, 
FIDESZ 
 MSZP  
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The change of electoral base for FIDESZ-MPP is clearly visible in Table 12, as this party 
replaces KNDP and FKGP in this dimensional space. The negative significant findings are 
also important as it shows that weekly church attendance not only significantly increases the 
probability for voting for certain parties, but also that it decreases the probability for voting 
for especially MSZP.  
 
Urban-rural 
Furthermore, we see a similar pattern for the community size variable. The most interesting 
finding here is that it overlaps well with the religiosity dimension, something that is visible 
when we plot the Beta values from the multivariate models for the two variables in a 
scatterplot with the different parties in the different years as units. 
 
Figure 2. Scatterplot of the urban-rural and religiosity cleavages in Hungary 
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Although we loose information because of some parties` lack of significant results on both 
variables, the scatterplot clearly paints a picture of an important dimension in Hungarian 
politics. Moreover, when replacing the urban variable with nostalgia on the X-axis, while at 
the same time keeping Figure 2 in mind, we get a picture of a more complex cleavage pattern. 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of the nostalgia and religiosity cleavages in Hungary 
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When seen in connection with Figure 2 it is clear that the nostalgia cleavage cuts across the 
religiosity cleavage and in practise becomes a main difference between the MSZP voters and 
the other secular voters. At the same time, we also know that the rural electorate, in addition 
to being more frequent churchgoers, also display significant anti-nostalgic attitudes. For the 
rural segment of voters then, the nostalgia dimension reinforces the urban-rural cleavage.  
 
The lack of importance of economic policy attitudes in the last two elections is an indication 
of the absence of a traditional economic left-right cleavage in Hungary. Even when the pro-
market attitudes were significant in the multivariate analysis for SZDZS, the Beta values were  
comparatively low, thus indicating that the effect was not very strong when controlled for 
other variables. From a voter perspective then, it seems plausible that SZDZS never has been 
seen as a party on the right in the political spectrum by their core electorate and the coalition 
governments with MSZP have not been a gamble in this respect. This corresponds with what 
has been said about economic policy not being a primary dimension of differentiation in the 
party system when examined from the elite level (Kitschelt et.al 1999:313pp.). An economic 
dimension which appears to be more important is income, where SZDZS has firm support in 
the (upper) middle class. 
 
FIDESZ-MPP managed to capitalise on the existing cleavages and take over, firstly, the 
religious vote from KDNP and, later, even more of the rural vote from FKGP. Instead on 
being marginalised as party with a secular appeal, the cleavage structure made it possible to 
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survive with a new electoral base. The two other parties that have survived had less to fear. 
The nostalgia cleavage clearly separated their respective electorate bases, while the 
convergence on the urban and religion dimensions made them possible coalition partners.  
 
Romania  
 
The party by party approach that was applied in the analysis of Hungary is even more 
challenging to work with in the Romanian case. When Ion Iliescu was replaced by Mircea 
Geoana as the leader of PSD in the spring 2005, the speculations on whether or not the 
strongman of Romanian politics would found yet another party were widespread. Iliescu, who 
celebrated his 75th birthday a few weeks before loosing his position in his own party, would 
indeed have had the experience to do so. What does this tell us? First of all, the triple 
transition has been a longer process in Romania than in most other post-communist countries. 
This may also be visible in the analysis through weak or absent transition-related cleavages. 
On the other hand, the important difference between the stability of cleavage on the mass and 
elite levels should once again be a main concern.  
 
National Salvation Front, Demoratic National Salvation Front and Romanian Party of 
Social Democracy (FSN, FDSN, PDSR) 
 
There are obviously differences between the FSN that participated in the 1990 election and its 
successor parties. A common denominator is nevertheless that they were centred around Ion 
Iliescu. From a cleavage perspective it is therefore interesting to examine if there are coherent 
underlying dimensions that create a space that Iliescu and his parties have managed to 
occupy. The analysis of FSN in 1992 has also been included in Table 13, in order to examine 
differences between those who voted for this party and FDSN in the 1992 election. 
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Table 13. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for FSN, FDSN and PDSR support 
FSN 1990               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Orthodox 1,521 0,290 0,498 1,248 0,332 0,000 0,201 
Urban -0,916 0,189 0,498 1,248 0,498 0,000 -0,182 
Satisfaction with democracy 1,166 0,182 0,498 1,248 0,500 0,000 0,233 
Farmer 0,482 0,185 0,498 1,248 0,500 0,009 0,096 
Market economy is positive -1,150 0,181 0,498 1,248 0,500 0,000 -0,230 
Constant -0,497 0,344       0,148   
                
                
FDSN 1992               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Orthodox 2,263 0,351 0,402 1,189 0,425 0,000 0,325 
Urban -0,459 0,206 0,402 1,189 0,483 0,026 -0,075 
Satisfaction with democracy 0,975 0,195 0,402 1,189 0,462 0,000 0,015 
Income in the third quartile 0,647 0,226 0,402 1,189 0,408 0,004 0,089 
Market economy is positive -0,615 0,205 0,402 1,189 0,434 0,003 -0,090 
Constant -2,449 0,383       0,000   
        
                
FSN 1992               
Variables in the Equation b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Titular national 1,579 0,730 0,132 0,643 0,360 0,030 0,117 
Satisfaction with democracy 0,688 0,295 0,132 0,643 0,462 0,020 0,065 
Constant -4,295 0,729       0,000   
        
                
PDSR 1996               
Variables in the Equation b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Hungarian minority -2,471 0,732 0,327 0,950 0,257 0,001 -0,219 
Urban -0,459 0,188 0,327 0,950 0,497 0,015 -0,079 
Nostalgia 0,602 0,179 0,327 0,950 0,499 0,001 0,103 
Farmer 0,586 0,255 0,327 0,950 0,362 0,021 0,073 
Market economy is positive -1,001 0,175 0,327 0,950 0,487 0,000 -0,168 
Constant -0,636 0,193       0,001   
                
                
PDSR 2000               
Variables in the Equation b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Orthodox 0,733 0,316 0,435 1,026 0,372 0,020 0,116 
Nationalism 0,941 0,209 0,435 1,026 0,499 0,000 0,199 
Nostalgia 0,820 0,212 0,435 1,026 0,486 0,000 0,169 
Satisfaction with democracy -0,477 0,264 0,435 1,026 0,412 0,071 -0,830 
Market economy is positive -0,980 0,224 0,435 1,026 0,458 0,000 -0,190 
Constant -1,081 0,360       0,003   
 
The multivariate cleavage analysis confirms that the bases of support for FSN in 1990, FDSN 
in 1992 and PDSR have very much in common.  A negative value on the market economy 
variable significantly increases the probability of voting for these parties in all four elections, 
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other variables in the models held constant. The rural support is also important, and this is 
significant when controlled for the other variables in the model in the first three elections. The 
rural variable is also significant on the 5% level in the bivariate regression for the 2000 
election. The parties` space on the urban-rural dimension is further strengthened by the 
significant positive values for farmer support as this appears in the multivariate models for 
1990 and 1996. 
 
An interesting finding is the development on the nostalgia dimension. Regardless of what 
perspective one has on whether the events of Christmas 1989 was the beginning of a ”stolen 
revolution” or not, it is clear that FSN was the principal actor in the overthrow of the old 
regime. Thus, it also makes sense that nostalgic attitudes were not significant for this party in 
the early elections. The finding from the multivariate models for PDSR is that nostalgia 
sentiments towards the communist part become positive and significant in the 1996 and 2000 
elections, when controlled for the other variables. Seen in connection with the other variable 
that concerns regime attitude, i.e. satisfaction with democracy, the picture becomes somewhat 
clearer. A positive value on this variable was a significant predictor for FSN support in 1990 
and for FDSN support in 1992, when controlled for the other variables. Measured by the Beta 
values, it was in fact the strongest variable in the model for FSN in 1990. However, in 2000 
the same variable is negative and significant (on a 7% level). This development might be 
interpreted as a change of electoral support base, but as other cleavages like the rural and anti- 
market characteristics seem to be persistent, it could very well be that the regime attitudes has 
changed within the same stable electorate. After all, cleavages that are related to attitudes 
concerned with the transition process would be likely to change more in the Romanian than 
for instance the Hungarian setting, as the development has been slower and with more 
challenges. In this sense, it could be argued that while the Iliescu leadership was credited by 
parts of the electorate as representatives of a new era in the early nineties, it was also seen as 
the party that could secure the aspects that filled the same parts of electorate with 
disillusionment or disappointment in the end of the nineties. The regime cleavage is then an 
important one, caused by both the peculiarities of the Ceausescu regime and the difficult 
transition process.  
 
The question of whether or not Iliescu has targeted nationalist sentiments in the electorate is 
not easy to answer on background of the findings here, partly because of lack of relevant data  
for the first two elections. It has been argued that there is a distinct red-brown dimension in 
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Romania, and that Iliescu has targeted this to various degrees in the elections (Crowther 2004: 
384-386). Pride of citizenship is positive and significant in the multivariate model for 2000, 
and positive and significant on a 10% level in a bivariate model for 1996. To a certain extent 
then, especially as it is also visible that the orthodox and ethnic Romanians are important, it 
can be cautiously argued that this is a cleavage that to a certain extent reinforces the other 
cleavages that predict support for Iliescu`s parties.  
 
The split in FSN that was caused by the internal power struggle between factions centred 
around former Prime Minister Petre Roman, who argued for a more pro-reform policy, and 
Iliescu`s supporters, led to FSN competing with FDSN in the 1992 election. The multivariate 
analysis for FSN in 1992 shows that ethnicity remains a significant predictor, when controlled 
for other variables, while other variables no longer are significant. It is especially interesting 
that a main predictor for the Iliescu parties, i.e. negative attitudes to market economy is not 
significant for support for Petre Roman`s FSN in 1992.  
 
National Liberal Party and Democratic Convention of Romania (PNL and CDR) 
 
Due to  PNL`s important role in CDR, these are interpreted together here. The 1990 election 
was difficult for PNL and the poor result suggested that this founding election was completely 
centred around and dominated by FSN. However, the Table 14 shows an interesting pattern of 
a clearly defined support base. It can be argued that cleavages are never more visible than in 
difficult times for a party, as the most typical voters are the first to arrive and the last to leave. 
The multivariate model show that the variables that were significant predictors for FSN 
support in 1990 to a large extent are the same variables that predict the probability for PNL 
votes, but of course with different direction on the correlation. This clearly suggest that these 
two parties are on the opposite ends of a set of reinforcing cleavages. 
 
When controlled for the effect the other variables in the model, it is visible that urban 
residence and pro-market attitudes significantly increased the probability for voting PNL in 
1990, when controlled for the effect of the other variables in the model.  
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Table 14. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for PNL and CDR support 
PNL 1990               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -1,237 0,427 0,383 1,187 0,395 0,004 -0,158 
Urban 0,625 0,254 0,383 1,187 0,498 0,014 0,100 
Satisfaction with 
democracy -1,157 0,253 0,383 1,187 0,500 0,000 -0,187 
Farmer -0,771 0,252 0,383 1,187 0,500 0,002 -0,124 
Market economy is 
positive 1,284 0,246 0,383 1,187 0,500 0,000 0,207 
Constant -2,019 0,308       0,000   
                
                
CDR 1992               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Protestant 0,899 0,330 0,296 0,761 0,259 0,007 0,091 
Urban 0,596 0,185 0,296 0,761 0,483 0,001 0,112 
Satisfaction with 
democracy -1,345 0,236 0,296 0,761 0,462 0,000 -0,242 
Market economy is 
positive 0,460 0,223 0,296 0,761 0,434 0,039 0,078 
Constant -1,321 0,207       0,000   
                
                
CDR 1996               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity 0,292 0,175 0,266 0,581 0,439 0,096 0,059 
Secular 1,484 0,785 0,266 0,581 0,126 0,059 0,086 
Urban 0,500 0,152 0,266 0,581 0,497 0,001 0,114 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 0,408 0,199 0,266 0,581 0,384 0,040 0,072 
Nostalgia -0,538 0,151 0,266 0,581 0,499 0,000 -0,123 
Market economy is 
positive 0,591 0,155 0,266 0,581 0,487 0,000 0,132 
Constant -0,378 0,175       0,031   
                
                
PNL 2000               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Nationalism -1,192 0,481 0,137 0,803 0,499 0,013 -0,101 
Market economy is 
positive 0,974 0,629 0,137 0,803 0,458 0,122 0,076 
Constant -3,321 0,613       0,000   
 
The multivariate model for CDR in 1992 resembles the model for PNL in 1990 in some, but 
not all aspects. Pro-market attitudes remain a significant variable, when controlled for the 
other variables. However, when measured by Beta values it is clear that while this was the 
strongest predictor for PNL in the 1990 model,  it is only the fourth strongest for CDR in 
1992. A negative value on the satisfaction with democracy is more important. When 
controlled for other variables, this appears to be the main common denominator for CDR 
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voters. As we saw above, this clearly separates them from the FDSN voters. Furthermore, the 
urban dimension is confirmed from the 1990 analysis for PNL. A difference is that whereas 
religiosity significantly decreased the probability for voting for PNL in 1990, a protestant 
denomination is a significant and positive variable in the CDR model for 1992, other 
variables held constant. This is probably a result of the participants in the alliance, but it is 
interesting as it suggests that a protestant denomination and strength of belief are not cross-
cutting cleavages, insofar as they are cleavages at all.   
 
The 1996 elections were a watershed in Romanian post-communist politics. Not only did 
CDR win the Presidential election with Emil Constantinescu this year, but the victory in the 
Parliamentary election and the support from UMDR and USD enabled them to create a 
government with Victor Ciorbea as Prime Minister. Overall, the multivariate analysis for this 
election and the 2000 election confirm the importance of a positive attitude towards market 
economy. The nostalgia variable is negative and significant, when controlled for the effects of 
the other variables, in this election. This strengthens the assumption that CDR represented the 
liberal alternative to the FSN derived parties. At the same time, PNL performed poorly in 
2000, which was also an election with a much lower turnout than the previous elections. The 
liberal alternative appeared to be weakened, but the data in this analysis do not allow for 
conclusions on voter movements per se. It is therefore also difficult to assess why community 
size is no longer relevant in the multivariate models for either the relevant parties.  
 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UMDR) 
 
Regression analysis is hardly needed to support the understanding of how the Hungarian 
minority votes coherently for UMDR. The Hungarian minority is also a religious minority in 
the sense that they are not orthodox like the majority of Romanians. Furthermore, this ethnic 
cleavage is confirmed by significant negative values on the pride in citizenship variable, 
something that places these voters on one end of a possible nationalism dimension. The other 
findings are more incoherent, and likely to be reflections of the dramatic shifts in the 
country`s development. 
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Table 15. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for UMDR support 
UMDR 1990               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Catholic 1,531 0,553 0,648 1,992 0,168 0,006 0,084 
Orthodox -4,176 0,643 0,648 1,992 0,332 0,000 -0,450 
Market economy is 
positive 2,165 0,695 0,648 1,992 0,500 0,002 0,352 
Constant -2,659 0,706       0,000   
                
                
UMDR 1992               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Hungarian minority 5,531 0,540 0,731 0,349 0,349 0,000 4,046 
Constant -5,070 0,502       0,000   
                
                
UMDR 1996               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,959 0,545 0,251 3,043 0,261 0,078 -0,021 
Nationalism -3,429 1,017 0,251 3,043 0,499 0,001 -0,141 
Market economy is 
positive -0,944 0,354 0,251 3,043 0,487 0,008 -0,038 
Constant -1,811 0,235       0,000   
                
                
UMDR 2000               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Catholic 6,525 1,091 0,834 2,485 0,292 0,000 0,638 
Protestant 6,492 1,222 0,834 2,485 0,162 0,000 0,353 
Nationalism -1,276 0,745 0,834 2,485 0,499 0,087 -0,214 
Farmer 2,381 1,243 0,834 2,485 0,341 0,055 0,272 
Constant -5,299 1,050       0,000   
 
 
Party of Romanian National Unity and Greater Romania Party (PUNR and PRM) 
 
The parties that have labelled as nationalist are PUNR and PRM, and they are therefore 
analysed together here. Although their electoral fortunes have changed, with PUNR being a 
relevant party in 1992 and 1996 and PRM in 1996 and 2000, these parties have been 
important parts of the post-communist political landscape in Romania. 
 
Unfortunately, we are missing data on the nationalism dimension in the 1992 election, and all 
we can tell from Table 16 is that negative values on the capitol variable and on the nostalgia 
dimension were significant for PUNR votes in the multivariate model. 
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Table 16. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for PUNR and PRM support 
PUNR 1992               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Capitol and 
surroundings -1,566 1,022 0,150 0,721 0,297 0,125 -0,097 
Not nostalgic -1,084 0,315 0,150 0,721 0,487 0,001 -0,110 
Constant -2,032 0,195       0,000   
                
               
PRM 1996               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Nationalism 0,808 0,378 0,070 0,403 0,499 0,032 0,070 
Constant -3,837 0,305       0,000   
                
                
PUNR 1996               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Income in the second 
quartile 1,601 0,640 0,053 0,801 0,500 0,012 0,000 
Constant -5,067 0,579       0,000   
                
               
PRM 2000               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Orthodox 2,038 1,020 0,100 0,758 0,372 0,046 0,100 
Constant -4,511 1,005       0,000   
 
The analysis of PRM support in 1996 and 2000 do not explain all too much about the 
electoral base for the party. Although, the nationalism variable is positive and significant in a 
bivariate analysis in 1996, it is only significant on an 8% level in 2000 in the bivariate 
analysis. In 2000, it is instead orthodox denomination that is the sole significant predictor. It 
should be kept in mind that PRM did a very good election in 2000, and probably won voters 
outside their previous core electorate. A more diverse electorate could also make it more 
difficult to identify strong patterns of cleavages. Clearly, this could make a case for arguing a 
weak cleavage structure, but at the same time it should not be forgotten that increased diverse 
support blurs the picture of the core support, which may still be cleavage-based. Other factors 
can not be ruled out as explanations for this success. For example, PRM leader Vadim Tudor 
is a political character that draws extensively on his persona.  
 
It would nevertheless be premature to reject nationalism as a cleavage on background of these 
regression analyses alone. The pure existence of these parties can be interpreted as signs of a 
nationalistic dimension. At the same time, this could also be an aspect of the ethnic cleavage 
between the titular nationals and the Hungarian minority. In this sense, the findings suggest 
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that this rift is stronger and more coherent on the elite than on the mass level. Furthermore, it 
seems plausible that both the PRM and the PUNR voters distinguish themselves from the 
supporters of FSN derived parties by being more explicitly anti-establishment, in addition to 
more extreme on the nationalist issue.   
 
Social Democratic Union (USD) 
As mentioned above, USD formed government with CDR and UMDR after the 1996 election. 
The multivariate model shows that this was quite understandable considering the significant 
variables. 
Table 17. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for USD support 
USD 1996               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Catholic -1,867 1,018 0,182 0,985 0,252 0,067 -0,087 
Farmer -1,921 0,725 0,182 0,985 0,362 0,008 -0,128 
Market economy is 
positive 0,988 0,298 0,182 0,985 0,487 0,001 0,089 
Constant -2,759 0,268       0,000   
 
The findings overlap considerably with the multivariate model for CDR and it is interesting 
that there are no cross-cutting findings between CDR and USD. From a cleavage perspective, 
this could imply that it would be hard for both of them to survive in the future, and USD did 
split again before the 2000 election when the Democratic Party (PD) decided to run alone. 
 
Democratic Party (PD) 
 
PD qualifies as a relevant party in the 2000 election, where it won one more seat than PNL to 
become the third largest party in the legislature.  
 
Table 18. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for PD support 
PD 2000               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity 0,672 0,379 0,122 0,441 0,427 0,076 0,079 
Nostalgia -0,682 0,417 0,122 0,441 0,486 0,102 -0,092 
Constant -2,700 0,248       0,000   
 
The multivariate model for PD is simple, but interesting. The negative value on the nostalgia 
variable places the voters in the liberal spectrum. The multivariate model also shows that 
religiosity is significant when controlled for the effect of nostalgia. At the same time, and as 
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can been seen in Appendix 3, neither community size nor views on the state role in the 
economy are significant in bivariate models. The positive direction of the religiosity variable 
is an important difference from the PNL models. 
 
Cleavages patterns in Romania 
 
When turning to the overall picture from the first four elections, the alternation of power 
between FSN and its successor parties on one side, and the liberal opposition on the other side 
that is most striking. The first split in FSN before the 1992 election is interesting in itself, as it 
appears like the division on the elite level over economic reform is clearly reflected in the 
analysis. The traditional left-right cleavage in terms of views on the state`s role in the 
economy has been a defining factor for the two main contenders in the Romanian party 
system. At the same time, it should be noted that income levels have little relevance.  
 
 Table 19. The economic liberalism cleavage in Romania 
Market economy is 
positive  1990 1992 1996 2000
Positive significant PNL, UMDR CDR CDR, USD PNL 
Negative significant FSN FDSN PDSR, UMDR PDSR 
 
A second cleavage, which overlaps and reinforces the economic cleavage, is community size. 
The FSN derived parties appear to have stable rural support, while urban voters look to the 
PNL and CDR. However, community size is not relevant as a predictor for any of the parties 
in the 2000 election. This could be an indication of a weak or absent urban-rural cleavage, but 
seen in connection with the clear pattern from the first three elections, it would also be 
premature to conclude that this has lost relevance. 
 
Table 20. The urban-rural cleavage in Romania 
Urban 1990 1992 1996 2000
Positive significant PNL CDR CDR  
Negative significant FSN FDSN PDSR  
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After all, based on the first three elections, a pattern of two reinforcing cleavages appears to 
be as strong in Romania as in Hungary. By plotting the pairs of relevant Beta values, this is 
clearly visible in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Scatterplot of the economic liberalism and urban-rural cleavages in Romania 
community size
1.000.500.00-0.50-1.00
st
at
e 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
-0.50
-1.00
-1.50
CDR 1996
CDR 1992
PNL 1990
PDSR 1996
FDSN 1992
FSN 1990
__ 
The clear differences between the two main contenders is further strengthened by the regime 
variables. While nostalgic sentiments are positive and significant for PDSR voters in 1996, 
they are negative and significant for CDR in the same election. The effect of the “satisfaction 
with democracy” variable varies both in significance and direction for the parties, but again a 
pattern of opposition emerges. The transition should therefore be taken into account when 
explaining the emerging party system in Romania, and, more importantly, it should be seen in 
connection with the state-market and urban-rural cleavages. When USD and PD became 
relevant parties in 1996 and 2000 respectively, they also shared positive attitudes toward 
market economy as positive predictors for votes, controlled for other variables in the models. 
Religion on the other hand, has different directions for these two parties, indicating a cross-
cutting cleavage among the economic liberal voters. 
 
A third consistently relevant part of the Romanian party system is the representation of the 
Hungarian minority. UMDR has a clearly defined electorate, and the party`s position in the 
 74
system is in the vicinity of the liberal parties as a natural consequence of the more nationalist 
features of the FSN-derived parties, PRM and PUNR.  
 
The final steady component in the Romanian party system is the presence of parties with a 
clear nationalist identity, even to the extent that it is reflected in the names of the parties. The 
electoral fortunes of PRM and PUNR have been changing, but the 2000 election underlines 
the importance of this dimension in the party system. At the same time, it is clear that the 
multivariate models are unable to explain this success. In this respect, we might have turn to 
dimensions that are not measured here to find the answer.  
 
One cleavage that does less to define patterns of party support than expected is religiosity. 
Though secularity and strong beliefs matter for different parties at different times, it is hard to 
identify a clear pattern. Overall then, one might be tempted to conclude that whereas religion 
matters to the Romanian voter, religiosity as cleavage is not strong enough to consistently 
rank as the defining cleavage in cases of cross-cutting cleavages. 
 
 
 
Bulgaria 
 
One of the main questions when turning to the analysis of the Bulgarian elections, is to which 
extent the emergence of the National Movement for Simeon the IInd (NMS) in the 2001 
election can be explained by cleavages. At first glance, it seems like the 2001 election turned 
the Bulgarian party system upside-down. Ex-King Simeon IInd returned to politics with full 
force and won half of the seats in Parliament. Of course, the question is how this was 
possible? Did NMS benefit mainly from another party`s electorate, or did they transcend the 
previous party system altogether? Based on NMS`s electoral victory, a new variable was also 
introduced in the analysis after careful consideration.17 “Expectations of a better personal 
economic future” is not an operationalisation of a cleavage, and was only included in the 
model after thorough testing of cleavage-based models.  
 
                                                 
17 Although this can be seens as a deviation from the structure in the thesis, the variable is reported because it 
adds information about an extraordinary election, in which the cleavages alone could not explain voting 
behaviour.  
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However, in order to answer the main question, the effect of cleavages on the party system as 
a whole, we will have to start in 1991. Unfortunately, it proved more difficult to find good 
datasets for Bulgaria than for the other two countries. This particularly applies to the 2001 
elections. I therefore refer the reader to Appendix 4 for more details on which data are 
missing, and how the different  cleavages have been operationalised.  
 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 
 
BSP and Coalition for Bulgaria are analysed together in the following. As we will see, the 
findings firmly place BSP on the traditional political left in many respects in terms of core 
electorate characteristics. This is of course not to say that BSP has been a modern European 
socialist or social-democratic party since the transition. Quite on the contrary, one could 
clearly argue that the origin in the communist party, the continued presence of parts of the old 
nomenklatura and the bureaucratic structures of the Bulgarian state administration all point in 
the direction of BSP being, at least at first, little more than an old structure with a fresh layer 
of paint.  
 
There is a pattern of secularity being a significant predictor for party support, when controlled 
for the effect of the other variables in the first three elections. The same applies to favouring a 
strong state over privatization. The 1994 and 1997 analysis show relevance of an urban-rural 
dimension, and the 1997 election also find that voters in the lower and middle income groups 
are more likely to vote BSP, other variables held constant.  
 
Interestingly, the nostalgia dimension also appears to be relevant. Positive attitudes towards 
the communist regime are significant predictors for BSP support both in 1991 and 1997, when 
controlled for the other variables in the model. A possible interpretation of this is that the 
previous regime did provide social security and that BSP is seen as a positive continuation in 
this respect. The findings on the satisfaction with democracy variable in 1994 and 1997 
support this.  
 
Turning to the dramatic 2001 election, the footprints of previous patterns appear to have 
weakened. The rural dimension is still valid, although with a low Beta-value, but secularity is 
no longer significant on a 5% level.  
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Table 21. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for BSP support 
 
BSP 1991               
Variables in the Equation b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity -0,545 0,167 0,413 0,943 0,259 0,001 -0,062 
Turkish minority -1,454 0,187 0,413 0,943 0,255 0,000 -0,162 
Nostalgia 1,293 0,162 0,413 0,943 0,270 0,000 0,153 
Satisfaction with democracy 0,307 0,087 0,413 0,943 0,482 0,000 0,065 
Partly satisfied with material 
welfare 0,406 0,090 0,413 0,943 0,473 0,000 0,084 
Satisfied with material welfare 0,830 0,105 0,413 0,943 0,414 0,000 0,150 
Market economy is positive -1,331 0,084 0,413 0,943 0,500 0,000 -0,291 
Constant -0,184 0,089       0,040   
                
                
BSP 1994               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Turkish minority -2,252 0,377 0,450 1,043 0,283 0,000 -0,275 
Urban -0,660 0,200 0,450 1,043 0,457 0,001 -0,130 
Satisfaction with democracy -0,637 0,302 0,450 1,043 0,316 0,035 -0,087 
Market economy is positive -1,522 0,188 0,450 1,043 0,489 0,000 -0,321 
Constant 1,127 0,137       0,000   
                
                
BSP 1997               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Secular 1,205 0,612 0,443 1,370 0,182 0,049 0,071 
Rroma minority 1,117 0,525 0,443 1,370 0,225 0,033 0,081 
Nationalism 0,572 0,269 0,443 1,370 0,426 0,033 0,079 
Capitol and surroundings -1,726 0,626 0,443 1,370 0,332 0,006 -0,185 
Nostalgia 0,842 0,270 0,443 1,370 0,497 0,002 0,135 
Satisfaction with democracy -0,823 0,402 0,443 1,370 0,400 0,041 -0,106 
Income in the lowest quartile 1,359 0,536 0,443 1,370 0,483 0,011 0,212 
Income in the second quartile 0,936 0,521 0,443 1,370 0,500 0,072 0,151 
Market economy is positive -0,927 0,298 0,443 1,370 0,494 0,002 -0,148 
Constant -2,408 0,564       0,000   
                
                
BSP 2001               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Urban -0,910 0,236 0,150 1,060 0,497 0,000 -0,064 
Expectation of better economic 
future  -1,094 0,304 0,150 1,060 0,444 0,000 -0,069 
Turkish minority -3,200 1,021 0,150 1,060 0,298 0,002 -0,135 
Constant -0,504 0,151       0,001   
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Union of Democratic Forces/Alliance of Democratic Forces (SDS) 
 
The Union of Democratic Forces and the Alliance of Democratic Forces are also analysed 
together, and abbreviated SDS throughout.  
 
Table 22. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for SDS support 
SDS 1991               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Secular -0,548 0,092 0,433 1,067 0,463 0,000 -0,103 
Turkish minority -0,984 0,207 0,433 1,067 0,255 0,000 -0,102 
Capitol and surroundings 0,231 0,124 0,433 1,067 0,359 0,061 0,034 
Urban 0,252 0,096 0,433 1,067 0,496 0,009 0,051 
Nostalgia -1,178 0,209 0,433 1,067 0,270 0,000 -0,129 
Satisfied with material welfare -0,473 0,109 0,433 1,067 0,414 0,000 -0,079 
Farmer -0,365 0,155 0,433 1,067 0,318 0,018 -0,047 
Market economy is positive 1,419 0,085 0,433 1,067 0,500 0,000 0,288 
Constant -1,073 0,087       0,000   
                
                
SDS 1994               
Variables in the Equation b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Urban 0,719 0,209 0,281 0,691 0,457 0,001 0,134 
Market economy is positive 1,101 0,206 0,281 0,691 0,489 0,000 0,219 
Constant -2,007 0,164       0,000   
                
                
SDS 1997               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Orthodox 0,550 0,290 0,403 0,906 0,415 0,058 0,101 
Urban 0,550 0,205 0,403 0,906 0,500 0,007 0,122 
Income in the lowest quartile -0,540 0,221 0,403 0,906 0,483 0,014 -0,116 
Market economy is positive 1,380 0,201 0,403 0,906 0,494 0,000 0,303 
Constant -1,309 0,295       0,000   
                
                
SDS 2001               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Capitol and surroundings  1,090 0,268 0,075 0,518 0,358 0,000 0,056 
Income in the lowest quartile -0,628 0,280 0,075 0,518 0,447 0,025 -0,041 
Constant -1,276 0,139       0,000   
 
 
The multivariate models for SDS confirm that BSP had one main opponent in the first three 
post-communist elections. A positive attitude to privatization has been a positive and 
significant variable with consistent high Beta-values in 1991, 1994, and 1997, other variables 
in the models being controlled for. The second consistently significant independent variable 
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in the first three elections is community size, where it is evident that urban residence 
significantly increases the probability for voting SDS, other variables held constant. In the 
fourth election, community size has been replaced by whether or not the respondent lives in 
the capitol and the surrounding area. This variable is also significant when controlled for the 
effect of the other variables, and further strengthens the impression of an urban-rural cleavage 
in Bulgaria. 
 
There are also signs that the SDS voters are not secular, but this appears to be more of a  
matter of denomination than religiosity. To the extent that denomination is a significant 
variable for voting denomination, this is interesting as it reinforces the anti-nostalgia 
cleavage. 
 
National Movement for Simeon IInd (NMS) 
 
It is difficult to explain the success of NMS by the cleavage model presented in Table 23. 
Although the three variables above are significant when controlled for the effect of each other, 
they do not reflect a clear pattern when compared to the models for the other parties. It is 
interesting that a belief in an improved personal economic situation is positive and significant, 
particularly as the same variable is negative and significant in the multivariate model for BSP. 
However, the Beta-values are low, and the success of NMS and the change in the Bulgarian 
party system must be accounted for by other means.  
 
Table 23. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for NMS support 
NMS 2001               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Orthodox  -0,970 0,295 0,087 0,556 0,772 0,001 -0,116 
Capitol and surroundings dummy 0,689 0,237 0,087 0,556 0,150 0,004 -0,016 
Expectation own economic future 
better 0,766 0,210 0,087 0,556 0,269 0,000 0,032 
Constant -1,043 0,219       0,000   
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Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) 
 
Quite similarly to the Hungarians in Romania, the Turkish minority has been successful in 
gaining representation through their own party in all four elections. DPS participated in the 
Alliance of National Salvation (ONS) in 1997, this coalition is analysed here. 
Table 24. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for DPS support18 
DPS 1991               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Religiosity 0,596 0,334 0,721 1,963 0,259 0,075 0,057
Secular -0,983 0,345 0,721 1,963 0,463 0,004 -0,167
Turkish minority 3,261 0,368 0,721 1,963 0,255 0,000 0,305
Capitol and surroundings 1,530 0,762 0,721 1,963 0,359 0,045 0,202
Urban -1,022 0,436 0,721 1,963 0,496 0,019 -0,186
Nostalgia -1,580 0,611 0,721 1,963 0,270 0,010 -0,157
Farmer 0,576 0,280 0,721 1,963 0,318 0,040 0,067
Market economy is positive -0,744 0,264 0,721 1,963 0,500 0,005 -0,137
Constant -2,684 0,365       0,000   
                
                
DPS 1994               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Turkish minority 3,302 0,731 0,746 2,305 0,283 0,000 0,303
Urban -2,636 0,864 0,746 2,305 0,457 0,002 -0,390
Income in third quartile -1,841 0,797 0,746 2,305 0,408 0,021 -0,243
Constant -1,910 0,618       0,002   
                
                
DPS 1997               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Turkish minority 4,197 0,429 0,715 2,451 0,330 0,000 0,404
Urban -2,888 1,052 0,715 2,451 0,500 0,006 -0,421
Farmer 0,950 0,529 0,715 2,451 0,482 0,073 0,134
Constant -4,477 0,606       0,000   
        
                
DPS 2001               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Turkish minority 5,258 0,803 0,627 1,566 0,298 0,000 0,627
Constant -4,714 0,710  0,502    0,000  
 
 
The multivariate models are consistent with expectations, and show that the Turkish minority 
votes coherently for DPS, also in the 2001 election. The model for the 1997 election 
furthermore suggests that DPS` participation in the coalition was “safe” in terms of 
                                                 
18 Other significant variables from the bivariate regression models omitted because of multicollinearity. 
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mobilizing a wider rural electorate without alienating core voters, as both these variables 
remain significant when controlled for the other variables in the model. 
 
Popular Union of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Democratic Party 
(BZNS-DP) 
 
While the 1991 election was more of a bipolar contest, with the Turkish minority as the 
exception, five parties or coalitions managed to win seats in 1994, BZNS-DP among them. 
These two parties participated in larger coalitions in other elections, but is analysed alone 
here.   
Table 25. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for BZNS-DP support 
BZNS-DP 1994               
 b S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Satisfaction with democracy 0,914 0,390 0,202 0,586 0,316 0,019 0,100 
Farmer 1,269 0,563 0,202 0,586 0,182 0,024 0,080 
Market economy is positive 0,824 0,329 0,202 0,586 0,489 0,012 0,139 
Constant -3,225 0,262       0,000   
 
The multivariate model is interesting because both agricultural background and a positive 
attitude towards market economy have positive and significant logistic regression 
coefficients, when controlled for the effect of each other and satisfaction with democracy. 
This suggest that the there is a significant split in the rural electorate, where some farmers are 
clearly not nostalgic and anti-capitalist.  
 
Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB) 
 
BBB also won more than 5% of the seats in the 1994 election.19 However, it should prove 
impossible to build a multivariate model based on the tested cleavage with significant 
variables. A significant positive attitude to market economy is noteworthy, but it seems 
plausible that this party does not have a clearly cleavage-based support group.  
Table 26. Multivariate logistic regression analysis for BBB support 
BBB 1994               
 B S.E. R SlogitY S.X Sig. BETA 
Market economy is positive 1,193 0,364 0,139 0,584 0,489 0,001 0,139 
Constant -3,404 0,293       0,000   
 
                                                 
19 BBB also won seats in the 1997 election, but not enough seats as to qualify as a relevant party. 
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Cleavage patterns in Bulgaria 
 
The multivariate analysis confirm the lack of overall structure when the 2001 election is taken 
into account. However, when looking at the first three elections, there are some interesting 
pattern of stable cleavages that shaped voting behaviour.  
 
First of all, the urban-rural cleavage shapes voting behaviour in all four elections. Urban 
voters are more likely to vote for SDS throughout, also when controlled for the effect of the 
other variables in the multivariate models. The variable is also quite consistently negative and 
significant for BSP, DPS and NMS. 
 
Table 27. The urban-rural cleavage in Bulgaria 
Urban  1991 1994 1997 2001
Positive significant SDS SDS SDS SDS* 
Negative significant 
DPS 
 
BPS, DPS, 
BZNS-DP 
BPS*, DPS 
 
BPS, NMS* 
 
*Measured as residence in Sofia 
 
There is also consistent difference between the supporters of SDS and BSP on the view of 
market economy in the first three elections. 
 
Table 28. The economic liberalism cleavage in Bulgaria 
Market economy is 
positive 1991 1994 1997 2001
Positive significant 
SDS SDS, BZNS-DP, 
BBB 
SDS 
 
Negative significant BSP, DPS BSP BSP  
 
 
As expected, those who voted for BSP have negative and significant Beta-values on this 
variable. Interestingly, this cleavage looses significance in all the multivariate models in 
2001, again underlining the effect of NMS. 
 
There is also consistency on the regime dimension, with BSP voters expressing positive 
sentiments towards the previous regime and SDS voters either being anti-communist or 
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simply positive to democracy.  Other cleavage variables appear in accordance with the 
expectations from time to time, but the lack of consistency makes it hard to classify these as 
cleavages. This applies to nationalism, income, and religiosity. 
 
Summing up, it does seem like the nostalgia, economic ideology and urban-rural cleavages 
have reinforced each other, and that this has contributed to the sharp divide between BSP and 
SDS in the first three elections. However, only the urban-rural cleavage maintains 
significance with the emergence of NMS, indicating that also the horizontal alignment is 
weak. With the exception of the analysis of BZNS-DP in 1994, there is also a lack of clearly 
defined cross-cutting cleavages.  
 
The minority cleavage is clearly present, and the strong horizontal alignment between the 
members of the Turkish minority is also manifested in strong and consistent vertical 
alignment to DPS.  
 
 
Expectations and findings 
 
Returning to the expectations of cleavage patterns presented at the end of Chapter 2, it is clear 
that all expectations have not been met. The lack of stable cleavage patterns in Bulgaria is 
most striking, although it should be pointed out that the analysis from the first three elections 
fit the expectations quite well. With the exception of the Turkish minority, the electorate 
appears to have been divided along reinforcing cleavages, which all can be traced to the 
communist period and in some cases with origins in the pre-communist history. I interpret the 
2001 election to have revealed both weak horizontal and vertical alignment. The cleavages 
that were significant in the first three elections mainly created alignment on two sides of one 
dimension, the nostalgia-modernity dimension, and this proved insufficient in the longer run. 
Nevertheless, both the urban-rural cleavage and the ethnic minority cleavage maintained 
significance in the 2001 election. 
 
Hungary is quite the opposite in this respect. Again, some of the expected reinforcing patterns 
are confirmed, with the nationalist, urban-rural and religiosity cleavage clearly shaping 
horizontal alignment. This pattern is strong, and explains why FIDESZ-MPP manages to 
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secure success on a new platform in 1998. It also explains why KDNP and FKGP could loose 
influence, without this being particularly dramatic for the structure of competition in the party 
system. Nostalgia is more important than anticipated, particularly because it cuts across the 
religiosity cleavage. Surprisingly, the economic dimension is less relevant.  
 
The expectations for Romania are also met to a certain extent. There are clear and consistent 
differences between those who vote for the parties that have formed or participated in 
government. The ethnic minority cleavage is present and strong. There is also a strong 
reinforcing pattern of cleavages dividing the titular national electorate in two, particularly 
pertaining to the state role in the economy and urban-rural cleavages. Somewhat surprisingly, 
nationalism was not consistently confirmed as a significant cleavage, and it also proved 
harder than expected to identify religiosity as a cross-cutting cleavage.  
 
Overall, it should therefore be possible to conclude that the first hypothesis (H1), that 
cleavages are expected to have been a decisive factor for voting behaviour, is strengthened by 
the findings.  
 
 
 Cleavage structures and party systems 
 
The second hypothesis (H2), that party systems founded on cleavage structures are more 
stable than party systems that are not, has a clear comparative component. We have identified 
the cleavage structures in all three countries, and the challenge is therefore to explain why the 
party systems differ in terms of structure of competition and fragmentation.  
 
Hungary appears to be a case in point for the second hypothesis. The cleavage structures are 
strong, not least in terms of horizontal alignment, and consistent over time. The importance of 
the strong horizontal alignment as a source of party system stability is evident. With this in 
place, parties would run great risks if they were to experiment with governing formulaes or 
open access to government to parties in conflict with the cleavage structures of their own 
electorate. Furthermore, parties that did not have sufficient cleavage-based support, like 
MDF, did not survive, while smaller parties, like SZDZS survived because of cross-cutting 
cleavages. The result is a relatively closed structure of competition and limited fragmentation. 
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The Romanian party system has greater fragmentation and a more open structure of 
competition than the Hungarian party system. The nationalist cleavage appear to be less than 
clearly defined both in the electorate and in the party system. This suggests that the lack of a 
clearly defined (yet probably significant) cleavage creates openness in the structure in 
competition. However, the main dimension in the structure of competition, the support for 
either one of the FSN-derived parties or PNL/CDR is based on a reinforcing pattern of 
cleavages. Once again, the importance of horizontal alignment is clear, as the same cleavages 
have been significant for different parties or constellations over time. In addition, the strength 
of the ethnic minority cleavage has been a stable component of the party system. Overall, it 
should be safe to state that the cleavage structures in Romania has contributed to party system 
stability. 
 
The Bulgarian case is different. Cleavages mattered in the three first elections, when the party 
system also showed signs of stability. The 2001 election disrupts this picture by disclosing a 
party system with an open structure of competition. It also showed that the previous cleavage 
patterns were unable to explain the emergence of NMS. In one sense, the lack of cleavages in 
the 2001 election does support that party systems that are not founded on cleavage structures 
are likely to be less stable than those that are. On the other hand, this does not explain why 
cleavages were important in the first three elections. One possible explanation is of course 
that what we measured in the first three elections were not actual cleavages, but rather 
transitional divides, thus supporting Kitschelt et. al. (1999). The main objection to this 
perspective is the strong theoretical basis for expecting a reinforcing cleavage structure, 
centred on attitudes towards the communist past. A different explanation could therefore be 
that while the cleavages were present and mattered in the first three elections, the pattern of 
reinforcement was weaker than anticipated. Although the cleavages could explain the splitting 
of the electorate in a bipolar contest for government, they would be insufficient to create both 
significant horizontal and vertical alignment when the bipolarity was challenged. 
Nevertheless, both the ethnic minority cleavage and the urban-rural cleavage maintained 
relevance, and particularly the former added to an element of stability also after 2001.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
By focusing on the voters, and by emphasising the importance of horizontal alignment, 
cleavage patterns have been identified as important for voting behaviour and party systems, 
the latter measured through openness in structures of competition and degree of 
fragmentation. The mere identification of cleavage patterns significantly weakens the notion 
of flattened societies. Furthermore, the first hypothesis, that cleavages have been a decisive 
factor for voting behaviour, has been strengthened by the multivariate logistic regression 
models.  
 
The second hypothesis, that party systems based on cleavage structures are more stable than 
party systems that are not, has also been strengthened. The difference between the three 
countries is important in this respect, because it is the country with the most clearly defined 
cleavage structures, Hungary, that exhibits the most stable party system, while Bulgaria, 
where the cleavage structure is weaker, has the most unstable party system. The distinction 
between horizontal and vertical alignment has been key to identifying stability, because it has 
been clear that the same cleavages have been significant predictors for support for different 
parties over time in Hungary as well as in Romania. This has not been the case in Bulgaria, 
where cleavages could not explain the emergence of NMS in 2001. 
 
These findings also have some implications for further research. First of all, it would be 
interesting to apply the approach on other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on 
the variation between the three cases in this thesis, other countries could be expected to fit the 
model quite well. Furthermore, the difference between horizontal and vertical alignment could 
benefit from further research. For example, elite and mass values on cleavage variables could 
be compared in greater detail, also with regard to Bardi and Mair`s attention to different party 
systems on different levels in the polity (Bardi and Mair 2008).  
 
Finally, and as the Bulgarian case clearly illustrates, more elections in post-communist 
Central and Eastern Europe will add information and probably help explaining the importance 
of cleavages and the features of the still relatively young party systems in greater detail.  
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Appendix 1. Election Results 
 
All election results are from the website of the University of Essex` project  Political 
Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/  
 
 
Hungary 1990 
Election dates: First round 25 March 1990; Second round 8 April 1990 
Turnout: 65.09 % (first round) 
 
 
 
PARTY/GROUPING  
% LIST  VOTES  REGIONAL 
LIST SEATS  
SINGLE 
MEMBER 
SEATS  
NATIONAL 
LIST SEATS  
TOTAL 
SEATS  
%SEATS  
MDF - Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (Magyar 
Demokrata Fórum) 
24.73 40 114 10 164 42.49 
SZDSZ - Alliance of Free 
Democrats (Szabad 
Demokraták Szövetsége) 
21.39 34 35 23 92 23.83 
FKgP - Independent Small 
Holders Party (Független 
Kisgazdapárt) 
11.73 16 11 17 44 11.4 
MSZP - Hungarian Socialist 
Party (Magyar Szocialista 
Párt) 
10.89 14 1 18 33 8.55 
FIDESZ - Federation of 
Young Democrats (Fiatal 
Demokraták Szövetsége) 
8.95 8 1 12 21 5.44 
KDNP - Christian 
Democratic People’s Party 
(Kereszténydemokrata 
Néppárt) 
6.46 8 3 10 21 5.44 
ASZ - Agrarian Alliance 
(Agrárszövetség) 
3.13 0 1 0 1 0.26 
Independents (199 first 
round; 11 second round) 
 0 6 0 6 0 
Joint candidates*  0 4 0 4 1.04 
TOTAL 100 120 176 90 386 100 
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Hungary 1994 
Election dates: First round 8 May; Second round 29 May 1994 
Turnout: 68,92% (first round) 
 
 
 
 
PARTY/GROUPING  
% LIST  
VOTES  
REGIONAL 
LIST SEATS  
SINGLE 
MEMBER 
SEATS  
NATIONAL 
LIST SEATS  
TOTAL 
SEATS  
%SEATS  
MSZP - Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar 
Szocialista Párt) 
32.99 53 149 7 209 54.15 
SZDSZ - Alliance of Free Democrats 
(Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége) 
19.74 28 16 25 69 17.88 
MDF - Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(Magyar Demokrata Fórum) 
11.74 18 5 15 38 9.84 
FKgP - Independent Small Holders Party 
(Független Kisgazdapárt) 
8.82 14 1 11 26 6.74 
KDNP - Christian Democratic People’s 
Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt) 
7.03 5 3 14 22 5.7 
FIDESZ (Federation of Young Democrats) 7.02 7 0 13 20 5.18 
ASZ - Agrarian Alliance (Agrárszövetség) 2.1 0 1 0 1 0.26 
Joint candidate: VP, FIDESZ, SZDSZ, ASZ   1  1 0.26 
TOTAL 100 125 176 85 386 100 
 
Hungary 1998 
Election date: 20 May 1990 
Turnout: 56,7% (first round) 
 
PARTY/GROUPING  
% LIST  
VOTES  
REGIONAL 
LIST SEATS  
SINGLE 
MEMBER 
SEATS  
NATIONAL 
LIST SEATS  
TOTAL 
SEATS  
% 
SEATS  
MSZP - Hungarian Socialist Party 
(Magyar Szocialista Párt) 
32.92 50 54 30 134 34.72 
Fidesz-MPP [ex-FIDESZ] Fidesz–
Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz – 
Magyar Polgári Párt) 
29.48 48 55 10 113 29.27 
FIDESZ-MPP - MDF joint 
candidates 
- - 35 - 50 12.95 
FKgP - Independent Small Holders 
Party (Független Kisgazdapárt) 
13.15 22 12 14 48 12.44 
SZDSZ - Alliance of Free 
Democrats (Szabad Demokraták 
Szövetsége) 
7.57 5 2 17 24 6.22 
MIEP - Party of Hungarian Justice 
and Life (Magyar Igazság és Élet 
Pártja) 
5.47 3 0 11 14 3.63 
MDF - Fidesz-MPP joint candidates - - 15 - 15 3.89 
MDF - Hungarian Democratic 
Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum) 
2.8 0 2 0 2 0.52 
Independents (53 first round, 11 
second round) 
- - 1 - 1 0.26 
TOTAL ~100 128 176 82 386 100 
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Hungary 2002 
Election date: 20 May 1990 
Turnout: 50,53% (first round) 
 
PARTY/GROUPING  
% LIST  
VOTES  
REGIONAL 
LIST SEATS  
SINGLE 
MEMBER 
SEATS  
NATIONAL 
LIST SEATS  
TOTAL 
SEATS  
%SEATS 
MSZP - Hungarian Socialist Party 
(Magyar Szocialista Part) 
42.05 69 78 31 178 46.11 
FIDESZ-MDF - joint list of FIDESZ - 
Hungarian Civic Party and Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (Fidesz- Magyar 
Polgari Part es Magyar Demokrata 
Forum) 
41.07 67 95 26 188 48.70 
SZDSZ - Alliance of Free Democrats 
(Szabad Demokratak Szovetsege) 
5.57 4 2 13 19 4.92 
MSZP-SZDSZ - joint candidates of 
the Hungarian Socialist Party and the 
Alliance of Free Democrats 
0 0 1 0 1 0.26 
Total 100 140 176 70 386 100.00 
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Romania 1990 
Election date: 20 May 1990 
Turnout: 86,19% 
 
PARTY/GROUPING  VOTES  %  VOTES  SEATS  % SEATS  
FSN – National Salvation Front (Frontul 
Salvarii Nationale) 
9089659 66.31 263 66.41 
UDMR/ RMDSZ – Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrata a 
Maghiarilor din Romania) 
991601 7.23 29 7.32 
PNL - National Liberal Party (Partidul National 
Liberal) 
879290 6.41 29 7.32 
MER - Romanian Ecological Movement 
(Miscarea Ecologista din Romania) 
358864 2.62 12 3.03 
PNTcd – National Peasants Party – Christian 
Democrat (Partidul National Taranesc – Crestin 
Democrat) 
351357 2.56 12 3.03 
AUR - Alliance for Romanian Unity (alianta 
pentru Unitatea Romanilor)* 
290875 2.12 9 2.27 
PDAR – Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania 
(Partidul Democrat Agrar din Romania) 
250403 1.83 9 2.27 
PER – Romanian Ecological Party (Partidul 
Ecologist Roman) 
232212 1.69 8 2.02 
PSD - Romanian Socialist Democratic Party 
(Partidul Socialist Democratic Roman) 
143393 1.05 5 1.26 
PSDR – Romanian Social Democratic Party 
(Partidul Social Democrat Roman) 
73014 0.53 2 0.51 
Democratic Group of the Centre (Grupul 
Democrat de Centru) 
65914 0.48 2 0.51 
TOTAL 13707159 100 396 100 
 
Romania 1992 
Election date: 27 September 1992 
Turnout: 76,29% 
 
 PARTY/GROUPING  VOTES  %  VOTES  SEATS  % SEATS  % SEATS220  
FDSN - Democratic National Salvation Front 
(Frontul Democrat al Salvarii Nationale) 
3015708 27.72 117 35.67 34.31 
CDR – Democratic Convention of Romania 
(Conventia Democrata din Romania)* 
2177144 20.01 82 25 24.05 
FSN – National Salvation Front (Frontul 
Salvarii Nationale) 
1108500 10.19 43 13.11 12.61 
PUNR - Party of Romanian National Unity 
(Partidul Unitatii Nationale Romane) 
839586 7.72 30 9.15 8.8 
UDMR/RMDSZ - Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrata a 
Maghiarilor din Romania) 
811290 7.46 27 8.23 7.92 
PRM - Greater Romania Party (Partidul 
Romania Mare) 
424061 3.89 16 4.88 4.69 
PSM - Socialist Party of Labour (Partidul 
Socialist al Muncii) 
330378 3.04 13 3.96 3.81 
TOTAL 10880252 100 341 100  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
20 This Figure represents the % seats for each party that passed the threshold, calculated from the total number of 
seats (328), thus excluding the minority seats. 
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Romania 1996  
Election date: 3 November 1996 
Turnout: 76,01% 
 
PARTY/GROUPING  VOTES  %  VOTES  SEATS  % SEATS  % SEATS221  
CDR – Democratic Convention of 
Romania (Conventia Democrata 
Romana)1 
3692321 30.17 122 35.57 37.2 
PDSR – Romanian Party of Social 
Democracy (Partidul Democratiei 
Sociale din Romania)2 
2633860 21.52 91 26.53 27.74 
USD – Social Democratic Union 
(Uniunea Social Democrata)3 
1582231 12.93 53 15.45 16.16 
UDMR/RMDSZ - Democratic 
Alliance of Hungarian in Romania 
(Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor 
din Romania) 
812628 6.64 25 7.29 7.62 
PRM - Greater Romania Party 
(Partidul Romania Mare) 
546430 4.46 19 5.54 5.79 
PUNR - Party of Romanian National 
Unity (Partidul Unitatii Nationale 
Romane) 
533348 4.36 18 5.25 5.49 
Total 12238746 100 343 100 100 
 
 
Romania 2000  
Election date: 26 November 2000 
Turnout: 65,31% 
 
PARTY/GROUPING  VOTES  %  VOTES  SEATS  % SEATS  % SEATS2  
P.D.S.R. - Democratic-Social Pole 
of Romania (Polul Democrat-Social 
din Romania - PDSR) 
3968464 36.61 155 44.93 47.26 
PRM - Greater Romania Party 
(Partidul Romania Mare) 
2112027 19.48 84 24.35 25.61 
PD - Democratic Party (Partidul 
Democrat) 
762365 7.03 31 8.99 9.45 
PNL - National Liberal Party 
(Partidul National Liberal) 
747263 6.89 30 8.7 9.15 
UDMR/RMDSZ - Democratic Union 
of Hungarians in Romania 
(Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor 
din Romania) 
736863 6.8 27 7.83 8.23 
TOTAL 10839424 100 345 (327+18) 100 (of 345) 100 (of 327) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 This Figure represents the % seats for each party that passed the threshold, calculated from the total number of 
seats (328), thus excluding the minority seats. 
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Bulgaria 1991 
Election date: 13 October 1991 
Turnout: 83,87% 
 
PARTY/GROUPING  VOTES  % VOTE  SEATS  % SEATS  
SDS - Union of Democratic Forces (Suyuz na 
demokratichnite sili) 
1903567 34.36 110 45.8 
BSP - Pre-electoral Union of the BSP, BLP, OPT, 
KhRP, NLP 'St. Stambolov', SMS, FBSM, SDPD, 
1836050 33.14 106 44.2 
DPS - Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi) 
418168 7.55 24 10 
TOTAL 5540837 100 240 100 
 
 
Bulgaria 1994 
Election date: 18 December 1994 
Turnout: 75,23%  
 
PARTY/GROUPING  VOTES  %  VOTES  SEATS  % SEATS  
BSPASEK - Coalition of the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union 
'Alexander Stamboliiski' and Ecoglasnost 
Political Club (Koalitsiya - BSP, BZNS 'Al. 
Stamboliiski' i PK 'Ekoglasnost') 
2262943 43.5 125 52.08 
SDS - Union of Democratic Forces (Suyuz na 
demokratichnite sili) 
1260374 24.23 69 28.75 
BZNS-DP - Popular Union of the Bulgarian 
Agrarian National Union and the Democratic 
Party (Naroden suyuz - BZNS-DP) 
338478 6.51 18 7.5 
DPS - Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi) 
283094 5.44 15 6.25 
BBB - Bulgarian Business Block (Bulgarska 
biznes blok) 
245849 4.73 13 5.42 
Total 5202065 100 240 100 
 
Bulgaria 1997 
Election date: 19 April 1997 
Turnout: 58,87% 
 PARTY/GROUPING  VOTES  %  VOTES  SEATS % SEATS  
ODS - Alliance of Democratic Forces - SDS, DP, BZNS,  2223714 49.15 137 57.55 
DemLev - Democratic Left - Bulgarian Socialist Party, 
Ecoglasnost Political Club (Demokratichna levitsa - BSP, PK 
'Ekoglasnost') 
939308 22.44 58 25.03 
ONS - Alliance of National Salvation - Bulgarian Agrarian 
National Union - Nikola Petkov, Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms, Green Party, Party of the Democratic Centre, 
New Choice, Federation of the Bulgarian Kingdom 
(Obedinenie za natsionalno spasenie) 
323429 9.44 19 9 
EvroLev - Euroleft (Evrolevitsa) 234058 5.57 14 4.4 
BBB - Bulgarian Business Block (Bulgarska biznes blok) 209796 5.27 12 4.02 
Total 4255301 100 240 100 
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Bulgaria 2001 
Election date: 18 June 2001 
Turnout: 66,77% 
 
PARTY/GROUPING  VOTES  %  
VOTES  
SEATS  % SEATS  
National Movement Simeon the Second 1952513 42.74 120 50 
United Democratic Forces - UDF, People's Union: BAPU - 
PU and DP, BSDP, National MRF 
830338 18.18 51 21.25 
Coalition for Bulgaria 783372 17.15 48 20 
MRF (MRF - Liberal Union - EuroRoma) 340395 7.45 21 8.75 
Total 4568191 100 240 100 
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Appendix 2. Government compositions 
 
Government compositions after elections in Hungary 1990-2002 
Time Parties Prime Minister Comments 
23.05.1990-15.07.1994 MDF,FKGP,KDNP Jósef Antall (MDF) 
Péter Boross (MDF) 
FKGP formally left 
the coalition on 
21.02.1992. Antall 
passed away on 
12.12.1993. 
15.07.1994-08.07.1998 MSZP and SZDSZ Gyula Horn (MSZP)  
08.07.1998-27.05.2002 FIDESZ-MPP, 
FKGP, MDF 
Viktor Órban (FIDESZ)  
27.05.2002-29.09.2004 MSZP and SZDSZ Péter Medgyessy (MSZP) 
Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP) 
Ferenc Gyurcsány 
replaced Medgyessy 
in 2004.  
Source: Tóka (2004:332) 
 
 
 
Government compositions after elections in Romania 
Time Parties Prime Minister Comments 
May 1990-27.09.1991 FSN Petre Roman (FSN) Government fell as 
result of FSN 
splintering 
17.10.1991-20.11.1992  Teodor Stolojan (formally 
unaffiliated) 
 
20.11.1992-12.12.1996 FDSN/PDSR Nicole Vacariou (formally 
independent, but aligned 
with FDSN/PDSR) 
 
12.12.1996-16.04.1998 CDR Victor Ciorbea  
16.04.1998-14.12.1999 
16.12.1999-28.12.2000 
CDR Radu Vasile (CDR) 
Mugur Isarescu (CDR) 
Vasile`s government 
replaced by Isarescu 
because of internal 
conflict.  
28.12.2000-21.12.2004 PSD Adrian Nastase (PSD)  
Source: Crowther (2004:404) 
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Governments after elections in Bulgaria22 
Time Parties Prime Minister Comments 
08.11.1991-30.12.1992 SDS Philip Dimitrov  
30.12.1992-17.10.1994  Lyuben Berov  
17.10.1994-25.01.1995  Reneta Indzhova Interim Prime 
Minster 
25.01.1995-13.02.1997 BSP Zhan Videnov  
13.02-1995-21.05.1997 SDS Stefan Sofiyanski Interim Prime 
Minster 
21.05.1997-24.07.2001 SDS Ivan Kostov  
24.07.2001-17.08.2005 NMS + DPS Simeon Sakskoburggotski  
Source: Karasimeonov (2004:443) 
 
 
                                                 
22 Table limited to the elections included in the thesis. In addition Andrey Lukanov and Dimitar Illiev Popov`s 
served as head of government before Dimitrov. 
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Appendix 3. Results from bivariate logistic regressions  
 
The results from the bivariate regressions are presented below. The Tables are organized by 
country, party and election. The unstandardized regression coeffecient b, standarderror and 
significance are reported, and findings which are significant at the 5% level are highlighted in 
bold.  
 
Hungary 
 
Dependent variable: 
SZDSZ  
1990    
SZDSZ  
1994   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic -0,136 0,110 0,213  -0,237 0,137 0,085 
Calvinist -0,323 0,186 0,082  -0,245 0,227 0,280 
Secular 0,207 0,104 0,047  0,284 0,129 0,028 
Religiosity -0,463 0,168 0,006  -1,017 0,272 0,000 
Nationalism  0,222 0,106 0,036  0,728 0,140 0,000 
Urban 0,449 0,113 0,000  0,803 0,155 0,000 
Capitol and surroundings  0,425 0,120 0,000  0,606 0,141 0,000 
Nostalgia -0,265 0,153 0,083  -0,592 0,213 0,005 
Satisfaction with democracy -0,112 0,118 0,344  0,023 0,138 0,869 
Quartiles of mean income:        
Lowest -0,534 0,131 0,000  -0,538 0,173 0,002 
Second -0,319 0,127 0,012  -0,127 0,154 0,412 
Third 0,408 0,117 0,000  0,071 0,148 0,633 
Highest 0,397 0,115 0,001  0,431 0,135 0,001 
Farmer -0,974 0,240 0,000  -1,049 0,329 0,001 
Market economy positive 0,240 0,105 0,023  0,515 0,129 0,000 
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Dependent variable: 
SZDZS 
1998    
SZDZS 
2002   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sign. 
Catholic -0,570 0,302 0,059  -1,233 0,360 0,001
Calvinist 0,771 0,331 0,020  -0,132 0,394 0,737
Secular 0,055 0,535 0,918  0,343 0,364 0,346
Religiosity -0,897 0,604 0,137  0,074 0,446 0,869
Nationalism  -0,072 0,309 0,815  -1,385 0,601 0,021
Urban -0,566 0,378 0,134  1,200 0,294 0,000
Capitol and surroundings  0,734 0,324 0,024     
Nostalgia 0,169 0,327 0,605     
Satisfaction with democracy -0,588 0,312 0,059     
Quartiles of mean income 
dummies:        
Lowest -0,276 0,447 0,537  -1,764 1,015 0,082
Second -0,676 0,328 0,039  -0,929 0,392 0,018
Third 0,829 0,307 0,007  1,059 0,329 0,001
Highest -18,113 14210,361 0,999  0,178 0,535 0,739
Farmer -0,652 0,378 0,084  -0,966 1,019 0,343
Market economy positive 0,409 0,318 0,197  -0,038 0,377 0,920
Dependent variable: 
FIDESZ 
1990    
FIDESZ 
1994   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic -0,303 0,148 0,041  -0,418 0,114 0,000
Calvinist -0,445 0,261 0,088  -1,046 0,243 0,000
Secular 0,527 0,140 0,000  0,768 0,108 0,000
Religiosity -1,128 0,291 0,000  -1,025 0,214 0,000
Nationalism  0,077 0,138 0,579  0,252 0,106 0,018
Urban 0,328 0,148 0,027  0,254 0,112 0,023
Capitol and surroundings  0,471 0,154 0,002  0,088 0,126 0,485
Nostalgia -0,477 0,219 0,030  -0,279 0,154 0,070
Satisfaction with democracy -0,429 0,167 0,010  -0,258 0,117 0,027
Quartiles of mean income 
dummies:        
Lowest -0,256 0,164 0,119  -0,499 0,137 0,000
Second 0,142 0,153 0,355  -0,137 0,125 0,274
Third 0,022 0,162 0,892  0,245 0,118 0,037
Highest 0,097 0,156 0,535  0,260 0,113 0,022
Farmer -0,358 0,262 0,171  -0,853 0,238 0,000
Market economy positive 0,397 0,138 0,004  0,428 0,105 0,000
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 Dependent variable: 
FIDESZ-
MPP 
1998    
FIDESZ-
MPP-MDF 
2002   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sign. 
Catholic 0,106 0,143 0,461  0,424 0,121 0,000
Calvinist -0,023 0,179 0,896  0,061 0,156 0,697
Secular -0,195 0,255 0,446  -0,215 0,169 0,201
Religiosity 0,449 0,183 0,014  0,812 0,188 0,000
Nationalism  0,438 0,137 0,001  0,102 0,149 0,494
Urban 0,310 0,145 0,033  -0,512 0,144 0,000
Capitol and surroundings  -0,270 0,178 0,130     
Nostalgia -0,302 0,141 0,032     
Satisfaction with democracy 1,033 0,143 0,000     
Quartiles of mean income dummies:        
Lowest -1,191 0,244 0,000  -0,029 0,197 0,882
Second -0,132 0,139 0,340  -0,029 0,129 0,824
Third 0,659 0,141 0,000  -0,032 0,120 0,791
Highest 0,957 0,711 0,178  0,192 0,233 0,410
Farmer 0,233 0,144 0,105  0,254 0,270 0,347
Market economy positive 0,575 0,147 0,000  0,043 0,153 0,778
 
 
Dependent variable: 
MSZP 
1990    
MZSP 
1994   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  B S.E. Sig. 
Catholic -0,407 0,153 0,008  -0,383 0,101 0,000
Calvinist -0,274 0,249 0,273  0,057 0,151 0,707
Secular 0,461 0,141 0,001  0,362 0,094 0,000
Religiosity -0,928 0,274 0,001  -1,166 0,196 0,000
Nationalism  0,496 0,146 0,001  0,460 0,097 0,000
Urban 0,340 0,151 0,024  0,246 0,100 0,014
Capitol and surroundings  0,194 0,165 0,238  0,239 0,111 0,031
Nostalgia 1,714 0,148 0,000  1,287 0,110 0,000
Satisfaction with democracy -0,324 0,166 0,051  -0,646 0,111 0,000
Quartiles of mean income 
dummies:       
Lowest -0,318 0,169 0,060  -0,503 0,121 0,000
Second 0,171 0,155 0,269  0,069 0,108 0,526
Third -0,241 0,175 0,169  0,050 0,109 0,649
Highest 0,316 0,153 0,038  0,302 0,102 0,003
Farmer -0,915 0,331 0,006  -0,312 0,175 0,074
Market economy positive -0,402 0,149 0,007  -0,506 0,099 0,000
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Dependent variable: 
MSZP 
1998   
 MSZP 
2002   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sign. 
Catholic 0,042 0,159 0,794 -0,203 0,119 0,087
Calvinist 0,028 0,197 0,889 -0,102 0,153 0,504
Secular 0,072 0,277 0,796 0,168 0,163 0,303
Religiosity -0,727 0,239 0,008 -0,848 0,196 0,000
Nationalism  -0,115 0,153 0,453 0,120 0,148 0,418
Urban -0,299 0,169 0,076 0,219 0,137 0,109
Capitol and surroundings  0,097 0,190 0,610    
Nostalgia 1,152 0,190 0,000    
Satisfaction with democracy -0,690 0,153 0,000    
Quartiles of mean income dummies:        
Lowest 0,733 0,217 0,001 0,270 0,195 0,165
Second 0,137 0,154 0,377 0,225 0,127 0,076
Third -0,497 0,162 0,002 -0,220 0,118 0,063
Highest -20,666 20096,485 0,999 -0,244 0,233 0,295
Farmer -0,140 0,163 0,391 -0,028 0,270 0,919
Market economy positive -0,366 0,170 0,031 -0,157 0,151 0,297
 
 
Dependent variable: 
MDF  
1990    
MDF 
1994   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic 0,450 0,145 0,002  0,376 0,133 0,005
Calvinist 0,735 0,191 0,000  0,827 0,171 0,000
Secular -0,889 0,157 0,000  -0,877 0,144 0,000
Religiosity 0,461 0,181 0,011  0,573 0,166 0,001
Nationalism  -0,256 0,144 0,075  -0,293 0,132 0,026
Urban -0,042 0,148 0,778  0,036 0,137 0,791
Capitol and surroundings  0,480 0,161 0,003  0,411 0,149 0,006
Nostalgia -0,502 0,232 0,031  -0,399 0,204 0,051
Satisfaction with democracy 1,283 0,146 0,000  1,294 0,135 0,000
Quartiles of mean income dummies:        
Lowest 0,303 0,155 0,050  0,399 0,143 0,005
Second -0,061 0,167 0,713  0,108 0,150 0,473
Third -0,115 0,175 0,510  -0,191 0,161 0,235
Highest -0,155 0,172 0,367  -0,331 0,158 0,037
Farmer 0,331 0,218 0,129  0,193 0,211 0,362
Market economy positive 0,710 0,145 0,000  0,599 0,132 0,000
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105
Dependent variable: 
KDNP  
1990    
KDNP 
1994   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic 1,880 0,240 0,000  1,520 0,207 0,000
Calvinist -0,870 0,463 0,060  -0,157 0,238 0,626
Secular -1,751 0,282 0,000  -1,638 0,253 0,000
Religiosity 2,303 0,209 0,000  2,477 0,197 0,000
Nationalism  -0,084 0,201 0,676  0,024 0,188 0,897
Urban -0,218 0,203 0,282  0,125 0,198 0,528
Capitol and surroundings  0,084 0,242 0,728  0,060 0,227 0,790
Nostalgia -0,821 0,372 0,027  -1,294 0,422 0,002
Satisfaction with democracy 0,366 0,210 0,082  0,671 0,188 0,000
Quartiles of mean income dummies:        
Lowest 0,540 0,208 0,009  0,610 0,196 0,002
Second -0,142 0,237 0,550  -0,090 0,223 0,687
Third -0,115 0,245 0,639  0,021 0,218 0,923
Highest -0,400 0,258 0,121  -0,645 0,249 0,009
Farmer 0,093 0,326 0,776  0,491 0,270 0,069
Market economy positive -0,159 0,208 0,445  0,117 0,188 0,535
 
Dependent variable: 
FKGP 
1990    
FKGP 
94   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic 0,185 0,152 0,222  0,265 0,175 0,130
Calvinist 0,687 0,199 0,001  0,361 0,249 0,148
Secular -0,638 0,157 0,000  -0,376 0,177 0,034
Religiosity 0,667 0,179 0,000  0,508 0,219 0,020
Nationalism  -0,213 0,149 0,153  -0,539 0,175 0,002
Urban -0,950 0,152 0,000  -0,894 0,175 0,000
Capitol and surroundings  -1,561 0,314 0,000  -1,274 0,331 0,000
Nostalgia -1,300 0,330 0,000  -1,666 0,458 0,000
Satisfaction with democracy 0,109 0,163 0,502  0,013 0,185 0,946
Quartiles of mean income dummies:        
Lowest 0,649 0,154 0,000  0,885 0,177 0,000
Second 0,351 0,161 0,029  0,160 0,195 0,411
Third -0,543 0,204 0,008  -0,390 0,225 0,083
Highest -0,817 0,216 0,000  -0,974 0,256 0,000
Farmer 1,219 0,184 0,000  0,984 0,219 0,000
Market economy positive -0,132 0,154 0,390  0,077 0,175 0,661
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 Dependent variable: 
FKGP 
1998   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic 0,119 0,305 0,697
Calvinist -0,211 0,396 0,594
Secular -0,835 0,734 0,255
Religiosity 0,922 0,324 0,004
Nationalism  -0,706 0,314 0,025
Urban 1,051 0,288 0,000
Capitol and surroundings  -0,663 0,444 0,135
Nostalgia -0,402 0,295 0,174
Satisfaction with democracy 0,058 0,286 0,840
Quartiles of mean income 
dummies:    
Lowest 0,188 0,402 0,640
Second 0,330 0,294 0,262
Third -0,442 0,318 0,165
Highest -18,606 20096,485 0,999
Farmer 0,947 0,287 0,001
Market economy positive -0,069 0,316 0,828
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Romania 
 
Dependent variable FSN 1990    FDSN 1992   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic  -2,161 0,458 0,000  -1,677 0,477 0,000
Protestant      -3,436 1,012 0,001
Orthodox 1,708 0,211 0,000  2,066 0,283 0,000
Calvinist  -2,390 0,548 0,000     
Secular  -0,368 0,275 0,180  0,040 0,513 0,938
Religiosity  0,098 0,175 0,575  -0,027 0,186 0,887
Titular national     2,669 0,465 0,000
Hungarian minority     -3,115 0,591 0,000
Urban -1,043 0,143 0,000  -0,606 0,166 0,000
Capitol and surroundings      -0,008 0,260 0,976
Nostalgia 0,658 0,194 0,001  0,047 0,161 0,771
Satisfaction with democracy 1,224 0,148 0,000  0,798 0,165 0,000
Income:        
Lowest quartile 0,256 0,196 0,191  -0,532 0,179 0,003
Second quartile 0,002 0,146 0,991  -0,236 0,180 0,190
Third quartile -0,278 0,178 0,118  0,689 0,188 0,000
Highest quartile 0,200 0,353 0,571  0,226 0,195 0,246
Farmer 0,674 0,141 0,000  -0,048 0,869 0,003
Market economy positive -1,294 0,161 0,000  -0,655 0,181 0,000
 
Dependent variable FSN 1992   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic       -0,640 0,736 0,385
Protestant  -1,416 1,020 0,165
Orthodox 1,097 0,479 0,022
Calvinist  0,617 0,767 0,421
Secular  0,417 0,321 0,194
Religiosity     
Titular national 1,547 0,729 0,034
Hungarian minority -2,184 1,015 0,031
Urban -0,467 0,323 0,149
Capitol and surroundings  -1,753 1,018 0,085
Nostalgia 0,060 0,300 0,841
Satisfaction with democracy 0,661 0,294 0,024
Income:    
Lowest quartile 0,210 0,313 0,504
Second quartile -0,155 0,345 0,652
Third quartile 0,237 0,347 0,495
Highest quartile -0,404 0,420 0,336
Farmer -18,598 -18,598 0,999
Market economy positive 0,040 0,359 0,910
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Dependent variable 
PDSR  
1996    
PDSR  
2000   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic  -0,999 0,384 0,009  -1,833 0,443 0,000
Protestant      -20,920 10377,780 0,998
Orthodox 1,249 0,292 0,000  1,341 0,284 0,000
Calvinist         
Secular         
Religiosity  -1,673 1,035 0,106  -0,487 0,251 0,053
Titular national 0,013 0,165 0,938  0,016 0,201 0,935
Hungarian minority        
Urban 1,631 0,430 0,000  1,423 0,299 0,000
Capitol and surroundings      0,152 0,612 0,804
Nostalgia -2,564 0,721 0,000  -2,751 0,600 0,000
Satisfaction with 
democracy 0,247 0,146 0,092  1,170 0,182 0,000
Income: -0,440 0,162 0,007  -0,369 0,174 0,034
Lowest quartile     0,078 0,260 0,763
Second quartile 0,675 0,163 0,000  1,145 0,186 0,000
Third quartile -0,404 0,207 0,052  -0,514 0,222 0,021
Highest quartile        
Farmer 0,284 0,150 0,058  0,732 0,226 0,001
Market economy positive -0,139 0,149 0,350  0,224 0,188 0,235
Catholic  -0,491 0,296 0,097  -0,062 0,190 0,745
Protestant  0,033 0,589 0,955  -0,891 0,246 0,000
Orthodox 0,881 0,183 0,000  0,701 0,307 0,022
Calvinist  -0,992 0,160 0,000  -1,169 0,198 0,000
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Dependent variable:  
PNL 
1990   
 CDR 
1992   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic  -0,333 0,615 0,588 -0,302 0,350 0,389
Protestant     1,132 0,286 0,000
Orthodox 0,032 0,295 0,913 -0,327 0,189 0,085
Calvinist  -0,093 0,622 0,881     
Secular  0,406 0,363 0,263 0,162 0,539 0,764
Religiosity  -1,294 0,376 0,001 -0,052 0,202 0,795
Titular national    0,049 0,233 0,833
Hungarian minority    -0,047 0,240 0,846
Urban 1,123 0,217 0,000 0,596 0,169 0,000
Capitol and surroundings     0,562 0,258 0,030
Nostalgia -0,325 0,277 0,241 0,221 0,178 0,213
Satisfaction with democracy -1,411 0,237 0,000 -1,346 0,229 0,000
Income:        
Lowest quartile -0,317 0,303 0,295 0,317 0,181 0,080
Second quartile 0,213 0,218 0,327 -0,204 0,196 0,297
Third quartile 0,067 0,262 0,799 -0,426 0,225 0,058
Highest quartile -0,534 0,610 0,381 0,225 0,208 0,279
Farmer -0,866 0,215 0,000 1,044 0,821 0,204
Market economy positive 1,298 0,234 0,000 0,466 0,213 0,029
 
Dependent variable:  
CDR 
1996    
PNL 
2000   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic  -0,762 0,263 0,004  -0,938 1,031 0,363
Protestant      -18,178 10377,780 0,999
Orthodox 0,268 0,184 0,147  -0,241 0,514 0,638
Calvinist  0,018 0,644 0,035  0,069 0,559 0,902
Secular  0,348 0,147 0,018  -0,242 0,510 0,635
Religiosity  0,659 0,232 0,004  0,787 0,747 0,292
Titular national -0,975 0,266 0,000  -18,265 5277,596 0,997
Hungarian minority 0,001 0,129 0,995  -1,350 0,476 0,005
Urban 0,241 0,136 0,077  -0,025 0,412 0,953
Capitol and surroundings      -0,042 0,629 0,947
Nostalgia -0,622 0,138 0,000  -0,883 0,511 0,084
Satisfaction with democracy 0,614 0,175 0,000  0,195 0,484 0,687
Income:        
Lowest quartile 0,249 0,134 0,063  -0,111 0,557 0,842
Second quartile -0,325 0,131 0,013  -0,278 0,478 0,560
Third quartile 0,272 0,235 0,248  -0,521 0,509 0,306
Highest quartile -0,014 0,522 0,979  0,577 0,460 0,209
Farmer 0,019 0,176 0,915  -18,249 5684,144 0,997
Market economy positive 0,661 0,143 0,000  1,180 0,623 0,058
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Dependent variable:  
UDMR  
1990    
UDMR 
1992   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic  3,859 0,410 0,000  2,109 0,321 0,000
Protestant      1,515 0,335 0,000
Orthodox -5,320 0,606 0,000  -20,764 1682,023 0,990
Calvinist  4,160 0,473 0,000     
Secular  -0,164 0,610 0,788  -18,943 9748,227 0,998
Religiosity  0,993 0,290 0,001  0,709 0,270 0,009
Titular national     -5,340 0,536 0,000
Hungarian minority     5,531 0,540 0,000
Urban 0,602 0,284 0,034  0,235 0,257 0,360
Capitol and surroundings      -1,366 0,728 0,061
Nostalgia -0,669 0,441 0,129  0,758 0,306 0,013
Satisfaction with democracy -0,849 0,299 0,004  0,363 0,263 0,168
Income:        
Lowest quartile -0,649 0,481 0,177  0,844 0,270 0,002
Second quartile 0,317 0,308 0,304  0,003 0,299 0,993
Third quartile 0,179 0,354 0,612  -0,472 0,374 0,206
Highest quartile -0,892 1,024 0,383  -1,097 0,477 0,021
Farmer -0,488 0,287 0,089  0,683 1,103 0,536
Market economy positive 2,623 0,606 0,000  0,539 0,359 0,133
 
Dependent variable:  
UDMR 
1996    
UDMR 
2000   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic  4,153 0,371 0,000  4,271 0,417 0,000
Protestant      2,803 0,546 0,000
Orthodox -5,265 0,731 0,000  -21,072 1867,926 0,991
Calvinist  0,338 1,044 0,747  0,584 0,382 0,126
Secular  -1,328 0,529 0,012  1,122 0,324 0,001
Religiosity  -21,296 1340,511 0,987  -21,180 1857,921 0,991
Titular national 21,791 1328,739 0,987  22,256 1802,901 0,990
Hungarian minority -3,710 1,014 0,000  -2,094 0,449 0,000
Urban -1,680 0,528 0,001  -0,237 0,318 0,457
Capitol and surroundings      -18,871 4838,665 0,997
Nostalgia -0,585 0,330 0,077  -1,515 0,488 0,002
Satisfaction with 
democracy -0,180 0,420 0,668  -0,176 0,408 0,666
Income:        
Lowest quartile -0,711 0,373 0,057  -0,510 0,489 0,298
Second quartile 0,760 0,346 0,028  0,172 0,340 0,613
Third quartile -0,141 0,612 0,817  -0,068 0,354 0,847
Highest quartile -18,079 10377,780 0,999  0,464 0,368 0,208
Farmer -0,658 0,531 0,216  0,777 0,437 0,075
Market economy positive -1,061 0,344 0,002  0,777 0,427 0,069
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 Dependent variable 
PUNR 
1992    
PUNR 
1996   
Independent variables: b S.E sign  b S.E sign 
Catholic  0,610 0,460 0,185  -0,219 1,037 0,832
Protestant  0,338 0,493 0,493  -17,220 40192,970 1,000
Orthodox 0,029 0,341 0,932  -0,583 0,575 0,310
Calvinist  -18,635 9748,227 0,998  -17,236 10048,243 0,999
Secular  -0,324 0,378 0,391  0,087 0,531 0,869
Religiosity  0,344 0,447 0,441  17,312 4334,119 0,997
Titular national -0,253 0,447 0,571  -17,294 4803,979 0,997
Hungarian minority     -0,322 0,488 0,509
Urban -0,201 0,306 0,510  0,713 0,476 0,134
Capitol and surroundings  -1,045 0,732 0,153     
Nostalgia -1,109 0,314 0,000   0,208 0,498 0,676
Satisfaction with democracy -0,073 0,318 0,819  -1,330 1,032 0,198
Income:        
Lowest quartile 0,210 0,313 0,504  -1,656 0,756 0,028
Second quartile 0,381 0,314 0,226  1,601 0,640 0,012
Third quartile -0,311 0,399 0,436  -0,430 1,037 0,678
Highest quartile -0,592 0,447 0,186  -17,224 10377,780 0,999
Farmer -18,619 16408,711 0,999  -17,391 3249,409 0,996
Market economy positive -0,238 0,343 0,488  0,839 0,655 0,201
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Bulgaria 
Dependent variable 
SDS 
1991    
SDS 
1994   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Secular -0,626 0,084 0,000     
Religiosity -0,103 0,145 0,477     
Titular national 0,756 0,117 0,000  0,677 0,340 0,047
Rroma minority -0,633 0,242 0,009  -1,798 1,029 0,081
Turkish minority -1,268 0,193 0,000  -0,558 0,396 0,158
Bulgarian muslim -0,260 0,260 0,317     
Nationalism is negative 0,222 0,075 0,003     
Urban 0,762 0,075 0,000  0,943 0,200 0,000
Capitol and surroundings  0,656 0,100 0,000  1,235 0,250 0,000
Nostalgia -1,549 0,198 0,000  0,052 0,212 0,807
Satisfaction with democracy 0,500 0,079 0,000  0,040 0,303 0,895
Quartiles of mean income dummies        
Lowest     -0,378 0,228 0,097
Second 0,694 0,075 0,000  -0,254 0,212 0,231
Third -0,186 0,079 0,019  0,360 0,237 0,128
Highest -0,828 0,099 0,000  0,882 0,302 0,004
Farmer -0,939 0,138 0,000  -1,798 1,029 0,081
Market economy positive  1,627 0,082 0,000  1,236 0,201 0,000
 
Dependent variable 
SDS 
1997    
SDS 
2001   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic      -19,994 23205,422 0,999
Protestant      0,527 1,229 0,668
Orthodox  0,898 0,197 0,000  0,272 0,266 0,305
Muslim  -1,122 0,244 0,000  -0,705 0,396 0,075
Secular  -1,116 0,506 0,027  0,131 0,352 0,709
Religiosity  -0,301 0,208 0,148  0,348 0,462 0,452
Titular national 1,318 0,233 0,000  0,854 0,393 0,030
Rroma minority -0,946 0,388 0,015  -0,293 0,789 0,710
Turkish minority -1,469 0,293 0,000  -1,034 0,485 0,033
Nationalism is negative -0,060 0,176 0,735  -0,123 0,214 0,566
Urban  0,931 0,154 0,000  0,563 0,215 0,009
Capitol and surroundings  0,906 0,229 0,000  1,202 0,263 0,000
Nostalgia -0,788 0,155 0,000     
Satisfaction with democracy 1,509 0,217 0,000     
Quartiles of mean income dummies        
Lowest -0,848 0,162 0,000  -0,939 0,355 0,008
Second 0,541 0,151 0,000  -0,790 0,275 0,004
Third 0,975 0,340 0,004  0,013 0,214 0,952
Highest 1,926 1,098 0,079  0,605 0,240 0,012
Farmer -0,422 0,155 0,006  0,527 1,229 0,668
Market economy positive 1,470 0,194 0,000     
Optimist own economic future     0,079 0,238 0,739
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 Dependent variable 
BSP 
1991    
BSP 
1994   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Religiosity -0,563 0,150 0,000     
Titular national 0,349 0,106 0,001  0,862 0,252 0,001 
Rroma minority 0,546 0,209 0,009  1,119 0,519 0,031 
Turkish minority -1,193 0,177 0,000  -1,689 0,360 0,000 
Bulgarian muslim 0,347 0,242 0,151     
Nationalism is negative -0,145 0,074 0,051     
Urban -0,215 0,073 0,003  -0,824 0,181 0,000 
Capitol and surroundings  -0,228 0,103 0,026  -1,194 0,265 0,000 
Nostalgia  1,490 0,149 0,000  -0,734 0,183 0,000 
Satisfaction with democracy -0,140 0,075 0,062  -0,865 0,269 0,001 
Quartiles of mean income dummies        
Lowest     0,516 0,181 0,004 
Second -0,630 0,075 0,000  0,205 0,171 0,229 
Third 0,122 0,076 0,109  -0,594 0,206 0,004 
Highest 0,733 0,087 0,000  -0,915 0,302 0,002 
Farmer 0,051 0,114 0,655  -0,179 0,445 0,687 
Market economy positive -1,297 0,077 0,000  -1,425 0,176 0,000 
 
Dependent variable 
BSP 
1997   
 BSP 
2001   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic     0,562 1,230 0,647
Protestant    -19,959 23205,422 0,999
Orthodox 0,363 0,219 0,098 0,375 0,274 0,171
Muslim  -1,114 0,319 0,000 -1,804 0,603 0,003
Secular  1,415 0,413 0,001 -18,728 5801,356 0,997
Religiosity -0,010 0,233 0,967 -1,936 1,027 0,059
Titular national -0,103 0,219 0,639 1,164 0,443 0,009
Rroma minority 1,469 0,335 0,000 0,710 0,636 0,264
Turkish minority -0,857 0,323 0,008 -2,743 1,016 0,007
Nationalism 0,386 0,193 0,045 0,500 0,217 0,021
Urban -0,782 0,179 0,000 -0,756 0,230 0,001
Capitol and surroundings dummy -1,685 0,431 0,000 -0,470 0,335 0,161
Nostalgia 0,854 0,175 0,000     
Satisfaction with democracy -1,420 0,318 0,000     
Quartiles of mean income 
dummies    
 
   
Lowest 1,009 0,176 0,000  0,682 0,228 0,003
Second -0,584 0,174 0,001 0,514 0,264 0,052
Third -1,452 0,607 0,017 0,216 0,216 0,318
Highest -20,101 16408,711 0,999 -1,255 0,351 0,000
Farmer 0,194 0,181 0,284     
Market economy positive -1,248 0,252 0,000     
Optimist own economic future    -1,041 0,299 0,000
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Dependent variable DPS 91    DPS 94   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Secular  -1,234 0,262 0,000     
Religiosity 1,576 0,209 0,000     
Titular national -4,908 0,369 0,000  -4,225 0,441 0,000
Rroma minority 0,544 0,403 0,177  0,301 0,760 0,692
Turkish minority 5,338 0,273 0,000  4,622 0,428 0,000
Bulgarian muslim -0,053 0,597 0,929     
Nationalism is negative -0,098 0,178 0,582     
Urban -2,196 0,304 0,000  -2,300 0,729 0,002
Capitol and surroundings  -2,157 0,586 0,000  -18,813 4493,711 0,997
Nostalgia -1,113 0,512 0,030  0,485 0,388 0,211
Satisfaction with democracy -0,732 0,173 0,000  0,756 0,397 0,057
Quartiles of mean income dummies        
Lowest     0,510 0,318 0,109
Second -0,478 0,184 0,010  0,257 0,315 0,414
Third 0,236 0,177 0,182  -1,361 0,607 0,025
Highest 0,399 0,399 0,037  -0,814 0,738 0,270
Farmer 1,875 0,181 0,000  1,157 0,579 0,046
Market economy positive -0,909 0,187 0,000  -1,341 0,420 0,001
 
Dependent variable DPS 1997    
DPS 
2001   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig.  b S.E. Sig. 
Catholic      -18,625 23205,422 0,999
Protestant -5,760 1,014 0,000  -4,357 0,738 0,000
Orthodox 6,541 1,019 0,000  5,627 0,756 0,000
Muslim  -18,807 8038,594 0,998  -18,728 5801,356 0,997
Secular  1,358 0,289 0,000  0,197 0,76 0,796
Religiosity -3,827 0,398 0,000  -4,554 0,56 0,000
Titular national -18,828 6436,026 0,998  -18,642 12118,636 0,999
Turkish minority 4,614 0,414 0,000  5,258 0,583 0,000
Rroma minority -2,281 0,725 0,002  -1,775 0,492 0,000
Nationalism -3,666 1,012 0,000  -1,662 0,492 0,001
Capitol and surroundings 
dummy -18,916 4190,407 0,996  -1,864 1,022 0,068
Nostalgia -0,480 0,286 0,093     
Satisfaction with democracy -2,319 1,018 0,023     
Quartiles of mean income 
dummies        
Lowest 0,766 0,273 0,005  0,614 0,361 0,089
Second -0,642 0,280 0,022  0,866 0,385 0,025
Third -18,830 6355,067 0,998  -0,198 0,357 0,580
Highest -18,778 16408,711 0,999  -1,611 0,736 0,029
Farmer 1,543 0,410 0,000  1,916 1,238 0,122
Market economy positive -0,877 0,444 0,048     
Optimist own economic future     -1,104 0,541 0,041
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 Dependent variable 
BZNS-DP 
1994   
Independent variables: B S.E. Sig. 
Titular national 1,905 1,019 0,062 
Rroma minority -0,418 1,037 0,687 
Turkish minority -18,712 5469,570 0,997 
Urban 0,365 0,329 0,267 
Capitol and surroundings  0,778 0,383 0,042 
Nostalgia 0,863 0,366 0,018 
Satisfaction with democracy 1,116 0,376 0,003 
Quartiles of mean income dummies    
Lowest -0,595 0,387 0,124 
Second 0,247 0,322 0,443 
Third 0,311 0,367 0,396 
Highest 0,299 0,499 0,549 
Farmer 1,522 0,539 0,005 
Market economy positive 0,920 0,324 0,004 
 
Dependent variable 
NMS 
2001   
Independent variables: b S.E Sign. 
Catholic  -0,276 1,228 0,822 
Protestant 1,119 1,228 0,362 
Orthodox 0,664 0,232 0,004 
Muslim  -0,737 0,314 0,019 
Secular  -0,515 0,332 0,121 
Religiosity 0,441 0,419 0,293 
Titular national 0,556 0,289 0,054 
Rroma minority -0,144 0,634 0,820 
Turkish minority -0,776 0,346 0,025 
Nationalism 0,025 0,183 0,890 
Urban 0,132 0,184 0,471 
Capitol and surroundings dummy -0,848 0,288 0,003 
Quartiles of mean income dummies    
Lowest 0,109 0,241 0,650 
Second 0,031 0,184 0,867 
Third -0,015 0,205 0,941 
Highest -0,032 0,221 0,886 
Optimist own economic future 0,748 0,205 0,000 
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Dependent variable BBB 1994   
Independent variables: b S.E. Sig. 
Titular national 1,708 1,021 0,094 
Rroma minority -18,460 8770,825 0,998 
Turkish minority -18,521 5469,570 0,997 
Urban 0,179 0,365 0,624 
Capitol and surroundings dummy 0,083 0,498 0,868 
Nostalgia 0,852 0,398 0,032 
Satisfaction with democracy 0,263 0,500 0,599 
Quartiles of mean income dummies    
Lowest -0,600 0,435 0,168 
Second -0,148 0,372 0,691 
Third 0,195 0,420 0,642 
Highest 0,837 0,476 0,079 
Farmer -0,223 1,039 0,830 
Market economy positive 1,193 0,364 0,001 
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Election: Hungary 1990 Hungary 1994 Hungary 1998 Hungary 2002 
Data source: Election Studies. ZA1945. Consolidation of Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe 1997 
Consolidation of Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe 1997 
European Social Survey 2002 
(Interviews conducted in 2003) 
Dependent variable: Which party did you vote for in 
1990? (All relevant parties 
dichotomised) 
Which party did you vote for in 
1994? (All relevant parties 
dichotomised) 
Which party do you intend to vote 
for in the next election? 
(All relevant parties dichotomised) 
Which party did you vote for in the 
last national election? (All relevant 
parties dichotomised) 
Independent variables:     
Religion Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Calvinist (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Catholic at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Calvinist at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Catholic at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Calvinist at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Calvinist (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Not at all religious (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Religiousity Weekly or more frequent church 
attendance (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Do you follow church regularly? 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
Do you follow  church regularly 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
No data available 
Minority  Not included Not included Not included Not included 
Nationalism Statement: Nationalism is 
harmful (1=Agree, 0=Disagree) 
How proud are you of your 
citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All 
other values) 
How proud are you of your 
citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All 
other values) 
Statement: Better if almost all share 
values and traditions (1=Strongly 
agree, 0 
=All other values) 
Urban-rural Community size (1=population 
more than 50 000, 0=population 
less than 50 000) 
Community size (1=population 
more than 50 000, 0=population 
less than 50 000) 
Community size (1=population 
more than 50 000, 0=population 
less than 50 000) 
Community size (1=population more 
than 50 000, 0=population less than 
50 000) 
Appendix 4. Codebooks for logistic regression models 
Hungary 
 
  
Cont.  Hungary 1990 Hungary 1994 Hungary 1998 Hungary 2000 
Capitol and surroundings Area of residence (Capitol and 
surrounding=1, All other 
areas=0) 
Area of residence (Capitol and 
surrounding=1, All other areas=0) 
Area of residence (Capitol and 
surrounding=1, All other areas=0) 
No data available 
Nostalgia 1 Previous member of communist 
party (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Statement: Communism is a good 
idea (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Statement: Communism is a good 
idea (1=Yes, 0=No) 
No data available 
Nostalgia 2 Satisfaction with democracy 
(1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 
0=All other values) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
1=rated 5-10 on ten point scale, 
0=rated 0-4 on ten point scale) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
1=rated 5-10 on ten point scale, 
0=rated 0-4 on ten point scale) 
No data available 
Income Income divided in four quartiles, 
which all were dichotomised23 
Income divided in four quartiles, 
which all were dichotomised 
Income divided in four quartiles, 
which all were dichotomised 
How are you living on present 
income? Four categories were 
dichotomised: 
-very difficult 
-difficult 
-coping 
-comfortably 
Agrarian Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 
0=No) 
Agricultural production main 
source of income (1= Yes, 0=No) 
Agricultural production main 
source of income (1= Yes, 0=No) 
Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 0=No 
Left-right Statement: Privatisation is 
positive (1=Agree, 0=Disagree) 
Statement: Free market is right 
(1=Agree, 0=Disagree) 
Statement: Free market is right 
(1=Agree, 0=Disagree) 
Statement: Government should not 
intervene in economy (1=Agree, 
0=Disagree) 
 
                                                 
23 All four dichotomies were not included simultaneously in multivariate models.  
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Romania 
 
Election: Romania 1990 Romania 1992 Romania 1996 Romania 2000 
Data source: Post-Communist Citizen Survey 
1990-92. Election studies 
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 
3 
Consolidation of Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe 1997 
European Value Survey 1999 
Dependent variable: Which party did you vote for in 
1990? (All relevant parties 
dichotomised) 
Which party did you vote for in 
1992? (All relevant parties 
dichotomised) 
Which party do you intend to vote 
for in the next election? 
(All relevant parties dichotomised) 
Which party do you intend to vote 
for in the next election? 
(All relevant parties dichotomised) 
Independent variables:     
Religion Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Calvinist (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Catholic at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Calvinist at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Catholic at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Calvinist at birth (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Calvinist (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Not at all religious (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Religiousity Do you follow the teachings of 
the church? (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Do you follow church regularly? 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
Do you follow  church regularly 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
Weekly or more frequent church 
attendance (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Minority  No data available What is your primary language?  
Hungarian and Romanian 
dichotomised 
What is your primary language?  
Hungarian and Romanian 
dichotomised 
What is your primary language?  
Hungarian and Romanian 
dichotomised 
Nationalism No data available No data available How proud are you of your 
citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All 
other values) 
How proud are you of your 
citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All 
other values) 
Urban-rural Community size (1=population 
more than 50 000, 0=population 
less than 50 000) 
Community size (1=population 
more than 50 000, 0=population 
less than 50 000) 
Community size (1=population 
more than 50 000, 0=population 
less than 50 000) 
Community size (1=population more 
than 50 000, 0=population less than 
50 000) 
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Cont.  Romania 1990 Romania 1992 Romania 1996 Romania 2000 
Capitol and surroundings No data available Area of residence (Capitol and 
surrounding=1, All other areas=0) 
No data available Area of residence (Capitol and 
surrounding=1, All other areas=0) 
Nostalgia 1 Statement: Speed of change is 
too fast (1=Agree, 0=All other 
values) 
Statement: Previous system was 
bad (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Statement: Communism is a good 
idea (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Do you view the political system as 
good? (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Nostalgia 2 Satisfaction with democracy 
(1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 
0=All other values) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
(1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 
0=All other values) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
1=rated 5-10 on ten point scale, 
0=rated 0-4 on ten point scale) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
(1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 0=All 
other values) 
Income Income divided in four quartiles, 
which all were dichotomised24 
Income divided in four quartiles, 
which all were dichotomised 
Income divided in four quartiles, 
which all were dichotomised 
Income divided in four quartiles, 
which all were dichotomised 
Agrarian Do you produce agricultural 
goods? (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 
0=No) 
Agricultural production main 
source of income (1= Yes, 0=No) 
Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 0=No 
Left-right Statement: Capitalist economy is 
best for the country (1=Agree, 
0=Disagree) 
Statement: Capitalist economy is 
best for the country (1=Agree, 
0=Disagree) 
Statement: Free market is right 
(1=Agree, 0=Disagree) 
Statement: Private ownership is 
good (1=Agree, 0=Disagree) 
 
                                                 
24 All four dichotomies were not included simultaneously in multivariate models.  
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Bulgaria 
 
Election: Bulgaria 1991 Bulgaria 1994 Bulgaria 1997 Bulgaria 2001 
Data source: Election Studies. ZA study 
number 1945. 
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 
6 
Consolidation of Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe 1997 
European Value Survey 1999 
Dependent variable: Which party did you vote for in 
1990? (All relevant parties 
dichotomised) 
Which party did you vote for in 
1994? (All relevant parties 
dichotomised) 
Which party do you intend to vote 
for in the next election? 
(All relevant parties dichotomised) 
Which party do you intend to vote 
for in the next election? 
(All relevant parties dichotomised) 
Independent variables:     
Religion Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Other data not available 
Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Other data not available 
Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Muslim (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Secular (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Orthodox (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Catholic (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Muslim (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Not at all religious (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Religiousity Weekly or more frequent church 
attendance (1=Yes, 0=No) 
No data available Do you follow  church regularly 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
Weekly or more frequent church 
attendance (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Ethnic minority  What is your primary language?  
Turkish, Rroma and Bulgarian 
dichotomised 
What is your primary language?  
Turkish, Rroma and Bulgarian 
dichotomised 
What is your primary language?  
Turkish, Rroma and Bulgarian 
dichotomised 
What is your primary language?  
Turkish, Rroma and Bulgarian 
dichotomised 
Nationalism Statement: Etnic relations are 
bad (1=Agree, 0=Disagree) 
No data available How proud are you of your 
citizenship? (1=Very proud, 0=All 
other values) 
How proud are you of your 
nationality? (1=Very proud, 0=All 
other values) 
Urban-rural Community size (1=population 
more than 50 000, 0=population 
less than 50 000) 
Community size (1=population 
more than 50 000, 0=population 
less than 50 000) 
Community size (1=population 
more than 50 000, 0=population 
less than 50 000) 
Community size (1=population more 
than 50 000, 0=population less than 
50 000) 
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Cont.  Bulgaria 1991 Bulgaria 1994 Bulgaria 1997 Bulgaria 2001 
Capitol and surroundings Area of residence (Capitol and 
surrounding=1, All other 
areas=0) 
Area of residence (Capitol and 
surrounding=1, All other areas=0) 
Area of residence (Capitol and 
surrounding=1, All other areas=0) 
Residence in Sofia (Yes=1, No=0) 
Nostalgia 1 Statement: Former party 
leadership was good (1=Agree, 
0=All other values) 
Statement: Development is going 
the right direction (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Statement: Communism is a good 
idea (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Do you view the political system as 
good? (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Nostalgia 2 Statement: Multiparty system is 
good for the future 
(1=Agree, 0=All other values) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
(1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 
0=All other values) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
1=rated 5-10 on ten point scale, 
0=rated 0-4 on ten point scale) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
(1=Satisfied or very satisfied, 0=All 
other values) 
Income How satisfied are you with 
material welfare? (Three 
categories were dichotomised: 
Not satisfied, partly satisfied and 
satisfied) 
Income divided in four quartiles, 
which  were all dichotomised 
Income divided in four quartiles, 
which  were all dichotomised 
Income divided in four quartiles, 
which were all dichotomised 
Agrarian Are you an agricultural worker? 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 
0=No) 
Agricultural production main 
source of income (1= Yes, 0=No) 
Occupation: Farmer (1=Yes, 0=No 
Left-right Statement: A wide development 
of private property based 
business is good (1=Agree, 
0=Disagree) 
Statement: A free market is best 
for the country (1=Agree, 
0=Disagree) 
Statement: Free market is right 
(1=Agree, 0=Disagree) 
Statement: Private ownership is 
good (1=Agree, 0=Disagree) 
 
Expectations for the 
future (not a cleavage 
variable) 
Not included in the analysis Not included in the analysis Not included in the analysis Do you expect you economic future 
to be better? (1=Yes, 0=No) 
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